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THE SUBJECTIFIED AND RESISTING CORPOREAL BODY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING SUBJUGATION AND RESISTANCE

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Abstract

In this paper I propose a framework for the analysis of women’s corporeal subjugation and resistance in times of conflict. The benefit of such a framework is that the interrogation of concepts usually taken as pre-givens in international relations, such as ‘subject’ and ‘corporeality’ allows for a more full understanding of how subjectivities and resistances are intrinsically intertwined in conflicts. To establish this framework I rely upon a melding of concepts put forth by Foucault, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Agamben and Butler, and I demonstrate one possible site for such a framework through reference to Palestinian women’s subjugation in and resistance to occupation.
Practices and ‘eventualization’

Particularly in times of conflict, but in any situation where a group of people are classified as ‘the other’, Power is exercised in such a way that through it we are differently formed as subjects in relation to it. It is women who most often experience this differential subjugation, and state-centric, traditional methods in international relations which take ‘the subject’, ‘power’ and ‘gendered corporeality’ for granted will ultimately fail in the analysis of conflict because they have not interrogated the process of subjugation and subject formation which ultimately determines the trajectory of conflict. In order to more fully understand the formation, escalation and duration of seemingly intractable conflicts, we must first understand how power is exercised through subject formation and how subjects resist their subjugation. In other words, ‘the subject’ must be at the core of the framework for analysis (Foucault 1994, 327). Ideally, to truly understand the effects of differential subjugation, one should further narrow the criteria and examine women as subjects. I contend that a framework which centralizes the gendered corporeal subject will allow for an investigation of how women can be formed as subjects to power and how they enact resistance to that subjectification.

The aim of this paper is to explain how Foucault, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Agamben and Butler might inform the manner of investigating the ways in which gendered subjugation and resistance occur through and upon women’s corporeal bodies in times of conflict. In it I establish the theoretical framework of an analysis which seeks to extrapolate what constitutes a dispositif of subjugation and how that subjugation is challenged through the elements of a dispositif of resistance. Such an analysis is useful for situations wherein specific groups of women are subjugated with the aim of pacifying or exerting dominance over them, particularly in times of ethnic, religious or nationalist conflict, such as in Chechnya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan or Palestine. In explaining corporeal resistance vis-à-vis the way power acts upon corporeality this theoretical framework centralizes the claim that it is not possible to investigate either subjugation or resistance in isolation. They are not opposites, but rather each is necessary for the definition of the other. Moreso, I argue, subjectification and resistance cannot be examined effectively without an examination of corporeality. This paper will explain the theoretical framework necessary for examining the apparatuses of subjugation and resistance in relation to corporeality, with reference to the case study of Palestinian women living under occupation serving as the example of why such an approach can be enlightening.

1 Apparatus
Foucault maintained that his methods were aimed at uncovering practices\(^2\) that were not self-evident, but which emerged as just one of multiple possibilities. Furthermore, Foucault’s approach is concerned with how that particular practice emerged through the power/knowledge nexus. ‘To analyze regimes of practices means to analyze programs of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of jurisdiction) and codifying effects of regarding what is to be known (effects of veridiction)’ (Foucault 1991, 75). In other words, he aims to examine the relationship between power/knowledge. He goes on to argue that this process could be referred to as ‘eventualization’. He describes eventualization as the process of examining practices by taking the following as points of analysis: Firstly, practices are not self-evident, so the starting point of analysis is to stop constructing them as such. The next point should be to discover how the process came to appear as self-evident through connections, encounters, strategies, etc. Thirdly, using ‘causal multiplication’ which involves the analysis of an event or practice through the multiple processes which constitute it and finally, in such an analysis, as practices come to be broken down further and further, it is essential to examine them in regards to their ‘external relations of intelligibility’ or in other words, how the practice in question is more broadly related and intelligible to other practices (ibid., 76-77). Whilst Foucault was rarely explicit about his ‘methodology’ the above excerpt serves to illustrate that he employed myriad tactics in order to serve his goal of robbing the present of its necessity, in other words uncovering that practices should never be taken as the only inevitable result (Foucault, 1997). A dispositif is always contextual, so this paper in no way proposes that there can be one method for examining apparatuses. Instead, to understand a dispositif one must understand that it is not a theory but a collection of practices.

This paper, likewise, will employ myriad tactics to extrapolate what might broadly be conceived of as a ‘method’ for investigating dispositifs of subjugation and resistance as they relate to women’s corporeality. The first necessary steps are to formulate working definitions of ‘subject’ and ‘dispositif’ derived from definitions put forth by Foucault, Butler, Agamben and Deleuze. Next, the paper will focus more in-depth on Foucault’s notions of ‘archaeology’ and ‘genealogy’ in order to formulate more specific plans for how to investigate the dispositifs of subjugation and resistance. Finally, deriving from Merleau-Ponty and Butler, the paper will conclude with a detailed explanation of how and why a corporeal approach must be a cornerstone of the framework. The ensuing mélange of theories, approaches, methods and tools will be made clear in order to thoroughly explain how an investigation could be undertaken of women’s corporeal subjugation and corporeal resistance in times of conflict. To illustrate

\(^2\) Foucault’s interest in practices comes from their ‘interplay between a ‘code’ which rules ways of doing things and a production of true discourses which serve to found, justify and provide reasons and principles for these ways of doing things’ (Foucault 1991, 79) – in other words, practices function through power/knowledge.
one possible way in which this investigation can take place, reference will occasionally be made to Palestinian women’s corporeal subjugation and resistance

