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# **Generalised Trust and the Design of the United Nations**

**By**

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## **Abstract**

This study aims to establish if generalised trust influenced the design of the United Nations. Critics of the rational choice approach to institutionalism state that it fails to account for the impact of the values, morals and personalities of those involved in the process of institution creation. Is there really a need, however, to consider such personal factors? Or can states, as rational institutionalism proposes, be reliably expected to respond in a generally uniform fashion to the same structural circumstances?

Analysis will be carried out of the negotiations held to plan the structure of the UN, with the primary focus on the main actors from Britain and the Soviet Union. The aim is to establish if generalised trust, a personality-based variable, informed design preferences and if those preferences were realised in the institution's eventual structure. The generalised variety of trust is best understood as the belief that most people are part of one's moral community, regardless of their background. The findings will either serve as grounds for a rethink of the rationalist, structure-based approach to institutions, or as a rebuttal to those who claim the personal values of policy-makers play an influential role in guiding state decisions.

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# 1. – Introduction

When considering the factors influencing institution creation, most of the dominant International Relations schools of thought focus upon how structural conditions will affect policy-makers' design preferences. Is it appropriate, however, to presume that actors will respond in a uniform fashion to the same structural circumstances? Does the personal disposition of individual leaders, politicians and policy-makers influence the kind of international organisation they would prefer? Can the trusting nature of representatives from the constituent nations have an effect on the ultimate design of the institution? This paper endeavours to answer each of these questions through the investigation of whether or not generalised trust influenced the design of the United Nations.

Put simply, an actor with high levels of generalised trust believes that most people are part of their moral community and can be trusted, regardless of their background. Disagreement exists between rational institutionalist scholars - who emphasise the importance of structure and self-interested states – and social psychology-inspired authors – who contend that the personalities and values of leaders and policy-makers can influence institutional design.

Brian C. Rathbun is a strong proponent of the hypothesis that generalised trust influences institutional design and has already carried out research on the League of Nations, the UN and NATO in *Trust in International Cooperation* (2012). Because Rathbun's work has been largely focused around American multilateralism, this study will focus on the effect that generalised trust had on the design preferences of actors

from Britain and the Soviet Union in negotiations regarding the establishment of the UN.

If generalised trust were found to affect design, it would be grounds for a rethink of the structurally minded way in which many scholars consider the factors influencing the establishment of institutions. In a practical sense, it may prompt state negotiators, involved in the establishment of international institutions, to assign more importance to the personal disposition of policy-makers and leaders from other nations. If generalised trust were found to have a minimal or negligible effect on institutional design, however, such findings would reinforce the rational institutionalist approach to analysing institutions. Governments involved in the establishment of international institutions would be justified in overlooking the personality of their counterparts from other nations, and focusing instead upon how self-interested states are likely to respond to structural circumstances. Ultimately this study contradicts the work of Rathbun and offers little support to scholars hoping to undermine the rationalist approach, as the findings indicate that generalised trust ultimately did not affect the design of the UN.

To begin, a review of existing literature in relation to institution creation and generalised trust will be carried out. The alternating positions of each of the major International Relations schools of thought will be summarised, and the theoretical basis of generalised trust outlined. The following chapter on Research Design will then describe the method being employed to evaluate whether or not generalised trust influenced the design of the UN. The British and Soviet Union case study chapters will follow, after which the Results chapter will analyse the eventual UN structure agreed upon in 1945. The final chapter will evaluate the impact of this study's

findings on theories of generalised trust and on the hypothesis that trust impacts institutional design.

## **2. - Literature Review**

The majority of theories in relation to international security institutions have focused upon the ability, or inability, of such bodies to promote stability between states (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, p.761)(Martin and Simmons, 1998, p.729). Rather than addressing the power of an existing institution to modify state preferences, this paper focuses instead upon the factors influencing the ultimate design of multilateral security institutions. Despite the scholarly emphasis on institutions' capacity to influence state behaviour, it is still possible to identify the central positions of different schools of thought in relation to institution creation. This chapter is divided into three parts, the first of which will focus upon the three dominant International Relations schools of thought - institutionalist, idealist and realist – and what each has to say about preferences for institutional design (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p.14). Since the effect of generalised trust on institutional preferences is being examined here, the theoretical basis of generalised trust will be outlined in the second part. The concluding part of this chapter will then look briefly at the work of Brian C. Rathbun, who has previously carried out studies on generalised trust and international institutions.

### **International Relations Schools of Thought**

#### *The Institutional School*

In the decades following the Second World War, findings regarding institutions lacked a strong theoretical hook on which to hang their observations, but by the 1970s - in response to the issues facing the international community - new approaches to the

study of international institutions arose (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p.735). Within the institutionalist school, Federalism was the earliest theoretical orientation to arise, placing emphasis on historical examples of the creation of federations by political elites to create a common order between states. However, federalism became regarded as illusory by institutionalists, leading to the emergence of functionalism and neofunctionalism. Both schools focused instead upon the capability of international organisations to solve common problems of increasingly interdependent states (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p.17). Like federalism and functionalism, neofunctionalism “ascribed a dynamic role to individuals and interest groups in the process of integrating pluralist communities,” (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p.735). Within neofunctionalism, one can easily identify early design preferences of institutionalists. According to this school of thought, the structure of an international organisation should allow for the contribution of a wide cross-section of communities and groups in order to be effective. While neofunctionalism emphasises the importance of various political actors and organisations shifting their loyalties towards a new centre, this paper seeks to establish what role – if any – their personal dispositions played in that process.