The Subject
There are countless ways in which one can become a ‘subject’ of power. One illustration of the multiplicity of subject positions we occupy occurs when we examine the contents of our wallets. Identification cards illustrate what states we are subjects of, drivers licenses show which road jurisdictions we can drive in, and thus what rules of the road we are subject to, visas or green cards tell of our temporary permission to reside in ‘other’ states, while maintaining that our positions in these states are precarious, insurance cards tell of our subject status in the medical field, credit cards provide proof that we are subjects of capitalism, even our ‘coffee loyalty’ cards can tell us about our relationship to our caffeine addiction. We are not ‘simple’ subjects of one kingdom or another, nor mere citizens of a particular nation-state. Instead, we inhabit multiple positions of subjectivity, these positions become visible depending on which way one casts one’s gaze. The subject positions we occupy are not mutually exclusive, one can be subectified by capitalism, the Republic of Ireland and Starbucks coffee at the same time, though these different subjectifications occur in and through different apparatuses. Taking the subject as a ‘pre-given’ in political analysis and failing to interrogate how one is formed as a subject is a failure to understand that the process of subjectification is inherently political (Butler 1995, 13). This project thus starts with an interrogation of ‘the subject’. For Foucault, the starting point of an analysis of the subject is this: ‘There is no sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of subject to be found everywhere. The subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation’ (Foucault 1988, 50). Herein lies one of the most important and liberating views of the subject as found in Foucault.

While much of his writing can be seen as proposing a very negative view of the capability of the subject to ‘resist’ subjugation, this outlines that subjects, for Foucault, are not as ‘docile’ as they may appear in works such as Discipline and Punish. Indeed, we are all exposed to multiple sites of subjugation, but acts of resistance can and do occur. This being said, because he argues that all manners of power/knowledge form the subject, in Foucault’s view, acts of liberation form us as subjects as well, albeit differently, through different practices and with different outcomes (Foucault 1994b). If one reads Foucault through a traditional sovereign state model of power, his views on the subject and subjugation must seem extremely pessimistic. However, if one begins with an understanding of how he conceptualises power, the notion that ‘resistance forms the subject’ sounds much less repressive. The argument often made, particularly by feminist scholars (Bartky, 1997; McNay 1991; Deveaux, 1995) is that Foucault leaves too little room for resistance or that he is ‘hostile’ to the subject. I counter that is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of
Foucault’s conceptualisation of power. Subjects are not inactive, because power is not applied to them; instead, subjects are that which though power is transmitted or exercised (Foucault 2003, 29). This view in fact imbues ‘the subject’ with far greater possibility of resistance than a sovereign state model which claims that power is ‘applied’ to a subject. As power and resistance are interlinked and resistance is always possible; ‘Power does not take life as its objective without revealing or giving rise to a life that resists power’ (Deleuze 1999, 78).

In The Use of Pleasure Foucault describes the subject in relation to itself. The subject is not only she who is subject to the control of someone else, but also she who is ‘tied to her own identity and self-knowledge’ (Foucault 1994, 331). Both are the result of the formation of the subject through power. There is no possibility of a sovereign founding subject. In this way, Foucault rejects the modern liberal concept of ‘the individual’ as preceding society. Instead, the ‘individual’ is only formed through relations of power. Subjectivity comes into being through the process of subjectification, ‘The Self is neither knowledge or power’ (Deleuze, 1992, 161). Foucault argues that this is illustrated if one examines the process of confession in Catholicism, a practice projected as a way of ‘unlocking our inner selves’ therefore preventing the confessor from seeing themselves as part of a social formation (Bevir 2004, 46). The confessor is told to look inward to one’s self as an individual, and one’s actions as the result of individual free will. Foucault argues that this fails to account for how the actions of the confessor are shaped, constrained and disciplined by knowledge and power. The subject of confession becomes a subject through the myriad apparatuses that are aimed at ensuring her subjectivity. If one examines confession through Foucault’s analysis it becomes clear how it is one particular apparatus aimed at forming the subject by convincing her that her actions are entirely her own. Here Foucault is not rejecting the possibility of the agency of the subject, but he is staunchly refusing the notion that individuals can ever be autonomous (ibid). No individual can act entirely outside all social contexts and completely removed from relationships of power. This also raises the argument that the notion of individual autonomy conceals the formation of the subject.

In his writing on Foucault and subjectification, Deleuze explains that the ‘new’ dimension of the subject in relation to themselves can be understood as a ‘fold’. ‘The relation to oneself will be understood in terms of power-relations and relations of knowledge. It will be reintegrated into the systems from which it was derived’ (Deleuze, 1999, 85). The subject’s relation to herself is also not independent of all social contexts, instead, the subject is ‘folded’ back on that through which the subject is formed. The subject’s understanding of herself is mediated through power/knowledge and the apparatus of subjectification. This is not as dismal as it may first appear, as there is always the possibility of resistance. The subject’s relation to herself always encompasses the ‘communication’ between codifying power and that ‘which resists codes and
Butler’s understanding of the subject is also informed by Foucault. She argues that there is no such thing as a ‘subject before the law’ and that instead, the law forms the subject as a means of justifying its legitimacy (Butler 1999, 4). Calling the subject into question is not aimed at denying the existence of the subject, but rather the existence of a non-contingent, pre-discursive subject (Butler 1995, 9). The positions which constitute ‘I’ are constitutive of the ‘I’ – in other words, ‘I’ may make choices, but those choices are mediated by the positions which establish me. ‘No subject is its own point of departure; and the fantasy that it is one can only disavow its constitutive relations by recasting them as the domain of a countervailing externality’ (ibid). She argues that the notion of an individual who gives their consent to be governed is useful as a means of justifying the social order and the ‘performance’ of declaring a free individual helps to constitute the subject. ‘The performative invocation of a non-historical ‘before’ becomes the foundational premise that guarantees a pre-social ontology of persons who freely consent to be governed and, thereby, constitute the legitimacy of the social contract’ (Butler 1999, 4). Thus, subjection for Butler is both the formation of the subject, and the subsuming of the subject to power (Mills 2003, 259).