Before the end of the 1970s, it became apparent that some of the high expectations pinned upon international institutions and their formal structures by early neofunctionalism had been overstated (McLin, 1979, pp.35-36). In terms of design, neofunctionalist explanations were viewed as being overly dependent on analysis of the consequences of an institution to explain its form (Pierson, 2000, p.475). This gave rise to the study of institutions as “international regimes, defined as rules, norms, principles and procedures that focus expectations regarding international behaviour” (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p.737). The institutionalist school birthed

transactionalism, which was concerned less with supranational organisations and more with security communities. The design of such institutions, according to transactionalism, would be dictated by the degree of integration of their members. The interdependence approach followed, which like functionalism emphasised the importance of international organisations to solving problematic situations. Unlike functionalism, however, interdependence analysis assigned much importance to the balance of power in the emergence of international organisations and the form they took. Power, in this analysis, was issue-area specific and not confined just to security between nations. The most dominant theory to arise from institutionalist school of thought, however, has been neo-institutionalism. According to this school of thought, international organisations are growing in importance and, because states act rationally, rationalistic theory can be utilised to explain the actions – or institutional design preferences - of a state in certain circumstances (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, pp.17-19).

Among the most prominent authors to use this method was Robert Keohane, who, utilised rationalist theory to explore the conditions under which cooperation between states takes place and to “explain why international institutions are constructed by states” (Keohane, 1988, p.381). One of the main strengths of this rationalistic approach was its ability to explain the creation and maintenance of international institutions (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p.738).

State preferences for institutional design, according to rationalist literature, will vary according to the level and type of information available. When designing an institution, states are motivated by self-interest, a readiness for the worst-case scenario, and the necessity to maintain sovereignty. Uncertainty about other members’ behaviour and intentions will prompt states to push for fewer members and greater

centralisation of power and information-gathering capability in an institution. States will also seek to increase the scope of the institution in many scenarios, such as instances where there is a heterogeneous membership, or distribution or enforcement problems. Despite the emphasis on centralisation and increased issue scope for an institution, states will also seek to maintain individual control to prevent outcomes, which would be viewed as detrimental to the state. The most common tool that a state will use to retain this control is the power of a veto. States' desire to retain control of their own destiny can be seen also in insistence upon flexibility in institutional contracts, which would allow states to opt out of certain obligations if it does not serve their interests (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, pp.781-797).

This study will examine how the personal dispositions of political actors informed their design preferences for the UN. Depending on the findings, this paper could ultimately contradict elements of rational institutionalism. If generalised trust, a variable property of individual actors, is found to have had an effect on the ultimate design of the United Nations, then rationalism's claim to be able to predict how states will behave, depending on the structural circumstances and level of information available, will be called into question.

### *The Realist School*

Realists argue that states are in a constant struggle for power in an anarchical environment. They also hold that international organisations are of little significance in channelling this power struggle, as they cannot change the nature of the environment (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p.15). Each state, according to realists, is its own judge and can use force to enact its judgments. Fundamental conflicts of interest account for the discord we see between nations (Waltz, 1959, p.159). Viewed through

the prism of realism, all instances of cooperation between states can be explained as a feature of the balance of power, and post-World War Two stability could be explained by the presence of a hegemonic power like the United States.

Realists argue that while there have been changes in the international system in recent decades, the system itself has not changed and realism has retained its relevance. These changes have taken the form of widening democracy, an alteration in the polarity of the power structure, and greater interdependence in some instances. Structural change, in the form of institutions, can affect how states behave but it does not change the fact that states have to help themselves and that they live in constant uncertainty over each other's intentions. The shadow of the future leads states to prioritise relative over absolute gains, and serves as an obstacle to cooperation. These worries about the future do not necessarily make cooperation and institution-building impossible but they do strongly condition their operation and limit their accomplishment. For realists, international institutions amount to little more than a cipher for state power (Waltz, 2000, pp.39-41).

The realist emphasis on uncertainty about intentions informing actor's actions is reminiscent of the stance taken by rational institutionalists, albeit with a greater degree of pessimism. Rational institutionalists contend that realism needs to be supplemented, but not replaced, by theories stressing the importance of institutions. The behaviour of states, scholars such as Keohane argue, cannot be fully explained without understanding of the institutional context of action (Keohane, 1984, pp.7-9, 14). One of the key assumptions of modern realism, however, is that "risk-averse actors prefer a certain outcome to a chancy one when each has the same expected value." Fear of destruction and keenness to preserve sovereignty informs their

strategic calculations and institutional design preferences. (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, p.782).

Given their low expectations for international organisation, and beliefs regarding states' risk-averse preferences, realists would expect states to adopt strategies of risk-avoidance when designing institutions. Suspicion of others will prompt states to reduce the opportunity for others to take advantage of their membership. Efforts to reduce opportunism could take the form of trying to keep the number of members as low as possible, or avoiding binding conditions that would force the state to become involved in an unknown future conflict. The realist prediction that states will seek relative over absolute gains also creates zero-sum considerations that seriously impair many forms of cooperation (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, pp.784-785).

### *The Idealist School*

Since the end of the Cold War, a renewed interest in the study of norms, ideas, learning and identity formation in the field of international organisation led to the resurgence of the idealist school of thought (Sterling-Folker, 2000, pp.97-98). While rationalists and neoliberal institutionalists will claim that institutions are tools to be used by strategically motivated state actors, idealists treat them as reflective of the principles of the society that guides their creation and also sometimes as wilful actors in their own right (Haas and Haas, 2002, pp.574-575). Normative idealism can, in fact, be seen as a radical alternative to realism in that people, as opposed to states, are viewed as the central actors of international politics. Although this school accepts that people can have competing values and norms, it holds that societies can find common ground on which to build a peaceful international community. US President Woodrow Wilson was a leading exponent of the normative brand of idealism, advocating the

creation of the League of Nations, a body that would represent the common conscience of all nations. For normative idealists, contractual obligations should not be necessary to maintain peace between nations. As long as an international organisation is in place to stabilise the common peace-loving ideals and values of different societies, war will be prevented (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p.21). Social constructivism also considers the influence of human consciousness in international life but acknowledges selfish interests can inform actors' actions. As with normative idealism, social constructivism recognises that the building blocks for international organisation do not just depend on material factors, but also ideational. Culture, ideology, aspirations and principled beliefs all contribute towards identities, which can in turn influence state preferences and action (Ruggie, 1998, p.879). Constructivists also argue, though, that the collective identity of the state that is hegemon can play a large role in determining patterns of international outcomes. For instance, Ruggie contends that the post-war international order would have differed significantly if the Soviet Union – or even Britain - emerged as the hegemon instead of the United States (Ruggie, 1998, p.863).

The constructivist standpoint has particular relevance for a study that examines the level of generalised trust in various international actors. Because constructivism holds that values and norms can influence state preferences, it allows for conditions affecting international cooperation being variable from one nation to the next. This study is reflective of such an ethos, in that it seeks to find out if generalised trust – a variable that can be influenced by value and norms - can impact upon state preferences for international institution design.

## Generalised Trust

Traditionally, many international relations scholars have held the view that the nature of trust is not relevant to the theoretical understanding of politics (Dunn, 1993, p.638). However, scholars, such as Dunn, Uslaner, Michalos, Rathbun, Booth and Wheeler, have in recent years emphasised the relevance of psychology – and in particular the concept of trust – to international relations (Booth and Wheeler, 2008) (Dunn, 1993) (Michalos, 1990) (Rathbun, 2012) (Uslaner, 2002). According to Dunn, the ‘question of whom to trust, and how far, is as central a question of political life as it is personal life,’ (Dunn, 1993, p.641). Michalos states that trust is a necessary condition for international peace and security, due to the good interpersonal relations to which it leads. (Michalos, 1990, p.619). In order to carry out an examination on the impact of generalised trust later in this paper, it is first necessary to provide an explanation of the concept here.

It will be helpful to arrive at this explanation by way of description of a few other concepts of trust, however. In the context of world politics, Booth and Wheeler offer a basic definition;

Trust exists when two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of each other’s attitudes and behaviour, believe that the other(s), now and in the future, can be relied upon to desist from acting in ways that will be injurious to their interests and values.

(Booth and Wheeler, 2008, p.230)

The kind of trust defined by Booth and Wheeler is “particularised”, in that it relies upon the knowledge that other actors share their values. A particularised truster will demand evidence that someone from outside their own inner circle – be that family or immediate social group – share their beliefs (Uslaner, 2002, p.28) Trust, in this instance, is only arrived at once an evaluation has been made of the actions and

attitudes of the person in whom trust is being placed. Fukuyama emphasises the importance of shared interpretations of life between people, saying that trust arises when “a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create expectations of regular and honest behaviour.” He describes this kind of trust, based upon shared fundamental values, as “moralistic trust” (Fukuyama, 1995, p.153). Both the concepts of moralistic and particularised trust are quite restrictive by comparison to the type of trust being examined in this study.

The foundations of generalised trust, however, do lie in moralistic trust. The “community” which Fukuyama speaks of in his definition of moralistic trust could be quite small. In fact, it might only consist of a handful of people that share the same beliefs. Generalised trust, however, implies that *most* people are part of your moral community, regardless of their social standing, ethnic background, religion or any other dividing line that exists between people. The central idea separating generalised trust from particularised or moralistic trust is the moral community envisioned by generalised trusters is more inclusive. The concept of generalised trust is best captured in the “standard” survey research question; “Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted or can you not be too careful in dealing with people?” (Uslaner, 2002, pp.26-27).

There is no mention of context or specifics about the person in whom one is required to place trust, just a question regarding the respondent’s opinion on people in general. Uslaner contends that one’s level of generalised trust is established early in life, is heavily influenced by an individual’s parents and is very unlikely to waver later in life. Another strong influencing factor of generalised trust, according to Uslaner, is the regime type into which one is born. Democracies can have a varying effect on trust but in general, people from democracies are more trusting. Authoritarian and

communist states, however, make trust hazardous and are very likely to produce non-trusting populaces (Uslaner, 2002, pp.225-230).

Rothstein and Stolle say that generalised trust is at the “heart of social capital”, and define it as the “potential readiness of citizens to cooperate with each other and the abstract preparedness to engage in civic endeavours with each other.” They add that the effects of generalised trust go beyond the boundaries of friendship and kinship, and extend into the realm of people that are not personally known (Rothstein and Stolle, 2002, pp.2-3).

## **Rathbun**

The role that generalised trust played in the design of international security institutions has already been examined by Brian C. Rathbun in his work on the League of Nations, United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Rathbun, 2011)(Rathbun, 2012). Rathbun found in each of these studies that trust precedes, rather than follows on from, the creation of international organisations. This is counter to rationalist thinking, which holds that distrust drives the creation of international organisations which, in turn, can foster trust between states (Rathbun, 2012, p.xi)(Rathbun, 2011, p.243). Rationalism, according to Rathbun, cannot account for qualitative multilateralism, a form of international cooperation in which “states make binding commitments to certain kinds of actions before they know the particulars of any given case,” (Rathbun citing Ruggie, 2011, p.244). Generalised trust, he argues, facilitates qualitative multilateralism. In terms of international institution establishment, qualitative multilateralism can consist of obligations such as coming to the defence of another member state in a future unknown conflict, or agreement to submit future disputes to collective mediation. Rationalism - with its emphasis on

strategic trust - cannot account for why states would agree to such terms as there are too many unknowns involved for the possibility of establishing this form of trust (Rathbun, 2011, p.245). While rationalists predict that actors will respond in the same way to the same structural conditions, Rathbun's theory, guided by social psychology, proposes that actors' responses to circumstances can vary depending on their levels of generalised trust (Rathbun, 2012, p.5).

As an example of design features of NATO influenced by generalised trust, Rathbun cites that the "moral obligations" on the US to provide military aid to European members should they need it (Rathbun, 2012, pp.198-199). He further claims that the decision of the US not to join the League of Nations can be attributed to a lack of generalised trust in the "conservative internationalists" of the Republican Party, who ultimately defeated the motion to join the League when the time came to vote upon it in the Senate (Rathbun, 2011, pp-259-261).