From subjection the subject emerges, but the process continues as through the normalisation of the subject. This can be seen through the way in which Butler theorises gender, as something that is both performative and normalising. One is both formed by one’s gender and continually in the process of re-articulation. These processes are enmeshed in relations of power. Butler argues that the performance of gender ‘congeals’ over time ‘to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being’ (Butler 1999, 45). This does not mean that the process of subjugation stops when the subject is constituted. On the contrary, the subject is never fully constituted, but ‘produced time and again’ (Butler 1995, 13). The practice of domination of subjects works through their regulation and production (ibid., 14). One of the cornerstones of my argument is the idea that one cannot dominate subjects without first producing them.

For Butler, the subject is gendered as well as gendering, illustrating an obvious heritage of Foucault’s subject, who is constituted by power and simultaneously immersed in the exercise of power. For Butler as much as Foucault, this by no means implies that the boundaries of ‘the subject’ are fixed. Instead, the bounds of acceptability of gender (in the case of Butler) are re-negotiated and shifting.

‘Hence, the sexuality that emerges within the matrix of power relations is not a simple replication or copy of the law itself, a uniform repetition of a masculinist economy of identity. The
productions swerve from their original purposes and inadvertently mobilize possibilities of ‘subjects’ that do not merely exceed the bounds of cultural intelligibility, but effectively expand the boundaries of what is, in fact, culturally intelligible’ (ibid., 40).

Subsequently, because the subject is not irreversibly determined by subjectification, but instead formed through the repetition of performance of subjectification, there exists the possibility of changing the repetition of performance as a means of changing ones subjectivity (ibid., 198).

Drawing upon the above engagements with ‘the subject’ allows for the formation of one possible way to conceptualise the ‘subject’ which can be utilised in an analysis of Palestinian women and the dispositifs of subjugation and resistance. Before proceeding with the definition it is of utmost importance to state that this in no way signals the existence of a universal ‘Palestinian woman’. Palestinian women occupy countless subject positions. Bedouin women in the West Bank occupy different subject positions than women with Jerusalem ID cards living in East Jerusalem. Furthermore, individual women in Bedouin communities are differently subjectified amongst one another. There is no one ‘Palestinian Woman’. The inherent problem of using the identity categories of ‘Palestinian’ and ‘woman’ is the normative and exclusionary nature of identity categories. I cannot alter this inherent problem, but I can acknowledge the ways in which using the categories of ‘Palestinian’ and ‘woman’ function normatively. The same would be true for any analysis which seeks to understand women’s corporeal subjugation and resistance. As mentioned before, the context of the particular practices of a particular dispositif must be taken into account and no definition of ‘subject’ can be universally applied to two or more subject without risk of normalisation.

For the purpose of this paper, and drawing from Foucault and Butler, I propose that ‘the subject’ is: *she who becomes subjectified through practices which occur upon and through her corporeal body*. The domination of the Palestinian woman would not be possible without producing her as a subject. Of many women in many conflict situations a similar argument can be made. The on-going process of subjectification both produces her as subject as well as enabling her to perform that subject position or destabilise it. The subject reinstates or subverts her subjectification through conduct and counter-conduct, and this conduct and counter-conduct can occur at precisely the same moment. She thus not entrenched in the binary opposition of being either an ‘obedient’ subject or a ‘disobedient’ resister.

Dispositif

‘Dispositif’ can be translated from French as ‘apparatus’. Knowing this we can clearly see how the manner in which Foucault conducts investigations of power
and subjects is often precipitated through an exploration of dispositif. Foucault most clearly elucidated his definition of dispositif in an interview entitled ‘Confessions of the Flesh’ wherein he defined it as

‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions, in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements’ (Foucault 1980, 194).

To summarise, the dispositif is first and foremost multifarious. The commonality of the diverse elements is the desired outcome of the apparatus, specifically in relation to how the elements work together, enmeshed in power relations to form the subject. In the context of my use of dispositif, occupation of the Palestinian territories can be seen as a system of relations to subjectify Palestinians.

An analysis of a dispositif should aim to uncover how the various elements contribute to the formation of the subject. Agamben focuses on the definition given by Foucault in his 2009 essay ‘What is an apparatus?’ Agamben argues that the dispositif can be seen as a means of investigation, one that can be found throughout Foucault’s corpus, regardless of whether or not he explicitly used the term dispositif (Agamben, 2009). The way in which Foucault examines the world is by starting from particular occurrences and operations and moving forward to the larger ‘universal’ – this is opposed to seeing a universal as a starting point for investigation (i.e. – crime) and moving downward through the various particulars that come to constitute it. ‘Instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to start with the concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices’ (Foucault 2008, 3).

The dispositif itself can be seen as the network including virtually anything that itself has a strategic function imbedded in power relations (Agamben 2009, 3). Agamben later goes on to propose his own definition of apparatus, which greatly expands the possible number of what can be seen as an ‘apparatus’. For Agamben, an apparatus can be seen as ‘literally anything that has in some way the ability to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviours, opinions or discourses of living beings’ (ibid., 14). Therefore, he contends, apparatuses not only include what we consider to be very evidently imbued with power, but also
‘the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones, and – why not – language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses – one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably without realising the consequences that he was about to face. The boundless growth of apparatuses in our time corresponds to the equally extreme proliferation in processes of subjectification’ (ibid., 14-15).