Because Rathbun contends that generalised trust both plays a role in institutional design and can vary between actors, it was necessary for him to establish a mechanism through which to assess levels of generalised trust. He did this through the use of proxy measures. One indicator he used was concerns about opportunism in international relations – that is exploitation by another member state of your obligations as a member of the same institution. A low level of generalized trust, according to Rathbun, resulted in greater concerns of opportunism (Rathbun, 2011, p.254). Generalized trust, according to Rathbun, "provides a central pillar of the deep underlying ideological structure that divides left and right and from which specific policy positions emerge," (Rathbun, 2011, p.255). Following on from this assertion, he established that rightist views are generally consistent with low levels of generalized trust. The left, by contrast, with its traditionally "more libertarian

positions on law and order, civil rights and personal expression, and relatively more anti-militarist foreign policy position,” is consistent with a higher level of generalized trust (Rathbun citing Altemeyer et al., 2011, p.255). Using leftist or rightist ideology as an indicator, Rathbun identified domestic policy position as another proxy measure for generalized trust, with more conservative actors the least trusting and more liberal the most trusting (Rathbun, 2011, p.255). Correlating these two proxy measures – opportunism concerns and domestic policy positions - along with statements regarding generalized trust, Rathbun employed a triangulation strategy to confirm an actor’s level of generalized trust.

While Rathbun’s case for generalised trust preceding institution creation is well made, his works have been examinations of American multilateralism, with only case studies from the United States considered (Rathbun, 2012, p.xi)(Rathbun, 2011, p.243). There are occasional mentions of preferences expressed by the other states, but even in those instances such preferences are considered from an American point of view. Rather than writing of the machinations that took place in formulating the UK position in ‘Before Hegemony’, Rathbun describes how President Woodrow Wilson “fought off the British” when it came to deciding the membership of the League of Nations Council, (Rathbun, 2011, p.256). In the same paper, instead of considering the factors that contributed to Soviet Union design preferences for the UN, he speaks of “strategic distrust” of the Soviet Union because of their insistence upon an absolute veto for Security Council members on issues of peaceful settlement and enforcement (Rathbun, 2011, p.266). In *Trust in International Cooperation*, Rathbun does go into some detail on negotiations regarding the UN, League of Nations and NATO from a British perspective, but the focus remains primarily American. In contrast to his detailed American case studies of specific actors, Rathbun’s study of Britain remains

at the macro level and does not delve any deeper than an analysis of party positions at the time of the establishment of the League of Nations, the UN and NATO (Rathbun, 2012, pp.91-94, 141-145, 168-179).

Although Rathbun's analysis of American multilateralism is to be commended, his study largely neglects the involvement of all other nations in the establishment of the three cited institutions. While his works can make well-supported claims regarding American multilateralism, the same cannot be said of Rathbun's findings in terms of institution formation in general, due to the US-centric analysis, which he carries out on the formative stages of the three institutions. This paper will focus upon one of these institutions, the UN, but will consider the positions taken by both Britain and the Soviet Union. Analysis of this kind appears all the more relevant when one considers that there are accounts which state that both Britain and the Soviet Union viewed American plans for the UN with some degree of suspicion (Harbutt, 2010, p.210). Although China and France were among the initial 'Big Five' that are credited with guiding the establishment of the UN, the contribution of these two nations on the institution's design was too small to be considered influential. More details will be provided in the next chapter on why China and France are excluded from the study. By analysing the British and Soviet influence, it is hoped that a well-informed inference can be made regarding the role that generalised trust played in the ultimate design of the UN.

Another benefit to this kind of study – a benefit that Rathbun could not realise with his work – is that it will provide the opportunity to test the effect that culture and background can have on generalised trust. Uslaner writes that the society in which one grows up can have a large bearing on their level of generalised trust and can, in some cases, lead to “social distrust” (Uslaner, 2002, p.19). By analysing actors from two

nations with considerable differences, it will be possible to make an evaluation on claims that societal circumstances influence generalised trust.

### **3. - Research Design**

Answering the question posed in this study requires a multi-faceted approach. In order to ascertain if generalised trust influenced the design of the UN, it will first be necessary to find out if actors who played a pivotal role in the design of the institution had significant levels of generalised trust. If some are shown to have high levels of generalised trust, then the next task will be to find out if this was reflected in their design preferences. If elements of the UN's ultimate design are reflective of generalised trust-influenced preferences, then it will be necessary to find out if such features can be reasonably accounted for by other, possibly more strategic, explanations.

This chapter will begin with a short explanation of the series of conferences that took place to plan out the structure of the UN. An explanation will then be provided for why only actors from Britain and the Soviet Union will be analysed as part of this study. Then the actors that will be analysed from within these two states will be identified and reasons provided as to why they are relevant to this study. The next section will establish a number of indicators of generalised trust that will be sought out in the actors in the first half of the case study chapters. From this point on in the study, those with high levels of generalised trust will be referred to as 'trusters' while those with low levels will be referred to as 'non-trusters'. A number of design features that generated much debate between the Great Powers in negotiations on the structure of the UN will next be identified. The positions that those with high or low levels of generalised trust would be most likely to take - as well as the stance taken by each of the dominant International Relations schools of thought - in relation to those features

will also be provided. The chapter will finish by detailing some of the potential challenges of this study, and the measures that will be utilised to tackle them.

The purpose of the case study chapters is to establish actors' levels of generalised trust and whether or not those levels were reflected in their design preferences during negotiations. After the case studies, an analysis will be carried out of the structure of the UN that was eventually agreed upon between the negotiating parties. This is with a view to identifying if the institutional design features, requested by those with high levels of generalised trust, were realised in the UN's eventual structure.

## **Planning Conferences Timeline**

Although the 1941 Atlantic Charter was significant in that it defined allied forces' post-War goals and was the first reference to the "United Nations", the first substantial planning for the UN took place in 1943 at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference (Kennedy, 2007, p.25). Here, ministers from the leading allied nations agreed to the creation of a new world organisation to maintain security once the Second World War had ended. The most substantial planning of the institution took place between August and October of 1944, at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington DC. At this conference, all but a number of controversial provisions were agreed upon by the participating nations. In early 1945, the Yalta Conference took place, at which Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Franklin D. Roosevelt negotiated the majority of the remaining points of contention for the formation of the UN. A small number of unresolved issues were agreed upon and the 50 founding members signed the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference in June of 1945 (Gareis, 2005, pp.6-7).

## Sample of States

Although each of the current five members of the United Nations Security Council took part in various conferences to discuss the new international institution, the individual contributions of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China varied considerably. Although Chinese and French delegates participated in some of the institution planning conferences between 1943 and 1945, both nations were considered by the others to have been minor players at the time. Krasno writes that the Chinese were invited to participate in some of the conferences, largely as a “formality”, but that they were not major participants (Krasno, 2004, p.26). Kennedy further adds to the impression that the US, Britain and the Soviet Union were the primary architects of the UN Charter, writing that China was regarded with “bemusement” and without credibility by Moscow and London in these negotiations. This was in part due to the Chinese government being embroiled in a civil war at the time. France was regarded with equal sentiment as the nation felt the ravages of war and its government was focused upon rebuilding infrastructure (Kennedy, 2007, p.26). The secondary role of France and China is also well illustrated in the non-attendance of either country at the Yalta Conference (Gareis, 2005, p.7)

American State Department officials drew up the tentative set of proposals, which formed the basis for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944. Krasno writes that Dumbarton Oaks was only held once the US was ready and had already worked out domestic bipartisan issues. It was almost entirely an American endeavour up to that point. However, the main participants, along with the US, in debates regarding the form the new organisation would take, were the Soviet Union and Britain. At the request of the Soviet Union, the Chinese delegation was not permitted to participate in the talks until such a time as the Soviets had approved of the plans and had departed

from Dumbarton Oaks (Krasno, 2004, pp.25-30). The most significant disagreements also occurred between the Soviets, British and Americans, on matters such as the right to veto, entitlement to membership, and the functions of the new institution (Cadogan, 1971, p.661)(Krasno, 2004, p.27).

## **The Main Actors**

In order to analyse the effects, if any, of generalised trust on the eventual design of the UN, one must first identify the politicians, policy-writers and decision-makers that played pivotal roles in the process from Britain and the Soviet Union. History has done this study some favours in that the number of influential actors from each state was relatively small by comparison with the US, where two houses of parliament, from opposing sides of the political divide, had to be convinced to join the UN. No such political obstacle hindered the process in Britain or the Soviet Union. Technical arrangements at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference - at which ninety per cent of the details of the UN were agreed upon – also assisted in keeping the number of actors to be analysed relatively small (Cadogan, 1971, p.668). Because negotiators from the Soviet Union preferred the security of a small negotiating body, the steering committee – initially only set up for deciding upon matters of procedure – became the body through which all substantive decisions were made at Dumbarton Oaks. Despite the highly significant decisions that were made on this committee, the US, Soviet Union and Britain each had only two members sitting on it (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.70).

### *Britain*

The three most prominent British actors in the crafting of the UN during the mid-1940s were Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan,

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Choosing such a small sample of actors was facilitated, in part, by the relative lack of involvement of almost all members of the British parliament in the process of establishing the UN. This lack of involvement is well illustrated in a letter to *The Times* written by Conservative MP Irene Ward in 1944, shortly before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference;

The British delegation (at Dumbarton Oaks), consisting only of officials, is briefed to discuss the machinery of the world security organisation, with the House of Commons completely in the dark as to our intentions.  
(Ward, 1944).

One of the most prominent officials, whom Ward is referring to in her letter, was Cadogan. In his personal diaries, he wrote of a conversation he had in January of 1945 with Lord Cranborne, an MP whom he described as “about the only member of the cabinet who knows *anything*” about the new world organisation. Even that account of the conversation, however, implies that Cranborne was following Cadogan’s lead on the new institution, with the latter saying the MP took a “fairly sensible line” on the issue (Cadogan, 1971, p.685). The British historian, David Dilks, describes Cadogan as “one of the most outstanding civil servants Britain has ever known”, adding that he had a profound and formative role in the birth of the UN (Dilks in Cadogan, 1971, front flap). Cadogan’s influential role is illustrated by his position as Britain’s primary delegate at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944. He was also Britain’s lead representative on the all-important steering committee at the conference (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.70). The proposals drawn up at this conference would go on to become the founding principles of the post-war system and were reproduced virtually unchanged in the final UN Charter (Luard, 1982, p.28).

Anthony Eden served as Foreign Secretary in Britain from 1940 to 1945. He headed the British delegation at the Moscow foreign ministers conference in 1943, at which

the first official conversations took place between Britain, The US and The Soviet Union on the proposal of a post-war international organisation (Harbutt, 2010, p.124). He also had a central role as the leader of the UK delegation at the San Francisco Conference in April 1945, which concluded with the signing of the Charter of the United Nations (The Times, 1945). During the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Eden received regular updates from Cadogan. The two men held similar views on the UN and would occasionally team up in attempts to bring their Prime Minister round to their way of thinking (Cadogan, 1971, p.630).

Although the leader of his country for most of the Second World War, Winston Churchill regularly displayed apathy towards the establishment of the new world organisation and at times was perceived as an obstacle in the process of creating the UN (Hughes, 1974, pp. 193-194). With one clear day left prior to his departing for Dumbarton Oaks, Cadogan said he had yet to receive guidance from his Prime Minister on what the British position should be at the conference. When he did meet with Churchill and his cabinet to discuss the new international institution, Cadogan said the Prime Minister was “cynically jocular”;

Neither he nor anyone nor anyone else would take it seriously, and at 11.55, he said ‘There now: in 25 minutes, we settled the future of the World. Who can say that we aren’t efficient?’ Deplorable. I think I had a little of the sympathy of the Cabinet!  
(Cadogan, 1971, p.653).