Similarly, Deleuze conceptualises the dispositif as multifaceted, and as being composed of cross-cutting dimensions. ‘In the first instance the dispositif is a tangle, a multi-linear ensemble. It is composed of lines, each having a different nature. And these lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are homogenous in their own right’ (Deleuze 192, 159). The elements of the apparatus do not always act in harmony because they are not uniform, they can distance themselves from one another or change in nature. Therefore, power, knowledge and subjectivity are in constant flux, never stagnant, these elements may sediment, but may also just as likely fracture (ibid.). The visibility of the aspects of the apparatus, for example, the visibility of the aspects of punishment, is sometimes blurred or dispersed, obscuring its origins, thus, ‘Visibility cannot be traced back to a general source of light which could be said to fall on pre-existing objects, it is made of lines of light which form variable shapes inseparable from the apparatus in question’ (ibid., 160). Objects of the apparatus may appear to have a ‘pre-existing’ nature, but that is merely a means of making the apparatus seem more ‘solid’ than it in fact is.

The dispositif is most valuable because it calls for a refutation of concept of the universal, thereby allowing for alternative understandings to emerge. In the case of this paper, examining the dispositif of occupation will aim to draw out another way of viewing how occupation functions by starting from the examination of how the occupation forms Palestinian women as subjects. Drawing from Foucault, Deleuze and Agamben, for the purpose of this project the dispositif can be seen as the linkage that emerges from a diverse set of practices which are aimed at a certain manner of subjectification. In order to understand the dispositif of occupation as it pertains to the bodies of Palestinian women, it is necessary to investigate myriad practices aimed at the subjectification through their corporeal bodies. In order to understand the dispositif of resistance it will be necessary to explore how Palestinian women enacting elements of resistance challenge this subjectification. Understandings of different dispositifs in different contexts must be predicated on an understanding of the practices in question as unique.
It is debatable to what degree Foucault employed a specific methodology in his work. One could argue instead that he employs several techniques of investigation, all of which are informed by his drive to better understand how the subject comes to be formed. Therefore, for Foucault, what is most crucial is perhaps not how questions are answered, but rather, what questions are asked. This being said, broadly speaking it is possible to see common threads amidst how Foucault conducts his investigations. If we were to give name to them, one possibility is that Foucault employs what he refers to as ‘archaeology’ and ‘genealogy’. To understand how Foucault employs the concept of ‘archaeology’ as an approach, it is first essential to define what he meant by archaeology. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault defines archaeology as ‘describing discourses as practices specified in the archive’ (1989, 148). A particular practice is thus seen to arise from a discourse in the archive. This definition is in need of further extrapolation, as ‘archive’ has a very specific meaning in this context as well. For Foucault, the archive is not a specific place, nor is it a totalising discourse, nor can it be fully described. Instead, he defines archive as: ‘the general system of the formation and transformation of statements’ (ibid., 146).

The archive is thus the manner in which certain statements come to be formulated, and crucially, how those statements in turn alter practices. This is clearly an example of how Foucault conceptualises power/knowledge as heterogeneous yet entirely intertwined. The archive formulates knowledge about an event, and in turn, that knowledge functions through power to shape and alter the exercise of power over subjects. In ‘statement’ it is important to note that Foucault is not referring only to what is said, but also to the unsaid and the visible. The crucial aspects of archaeology can be listed as follows: 1) statements in the archive must be seen as one possible outcome, not an inevitable outcome, 2) there is a determinate relationship between ‘words’ and ‘things’ 3) relationships between statements are contingent, 4) statements establish a relationship between subjects. These aspects are discussed in further detail below.

Critical to archaeology is the idea that just because something is a discourse in the archive, does not mean that it was inevitably the only possibility. If one takes as a starting point that what comes to be considered as the archive is one particular emergence rather than an inevitable end point that is both generalizable and pre-determined, then the questions that arise are related to

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3 Here, it is important to note that Foucault makes a distinction between two kinds of ‘knowledge’ the distinction is clearly demarcated in French, but when translated into English is lost. Foucault distinguishes between *connaissance*, a particular corpus of knowledge such as biology and *savoir*, the condition by which an object becomes part of the ‘*connaissance*’ Foucault 1989, 16.
why this particular occurrence emerged rather than other potential occurrences. The relationship between the sayable and the visible is reliant on how Foucault perceives the determinate relationship between words and things. Within Foucault's own work, this can be seen clearly in *Discipline and Punish*, wherein he argues that the discursive distinction between 'the criminal' and the 'law-abiding citizen' functions in a dependent relationship with the architecture of the prison, where the prisoner regulates his own behaviour because the physical form the prison takes makes it impossible for him to know with certainty whether or not a guard is watching him at any given time. As such, the visible (prison) and the sayable (criminal vs. law abiding) function together.

The relationships between statements is also easily seen in Foucault’s concept of statements as contingent, not inevitable, wherein statements regulate in relation to one another and are ordered with regards to the status they are attributed. Returning to the concept of ‘eventualization’ we can see that for Foucault, an event or practice must be examined to account for how it relates to ‘external intelligibility’. Coming back to *Discipline and Punish*, statements about the penal system are externally intelligible, or relatable to statements about schooling, or the military. Statements also become repeatable through rules, demonstrating the power/knowledge nexus. Once a statement is sufficiently repeatable, (or ‘usable’) it could be conceptualised as ‘knowledge’, making it possible to utilise that knowledge to exercise power. Again, coming back to our example of *Discipline and Punish*, we can see how repeating (using) statements about criminality, knowledge is produced of who can be defined as a ‘criminal’ and thus opening up possibilities for the exercise of power over those designated as ‘criminal’.