While his role was not necessarily always positive, Churchill’s contribution towards the creation of the UN should not be understated. He was alone amongst the Chamberlain cabinet in voicing the need to re-establish a body such as the League of Nations after the war, along with an international court and air force (Hughes, 1974, p.178) and as early as 1943, he was exchanging notes with President Roosevelt on the outline of the new post-war organisation (Hughes, 1974, p.184). Churchill was also

the leader of the British delegation at Yalta in 1945 at which outstanding issues regarding the UN – which hadn't been agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks – were negotiated. According to Cadogan's description, the topics left for discussion at Yalta were contentious points that required discussion at the highest level between state leaders (Cadogan, 1971, p.668).

### *The Soviet Union*

Influence over the design of the UN, from the Soviet perspective, was even more concentrated in the hands of the few, than was the case with Britain. In the second case study, the actors to be analysed are former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov. Second World War Historian, Geoffrey Roberts, credits these two actors as being the Russian architects of the Soviet-Western "Grand Alliance" (Roberts, 2002, p.22-23).

A decade before the Great Powers came together to decide upon the structure and function of the new international institution, Stalin had routed all oppositionists and attained absolute power in the Soviet Union. Even faithful Stalinist, Sergei Kirov – who turned down the opportunity to run against Stalin for General Secretary in 1934, despite his extreme popularity within the party – was assassinated that same year, eliminating Stalin's most likely replacement (Chuev, 1993, pp.xvii,159). According to Aleksei Roschin - a former Russian diplomat and one of three advisors to the Soviet Delegation at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 – Stalin was the Soviet decision-maker on almost every aspect of their contribution to the UN. In an interview decades later, Roschin detailed how Stalin wrote all of the instructions in the build up to the signing of the UN Charter in 1945, and received and read all of the reports from the various conferences on the formation of the new institution (Roschin, 1990).

According to former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union and diplomatic historian, George F Kennan, Stalin's most influential advisor during this time was Molotov;

Stalin and Molotov played their cards, throughout this period, in the customary Stalinist way; persistently, cautiously, slyly, taking good care that no card ever lay face-up on the table, following the game with utmost seriousness.  
(Kennan, 1960, p.330)

In 1930, Molotov became chairman of the Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars). In terms of Soviet political power, this meant that he was second only to Stalin and he acted as his chief spokesman (Chuev, 1993, p.xvi). Prior to Molotov's assumption of the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1939, Soviet foreign policy was not decided upon at the Foreign Ministry office. Instead it was formulated at a higher level of the Communist Party. However, this arrangement changed when Molotov - one of the organisers of the Bolshevik Revolution who held a long and loyal association with Stalin - took charge (Kennan, 1960, pp.219, 307). Soviet Ambassadors at this time had no independence, as foreign diplomacy was kept firmly under the control of Stalin and Molotov. In 1985, Molotov recalled the process of "centralised diplomacy";

Stalin and I kept a tight hold on everything – we couldn't do it any other way at the time. On the whole we quite confidently directed our centralised diplomacy. 'Centralised' meant dependent on the centre, on Moscow, for everything. We didn't take risks.  
(Chuev, 1993, p.69)

A devoted Stalinist, Molotov was viewed by some as merely a tool, through which Stalin's will was imposed. However, a 1946 interview with Deputy Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, concerning worsening relations with the US, gives a unique insight into the autonomy Molotov had in shaping Soviet policy. Litvinov told a *Washington Post* reporter that relations with the US had soured because of the Kremlin's false conception of security based on territorial expansion, prompted by the belief that war with the West was inevitable. This certainty amongst Soviet leaders was founded

upon regular assertions by Molotov at the time that war was indeed inevitable. Molotov's beliefs, however, contrasted with those of his leader. Stalin was voicing a belief, at the time, in the possibility of peaceful coexistence, albeit peace that allowed for the establishment of a Soviet-led communist hegemony in Eastern Europe. Later in his career, Molotov would go on to present similar opposition to his new leader, Krushchev, on the issue of peaceful coexistence. Felix Chuev, the author of *Molotov Remembers*, views this as proof that Molotov dared to disagree with Stalin (Chuev, 1993, pp.6-7).

Molotov was the Soviet representative at the Moscow Conference in 1943 and was a signatory of the Moscow Declaration. The agreement represented the first time that the US, Britain, the Soviet Union and China agreed to create a new institution to maintain security once World War Two had finished (Gareis, 2005, p.6). At the 1945 Yalta Conference, Molotov and Stalin divided between them the negotiating responsibilities of the Soviet delegation (Harbutt, 2010, pp.302-304). At the San Francisco Conference in April, 1945 – at which the UN was officially established – Molotov led the Soviet delegation (Roschin, 1990). Neither Stalin nor Molotov attended the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 – at which much of the machinery of the UN was decided upon – but the level of control held by the Kremlin over the Soviet delegation was very apparent to those in attendance. This was a frequent source of frustration for the American and British delegations, which sometimes had to wait for several days to get a Soviet reaction to proposals made at the negotiating table (Cadogan, 1971, pp.656, 749).

## **Indicators of Generalised Trust**

A concept like generalised trust is difficult, but not impossible, to quantify. A large number of studies have taken place that measure levels of generalised trust in individuals and groups, with a view to assessing its impact on a wide variety of societal functions (Tan and Tambyah, 2011, p.357). In many of these studies, it is common to assess participants' levels of generalised trust by using the answer to a question regarding generalised trust as an indicator. "Do you think most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?" is a typical example of the kind of question used to measure trust (Nieminen et al, 2008, p.408). Other questions may be worded differently but in effect are a slight variation on the one cited here. Of course in a study of the main players in negotiations surrounding the establishment of the United Nations, it is not possible to ask such a question. There are alternative ways, however, to make a judgment on the core beliefs of historical actors. Rathbun can provide some methodological guidance in this regard. He utilised a "triangulation strategy" in which he analysed and compared several different measures of generalised trust. When correlated, the identification of a pattern of consistently high or low levels of generalised trust across several measures allowed Rathbun to draw an inference (Rathbun, 2011, p.255).