Foucault points out how the statement which distinguishes between ‘the criminal’ and the ‘law-abiding citizen’ establishes a specific relationship between these two subjects. The statement then acts differently upon the two subjects. Institutions function within established limits of how discursive objects can act. Here, prisons can be seen as places of authority, but which function upon those subjects designated as criminal in different ways than upon the non-criminal. Institutions are also ‘visible’ and function in specific ways to exercise power based on statements and the sayable. From the above examples it becomes apparent how Foucault conceptualises archaeology as the process of analysing discourse as practice in the archive.

Upon consideration of these aspects of archaeology it may be useful to provide an example of how a technique of archaeology might relate to an analysis of the dispositif of occupation. This example is by no means exhaustive, it simply serves as a rough framework in order to more concretely demonstrate the manner in which Foucault's concept of archaeology might be seen as a means of
investigating the formation of knowledge that is in turn applied to the subjectification of Palestinian women. The statement of ‘Judea and Samaria’ can be seen as an example of a discourse used in practice. The reference to ‘Judea and Samaria’ is often employed by far-right Zionist groups, Israeli settlers, the Israeli state and even Christian fundamentalist groups in the United States as a geographical term designating the territory which Palestinians, other states, international NGOs and the United Nations refer to as ‘The West Bank’.

1) **Statements in the archive must be seen as one possible outcome, not an inevitable outcome:** The use of ‘Judea and Samaria’ is only one possible way of referring to the territory between the 1949 Armistice line and the Jordan River. It emerged in discourse for a very specific reason, therefore the important question is why referring to this territory as Judea and Samaria became so dominant in Israeli discourse. The short answer is that ‘Judea and Samaria’ is the name for the territory as referred to in the Torah. Referring to the territory as such supports Israeli claims to the territory based on the idea that the whole of Greater Israel is the legitimate homeland of the Jewish people as decreed by God. It helps to establish a historical and religious claim on the land that predates and thus delegitimises any other inhabitants.

2) **There is a determinate relationship between ‘words’ and ‘things’:** There is an irrefutable relationship between the words ‘Judea and Samaria’ and the Israeli settlements as objects in the space of ‘Judea and Samaria’. Referring to the territory as Judea and Samaria legitimises the settlement activity in the territory and establishes the settlements as being located in Greater Israel, not as located in Palestinian territory. The visible settlements function together with the sayable ‘Judea and Samaria’ as part of the subjectification of Palestinians.

3) **Relationships between statements are contingent:** There are myriad relationships established between the statement of ‘Judea and Samaria’ and other statements in the archive. The repeatability of ‘Judea and Samaria’ is utilised in concrete ways such to the extent that it has become ‘knowledge’. This is easily seen when visiting the public relations website of the Israeli Defence Forces, which refers to the territory as Judea and Samaria. The use of the statement in such an official capacity illustrates how it has become ‘knowledge’.

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4 See the ‘Security Issues’ heading on [http://www.idfblog.com/](http://www.idfblog.com/). The glossary on [http://www.idf.il/english/](http://www.idf.il/english/) defines Judea and Samaria as: ‘The region of Judea and Samaria (also known as the West Bank) is an area of 5,860 square kilometers with a population of about 2.5 million people, mostly Palestinian. On its eastern border are the country of Jordan and the Dead Sea, and on its north, south and west, the Green Line of 1949 (the armistice line between Israel and..."
4) **Statements establish a relationship between subjects:** There is also a certain relationship between the different subjects of Israeli settlers living in ‘Judea and Samaria’ and the Palestinians living in the same territory. The Israeli settler as subject is produced altogether differently than the Palestinian woman as subject. Referring to the territory as ‘Judea and Samaria’ has a crucial role in establishing the relationships between the two.

The above example was not intended to ‘apply’ Foucault’s technique of archaeology as one might apply a coat of paint. Instead, the intent was to illustrate that the key elements of archaeology are quite advantageous in the process of re-routing an examination of occupation through a *dispositif*. The same formula certainly cannot be applied to every possible element of the *dispositif*, but the concept of archaeology forces aspects of the occupation into one’s gaze that might otherwise appear as natural or as pre-givens. The next section, which examines Foucault’s technique of genealogy, intends to do the same.

### Genealogy

Foucault borrows the idea of genealogy from Nietzsche, who argues for looking to history to understand how a particular practice arose. Foucault alters Nietzsche’s concept of genealogy by examining how power functions in the historical practice. Foucault admitted that there were many parallels between genealogy and archaeology, and he saw the two methods as complimentary (Kendall and Wickham, 1999). ‘Genealogy does not replace archaeology, so much as widen the kind of analysis to be pursued’ (Davidson 1986, 227). Foucault articulates what he sees as the difference between the two in ‘Two Lectures’ when he writes:

‘If we were to characterise it in two terms, then “archaeology” would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and “genealogy” would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were released would be brought into play’ (Foucault 1980, 85).

Genealogy is thus the expansion of archaeology such that rather than examining a statement as singular event in the archive, it is seen as part of an on-going process enmeshed in power. Foucault claims that the question which arises is therefore ‘What are the various contrivances of power, whose operations extend to such differing levels and sectors of society and are possessed of such

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*Jordan after the War of Independence). The region has been controlled by Israel since the end of the Six Day War in 1967.*
manifold ramifications?’ (ibid., 88). As we can see from this question, the technique of genealogy is embedded in an analysis of power. Foucault’s model of power is distinct from Liberal and Marxist conceptions of power, and an understanding of how he theorises power will go a long way in aiding the understanding of how genealogy can be employed as a technique. For Foucault, power is first and foremost, exercised, not possessed, given or taken (ibid., 89). Therefore, power is defined in and through action. Furthermore, he argues, power cannot be defined as repression alone. Another key characteristic of power is that it is productive. 'In any society there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse’ (ibid., 93).