As stated in the previous chapter, the interpretation of generalised trust being utilised in this study rests upon the notion of shared values and norms between actors that are previously unacquainted. Amongst scholars on trust, Eric Uslaner is the most prominent voice arguing that generalised trust is ultimately based on these moral norms (Nannestad, 2008, p.425). His work will be instrumental in deciding upon indicators for generalised trust levels in the actors being analysed in this study. In *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, Uslaner paints a detailed picture of someone with high

levels of generalised trust, from which it is possible to identify a number of indicators.

The generalised truster, he says, is;

An optimist who believes that she can control her own fate, who lives in a benign world, who bases her trust on this worldview more than on life experiences, who values diversity and civil rights yet sees a country with a common culture, and who is willing to participate in civic life with people different from herself.  
(Uslaner, 2002, p.75)

Uslaner emphasises that generalised trust is informed much more by one's morals than their personal experiences (Uslaner, 2002, p.74). Moralistic trust – the basis for generalised trust – can be defined as the belief that the world is a benevolent place with good people (Seligman cited in Uslaner, 2002, p.23). Generalised trust implies the perception that *most* people are part of your moral community and can be trusted. Unlike moralistic trust, the generalised variety of trust is somewhat influenced by real world experience and can go up and down in an individual over time, although it is basically stable (Uslaner, 2002, p.26). Someone with a high level of generalised trust is, for the most part, not concerned that strangers will exploit their trust and do not expect a specific return from a trusting gesture, rather they expect that “someone else will do something for me down the road.” Because of this disposition, and the belief that most people are part of their moral community, they will not see differences in class, ethnicity or race as an obstacle to realising common interests. These beliefs also mean that generalised trusters will be more inclined to cooperate with larger groups, rather than focusing on cooperation with exclusive cliques (Uslaner, 2002, pp.19-25). People with low levels of generalised trust, irrespective of their ideologies, are more inclined to believe in suppression of actors or groups of actors that voice an opinion that differs from their own. Studies have shown that those with low levels of generalised trust are more likely to advocate suppression of deviant groups and religions that preach unwholesome ideas. People with low generalised trust levels are

also more likely to support restrictions on the right to run for public office (Rosenberg, 1956, pp.693-694). Based upon the above characterisation, the following can be established as indicators of high levels of generalised trust in actors:

- A general willingness to cooperate with strangers. This could be a willingness to hold negotiations with, enter into agreements with, or seek diplomatic resolutions to problems with actors of a different national, ethnic or ideological background. It could also be manifested in expressions of admiration and respect for those of a different background. Actors with a high level of generalised trust are less likely to see differences as an insurmountable obstacle to cooperation. Those with a low level of generalised trust would be supportive of isolationist strategies and suspicious of external intrusion into domestic affairs.
- A general willingness to cooperate with a large number of actors. Rather than being concerned only with exclusive spheres of cooperation, actors with a high level of generalised trust would be of the opinion that international stability requires the contribution of many nations. Cooperation, as far as a truster is concerned, should be extended beyond one's close neighbours. For the purposes of this study, such cooperation could take the form of treaties, diplomatic relations or institutional arrangements. Actors with low levels of generalised trust will be more likely to attempt to concentrate power in their hands or those of their close allies.
- A lack of fear of exploitation by those with whom one cooperates. An actor with high levels of generalised trust will be more willing to engage with other actors or states, even if evidence suggests that such engagement may present a

danger to the truster's safety. They will be less likely to view superior military strengths of other states as a threat. Those with low levels of generalised trust will be more likely to express the opinion that actors with a fundamentally different ideological standpoint are prejudiced against them.

- An opposition to suppression of deviant voices. Actors with low levels of generalised trust will be more inclined towards silencing actors that do not share their worldview. Non-trusters will be more inclined to view disagreement as a personal insult or even a threat. They may also be supportive of actions to nullify opinions that are inconvenient or deviate from their own, such as political, legal or social exclusion, or even execution.

As the individuals being looked at here are long deceased, use will be made of biographies, diaries, interviews, speeches, transcribed conversations, statements, memoirs, newspaper articles and other historical documents to search for these indicators in the actors that are being analysed. In the case study chapters, for ease of categorisation, those with a high level of generalised trust will be labelled 'trusters' and those with low levels of generalised trust will be labelled 'non-trusters'.

## **Design Features**

The best way to establish if high generalised trust levels in the relevant actors influenced their design preferences is to look at the main points of contention in negotiations surrounding the establishment of the UN. These issues will have created the most debate and should therefore provide the most documentary evidence on the reasoning behind actors' particular positions and preferences. It is not sufficient to merely establish the central negotiation issues, however. Informed by the previous

section on indicators of high levels of generalised trust, this section will also outline the position that trusters and non-trusters are most likely to take in these particular debates. Based upon the literature review carried out in the previous chapter, the rationalist, realist and idealist positions in relation to these particular design aspects will also be detailed. The three features that have been identified as points of major contention for this study are the topic of the Great Power veto, membership and the scope of function of the UN. Each point will be briefly elaborated upon here.