Herein enters the benefit of genealogy as a means of examining statements and the centrality of power in the approach. One can conduct an analysis of power by conducting a genealogical analysis of discourse. If discourses are produced by the exercise of power, then we can work backwards from a discourse to understand how power operates in relation to it. In this way, genealogy expands the analysis made by archaeology by examining the broader processes to which the discourse is related. Kendall and Wickham summarise genealogy as:

‘describing statements but with an emphasis on power, introducing power through a “history of the present” concerned with disreputable origins and unpalatable functions, describing statements as an on-going process rather than as a snapshot and concentrating on the strategic use of archaeology to answer problems about the present’ (Kendall and Wickham 1999, 34).

For Foucault, making history central to the method of genealogy is what makes it such an illuminating approach. He argues that as a result of looking for subjugated knowledges and basing his analysis on historical content he was able to launch a far more effective analysis of the asylum (Madness and Civilization) and the prison (Discipline and Punish). ‘Only the historical contents allow us to rediscover the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle that the order imposed by functionalist or systematising thought is designed to mask’ (Foucault 1980, 82). Genealogies thus open the possibility to investigate 'local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges’ and thereby challenge any theories or knowledges which claim to be unitary (ibid., 83). Here, Foucault challenges the hierarchy of scientific knowledge, arguing that genealogies are

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5 Foucault’s use of history is often defined this way as it implies that his historical analysis does not stop upon reaching a certain epoch, nor does it claim that the present is a desirable alternative to the past. Instead, history for Foucault is ‘a way of diagnosing the present’ (Kendall and Wickham 1999, 4).
'anti-sciences' precisely because they challenge the dominance of scientific knowledge as a means of exercising power. In utilising genealogy as a method, subjugated knowledges are emancipated. (ibid).

To illustrate how genealogy can provide an informative means of investigating power and subjectivity, the below example takes a genealogical approach to examine one element of how Palestinians are formed as *de facto subjects* to Israeli power. This example is in no way exhaustive, but merely provides an illustration of why taking inspiration from Foucault methods is so interesting. The problem for investigation for this example is the Israeli discourse of ‘security’.

1) It is well documented that the primary discourse employed by the Israeli state is that of ‘security’. Historically, official and non-official discourse has portrayed Israel as the victim of Arab aggression and Palestinian terrorism and at perpetual risk of ‘being pushed into the sea’. Therefore, the discourse of security eclipses all other discourses in terms of importance.

2) The discourse of security is wholly imbued with power, especially in relation to how different subjects experience the discourse. The security of some is often achieved by producing insecurity for others. Particularly, the use of security discourse frames Palestinians as terrorists and thus legitimises violence and punishment against them because they are framed as threats to Israeli security. ‘Security’ is used as justification for assassinations, raids on villages, arrest and detention of prisoners, the demolition of houses and the imposition of curfews.

3) One could examine how ‘security’ has been framed throughout the history of the Israeli state, as well as how it is framed within Israeli society. ‘Security’ was central to the discourse of the early Zionists prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. Since 1948 it has dominated national discourse, most especially in times of conflict, such as in 1967, 1973, and 1982, as well as during the First and Second Intifadas.

4) Such a historical analysis would be most effective if it took Foucault’s approach of a ‘history of the present’ and examined how the historical use of ‘security’ is effecting the present. The historical discourse of security supports and re-enforces the discourse today. As a result of ‘security’ being such a core tenet of the Israeli state and society the discourse today is largely un-challenged, especially with the present discourse of the ‘War on Terror’ which also supports and bolsters the Israeli discourse of security. This is easily seen through Ariel Sharon’s 2005 comment to George W. Bush that ‘Arafat is our bin Laden’ (Whitaker 2001).

5) Such an analysis would also ground the historical content within a discussion of power, predominately to bring to light the various
subjugated knowledges which have been usurped, delegitimised and silenced by ‘security’. The knowledges that have been subjugated by the discourse of security are the knowledges of the conditions of daily life and insecurity for Palestinians and how these insecurities are manifested through Israeli security discourses.

6) The analysis would also be able to critically challenge the origins of the discourse of ‘security’

The discourse of ‘security’ is well-suited to the technique of genealogy precisely because of the historical content of the discourse and the way in which the discourse has served as a means of exercising power and subjugating other knowledges.

Corporeality

As outlined in the introduction, I argue that the core of a theory examining women, subjectivity and resistance has to be corporeality, because corporeality is the site where subjugation and resistance occur. This corporeal approach differs from state-centric analyses of subjugation or resistance that take the body for granted, as a pre-given, or as an irrelevant element. One of the most fundamental claims driving this project is that bodies matter. The importance placed on corporeality draws upon Foucault, Butler and Merleau-Ponty to defend the centrality of material bodies. The most primary argument to be made for centralising corporeality is that our material bodies are the conduit through which we experience the world. Our material bodies directly come into contact with operations of power and it is through this that we become subjects. The requirements of our material bodies for food, shelter, water and security more often than not, surpass any other need or requirement. Our corporeal bodies matter, but rarely are they the starting point for analysis, because the formation of corporeal bodies is generally taken as a pre-given that lies outside the realm of political analysis. For authors such as Foucault, neglecting to analyse the corporeal body neglects the very real political processes which occur to shape and form the subject through their body. Diana Coole argues that in politics the body is ‘paradoxically, the its most visible and its most invisible component’ (Coole 2007, 413). Our corporeal bodies are easily seen, but are generally invisible to analysis.

Coole’s analysis is based on a reading of Merleau-Ponty, who, as a phenomenologist, argued that it is through our physical bodies that we experience and therefore come to an understanding of the world. Bodies are not the same as objects in that bodies inhabit space. ‘It applies itself to space like a hand to an instrument, and when we wish to move about we do not move the body as we move an object...for us the body is much more than an instrument or a means; it is our expression in the world the visible form of our intentions’
The easiest way of illustrating this is to touch your right hand to your left. Your right hand acts as a subject in touching the left, but also as an object touched by the left. Our corporeal bodies are thus both acted upon and able to act as well as perceived and able to perceive. Furthermore, the body as both subject and object can tell us something about the wider relationships between subjects and objects. Specifically, the relationship between subject and object can be described as the ‘obverse and the reverse’ (ibid., 138). ‘My body as a visible thing is contained within the full spectacle. But my seeing body subtends this visible body, and all the visibles with it. There is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other’ (ibid.). The contribution of Merleau-Ponty is extremely valuable because it posits the corporeal body at the fore of an investigation into how we experience the world rather than seeing the body as a ‘given’ which does not warrant attention. Additionally, his discussion of the relationship that is revealed between subject and object is particularly effective in an exploration of the Palestinian subject in relation to occupation and resistance.

As there is no shortage of literature exploring Foucault’s approach to the corporeal body, there is no need to excessively engage with it here. It will suffice to provide a brief reminder that in Discipline and Punish, Foucault argued ‘Let us say that disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constraining link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination’ (Foucault 1977, 138). Butler clearly drew heavily from Foucault when she developed her theories of bodily performance and the importance of understanding corporeality in relation to subjugation. In her seminal 1990 work, Gender Trouble, Butler contends that one’s gender is performed and performative such that the ‘internal essence of gender is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylization of the body’ (Butler 1990, xv). The performances one is expected to enact are based on the body one inhabits, and in turn, the repeated performances stylise the body.

Therefore, if society deems that the purpose of a woman’s body is reproduction it relies on the claim that the maternal body is pre-discursive (ibid., 125). If we challenge this claim on the basis of Butler’s theory of bodily performance it becomes clear that the maternal body is ‘an effect or consequence of a system of sexuality in which the female body is required to assume maternity as the essence of itself and the law of its desire’ (ibid.). This stems from Foucault’s argument that the body is not sexed prior to discourse. Here it becomes exceptionally clear how important the corporeal body is if one wants to conduct
a serious analysis of subjugation. The performances one is expected to enact and the gender one performs are entirely dependent on one's corporeal body. The female body is expected to be a maternal body and this expectation is all the more powerful because it is framed as natural and pre-discursive. One cannot, therefore undergo an examination of how Palestinian women are formed as subjects to Israeli power without starting from how their corporeal bodies are constructed through the gendered bodily performances which they are expected to enact.

This brings an important point about the nature of corporeal bodies, one which Butler reflects on in her work. One may argue that there is no such thing as a pre-discursive body; however the materiality of corporeal bodies can only be discussed through the discursive. While corporeal bodies may be inherently constructed from matter, when we discuss corporeality we have to use language. Butler saw this contradiction in her own work when she wrote 'I confess, however, that I am not a very good materialist. Every time I try to write about the body, the writing ends up being about language' (Butler 2004, 198).

This does not mean we should forget about the possibility of an investigation of the materiality of corporeal bodies, but instead serves as a reminder to take care in how we investigate corporeality. One way to move away from a strict focus on discourse can come from an examination of how the one trait that all of our corporeal bodies have in common is their vulnerability. This is certainly not to say that every body is equally vulnerable, but rather, our corporeal bodies are all at risk of harm (Butler 2004). ‘A body is both dependent upon others and subject to violation by another, by others’ (Chambers and Carver 2008, 52). The corporeal body can thus be examined in material terms based on its actual, physical vulnerability, the one aspect common to all corporeal bodies. This will certainly be important when exploring the subjectification of women in times of conflict.

The constructed nature of our bodies through performativity is in part due to the fact that our bodies are never quite only our own. Our corporeal bodies exist in a social context which shapes and forms them as we interact with others.

‘The body has an invariably public dimension; constituted as a social phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is mine and not mine. Given over from the start to the world of others, bearing their imprint, formed within the crucible of social life, my body is only later, and with some uncertainty, that to which I lay claim as my own’ (Butler 2004, 21).

One’s body relates one to others and claiming that one has ‘autonomy’ from others denies the very real ways in which our positions in society are determined by our corporeal bodies. In part, this stems from the fact that our bodily experiences are related back to a norm, whether that norm be an
example of our own bodily experience or to another's bodily experience (ibid., 28). Butler goes on to raise the question of whether we can acknowledge the ways in which we are corporeally dependent on one another and yet striving for autonomy in other ways. She argues that transgendered, transsexual, butch and drag illustrate the possibility of the transformation of the norm, thus calling into question the naturalness of the norm through differential embodiment. The body, then, is a site of possible resistance, not just of normalising practices.

This is complimented by Coole, whose reading of phenomenology argues that one’s ability to act should not be seen in binary terms of free subject/constituted subject. Instead, capacities for agency should be seen as a ‘chiaroscuro’ that do not unfold in a uniform manner but instead are as varied as the corporeal world (Coole 2005, 126). She goes on to identify three qualities of agency that can be identified at a corporeal level. Firstly, the corporeal body has an innate way of knowing; deducing meaning from diverse forms. Secondly, because of bodily knowing, the body is able to make ‘stylistic improvisations’. Finally, the body acts deliberately in its environment (ibid., 129). The corporeal body is thus not merely a site of discipline and subjugation, but also a site imbued with a degree of agency, provided, of course, that we are not defining agency in the dualism of free agent/subjugated non-agent. The significance of the corporeal body is clear here, in that corporeal bodies, even when subjugated, in their very materiality demonstrate a level of agency in determining their place in the world.

There are also explicit concomitants of the corporeal body in relation to politics. The corporeal body is a site upon which politics can act. Politics can make one's corporeal body more secure or less secure, more nourished or more malnourished. The corporeal body is what situates subjects in relation to one another and in relation to power. The exteriority of the corporeal body is what enables the formation of the subject. One cannot speak of the corporeal body's capacity for agency without simultaneously acknowledging that one’s corporeal body is precisely what makes one vulnerable to violence, power and subjugation. ‘For the body situates them firmly within the material and affective worlds, where economic and emotional structures mediate the satisfaction of somatic needs and violence assaults the flesh with raw immediacy’ (Coole 2005, 129).

It is perhaps Butler's notion of gendered performativity that best destabilises the claim that bodies have a natural role. Gendered performativity is advantageous because it argues that challenges to the norm are not merely a choice one can make in order to make life more gratifying, but instead illustrates that the performance of gender is malleable and therefore cannot be taken as a given that operates in the binary of female/male which claims the naturalness of the maternal female body. ‘To say however that gender is
performative is not simply to insist on a right to produce a pleasurable and subversive spectacle, but to allegorize the spectacular and consequential ways in which reality is both produced and contested’ (Butler 2004, 30). Corporeal practices which challenge the normalising performances of gender elucidate that other performances of gender are possible, and thus negate the notion that the purpose of a woman’s body is to produce children. Clearly, bodies matter.

Insomuch as bodies matter, it is necessary to take a corporeal approach to an examination of how Palestinian women are formed as subjects to Israeli power. It is just as essential to take a corporeal approach to how Palestinian women come to resist their formation as subjects. A corporeal approach lends to a better understanding of the complexity of agency in that material bodies are acted upon to form the subject, but material bodies are also always enacting, even on the micro-level, resistances of their own. A corporeal approach is also essential in that it brings to the fore the extremely vulnerable nature of our material bodies. One site where this vulnerability is highly visible is the occupied Palestinian territories, and the corporeal bodies of Palestinian women are always at risk. Multitudinous elements in everyday life under occupation make Palestinian women acutely aware of their vulnerability. This awareness of corporeal vulnerability has a whole host of consequences for how Palestinian women respond to their subjectification.

It will suffice to provide brief examples of one could ‘think corporeally’ about Palestinian women. As with the examples provided for archeology and genealogy in the above sections, these are merely illustrative and by no means comprehensive. They do not necessarily serve to reflect an exact formula for thinking through this framework to other cases, but instead propose one possibility for how to think corporeally for the particular dispositifs in the context of Palestine. Palestinian women living in the occupied territories experience multiple threats to their corporeal bodies. Many of these threats occur outside the home, as women travel through Israeli military checkpoints, attend demonstrations or walk their children to school. Some of the threats occur in the home, especially in regards to house demolitions or night-time raids. More indirect threats come from economic circumstances incurred as a result of decades of occupation or imprisonment of family members. A dispositif of occupation will more thoroughly explore the relationships between these elements and how they function to subjugate Palestinian women.

Furthermore, Butler's idea of gendered performativity is of utmost relevance to an examination of the subjugation and resistance of Palestinian women. There is no culture without gendered divisions derived from corporeal bodies, so this is in no way to make the argument that women in Palestine are further subjugated only because of their particular culture. Instead, I argue that as in all societies, gendered divisions do exist in Palestinian culture. Those divisions are
based on corporeality and are performed in multiple ways. In turn, many acts of resistance against occupation also have an effect of challenging those divisions by enacting different performances of gender. This is most clearly evident in the case of the female suicide bombers/martyrs, who through their resistance to the Israeli occupation, whether knowingly or not, perform a radical alternative to the idea that the purpose of a woman's body is that of reproduction, not destruction. Furthermore, the suicide bomber/martyr is effectively denying the Israelis control over her body and thus refusing her subjectification. By no means is the example of female suicide bombers/martyrs the sole example of how the norms of gendered performativity are challenged by Palestinian women, it is merely the most provocative. Palestinian women perform challenges to gendered norms in multifaceted sites. Common to all of gendered performativity is of course the corporeal body.

To summarise, corporeality in the context of this project is critical because it allows for a more thorough analysis of how women come to be subjected and how they enact resistance to that subjugation primarily through their corporeal bodies. It is their corporeal bodies which make them vulnerable, which relate them to others around them, which determine how they are treated and how they are expected to act. Their corporeal bodies are the means through which they are subjected to oppression, as a result of occupation, exposed to operations of power and simultaneously the means by which they are able to resist. In short, their corporeal bodies are the conduit for how they experience the world. Therefore, no thorough examination of the dispositifs of occupation and resistance for Palestinian women could gloss over or ignore corporeality. As a result, material bodies are central to the framework.

**From theory to practice**

To extrapolate an understanding of the operation of power in the occupied territories and come to an understanding of how Palestinian women are subjugated, it is necessary to start from an analysis of the diverse elements of the dispositif of occupation. Rather than start from the point of ‘occupation’ the strands which constitute the functioning of occupation have to be the focal point of analysis. Sovereign state models of power which might posit that subjugation or resistance can be investigated from a top-down approach are ineffective because they fail to explain how the starting point of analysis has to be the very subject at which subjugation is directed at forming. The elements that so effectively subjugate are by no means solely attributed to the state and a top-down analysis will invariably miss out on myriad elements of utmost importance. It is for this reason that the framework I propose is galvanised by Foucault. His approach to power gives full attention to the subject and their formation through multiple elements rather than merely examining the state as that which holds the power over its subjects. More importantly, in arguing that resistance is an intrinsic part of the operation of power, Foucault provides the impetus for an alternative analysis of how power functions and
how we might come to resist it. Such an analysis is useful for the potential that is opened up when we cease to view power and resistance as separable phenomena and instead view them as radically inseparable.
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