- Great Power Veto: The scope of the veto available to the Great Powers was one of the major points of controversy in negotiations leading up to the establishment of the UN. Actors from the Western nations - for the most part and after some internal debate - held that a party to a dispute should be unable to veto a Security Council decision. The Soviet Union held the position that a great power should be able to prevent any action by the Security Council (Luard, 1982, p.29). If the Great Powers were to forego the power to veto, the Soviets feared the policing power of the UN could have been opened up to the whims of smaller nations. Of even greater concern to supporters of granting the veto, was the possibility that a Great Power may be obliged to take part in actions that are against its interests or even on the territory of that state. This level of exposure worried the Soviets and was also a matter of concern for some in the British and American Governments (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.215). The issue of the Great Power veto, then, was really a question of fear of exploitation. Based upon the characterisation in the previous section, one would not expect an actor with a high level of generalised trust to be too concerned with exploitation, and they would therefore be more likely to favour giving up the Great Power veto.

The rational institutionalist school, with its emphasis on states being motivated by self-interest, the maintenance of sovereignty and the pursuit of power, would predict that the Great Powers would fight for the granting of the veto (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, pp.781-797). Realism would take the same position in relation to the veto, because of the importance it assigns to relative gains (Waltz, 2000, pp.39-41). Idealists, however, would be more likely to predict opposition to the granting of the veto power, because of their belief in the commonality of peace-loving ideals being enough to preserve stability (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p.21).

- Membership: Both the scope of membership and the structure adopted - in terms of using a universal or regional system of membership - were heated points of debate prior to the signing of the UN Charter. Some actors argued that fascist or fascist-type states should be prevented from joining the new institution while others would accept nothing less than a fully universal organisation (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.92) (Cadogan, 1971, p.661). There was also heated debate between East and West – and within the Western nations – on whether or not the UN should adopt a regional structure (Hilderbrand, 1990, pp.38-44, 45-46). By once again looking back at the characteristics proposed in the previous section, one can assume that a generalised truster would be more likely to support a universal institution with an inclusive membership. Such a preference would be informed by their openness to working with strangers and their lack of concern at the exploitation that could occur as a result of opting for a universal over a regional organisation.

Rational institutionalists would claim that uncertainty of the international sphere, fear of opportunism and a desire to centralise power, would lead states to push for

a small number of members and for membership to structure along regional lines (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, pp.781-797). Because of the importance realism assigns to risk avoidance, its proponents would also be more likely to predict fewer members and a regional structure (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, p.782). Idealists would again contradict the other two schools, however, and predict that states would favour a universal organisation that would reflect the common conscience of all nations (Rittberger and Zangl, 2006, p.21).

- Scope of Function: Throughout the conferences held to decide upon the structure, processes and membership of the UN, there was also considerable disagreement between and within the Great Powers over the function of the new institution. Some asked that the UN be limited only to a policing and security function while others sought to have the organisation address a wide variety of issues that could be construed as having an international nature (Roschin, 1990). Because someone with high levels of generalised trust is more likely to be open to working with strangers and in large groupings, one can assume that they would be in favour of the institution having a wider scope than someone with low levels of generalised trust. A non-truster, by comparison, would be more likely to fear the exploitation that could occur as a result of the increased exposure of their state's workings to an international organisation. The suppression of deviant voices - favoured by non-trusters - would also be more difficult to implement, if those voices are more likely to be coming from outside national borders.

Rational institutionalism contends that states will seek to increase the scope of an institution in many instances to counteract enforcement or distribution problems (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, pp.781-797). Realists, however, are likely

to disagree, saying that zero-sum considerations by states will impair forms of cooperation and are likely to hinder the widening of functions (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, pp.784-785). Idealists believe that the building blocks of international organisation are not just material but ideational and would therefore recognise the need to increase an institution's scope of functions (Ruggie, 1998, p. 879).

### **Potential Challenges**

Because this study involves the measurement of dispositional variables from either side of a historic ideological divide, there are a few potential challenges in carrying it out. There are, however, methods to tackle - or considerably reduce the likelihood of - conceivable shortcomings in the findings.

The period in history that is being looked at here immediately precedes the start of the Cold War. In fact, Aleksei Roschin claimed that the Cold War began at the end of the San Francisco Conference in 1945 and that tensions between the Soviet Union and the West were apparent in the very first sessions of the UN General Assembly (Roschin, 1990). Because of the hostility that would mark the next half-century of relations between East and West, one has to take into account potential bias in historical records to emerge from either bloc during this period. To counteract such bias, data will be drawn from sources on either side of the ideological divide as much as is practicably possible.

The data being analysed will be exclusively qualitative, and the study will largely rely on rhetoric and secondary sources to measure levels of trust and design preferences that are not directly observable. This reliance runs the risk of attracting criticism of 'cherry picking' evidence that suits earlier predictions for indicators of trust or design

preferences. One of the reasons for picking four different indicators of generalised trust is to allay such concerns about selective use of information. If any one of these indicators were considered on their own, they would not be enough to make an inference regarding an actor's level of generalised trust. However, by measuring and checking for a correlation between the four indicators, it will be possible to establish such an inference. When analysing the lives of the actors, multiple examples of indicators from several, spread-out stages of their life will be chosen, as opposed to just single instances that suit the argument being made here.

## **4. – British Case Study**

The case study chapters will each be divided into two sections, the first of which will establish the actors' levels of generalised trust, using the indicators established in the previous chapter. With the trusters and non-trusters categorised, the second section of each case study will then seek evidence that the design preferences of each actor in negotiations on the UN were reflective of their levels of generalised trust. The design preferences of each of the relevant actors will be analysed in the context of the three specific negotiation issues highlighted in the Research Design chapter.

### **The British Actors**

#### *Alexander Cadogan*

Alexander Cadogan's diaries provide a valuable look, both at the man's opinions on people from a background that was different to his own, and at his feelings on working with large and varied groups. The editor of his diary, David Dilks, writes that Cadogan was "by no means a cynic." His optimistic disposition, according to Dilks, contributed towards his ability to work with a wide number of groups. Cadogan was a strong believer in the League of Nations, as he "came from experience to believe in the value and promise of Geneva, for most delegates went there with a genuine desire to do business and reach solutions," (Dilks in Cadogan, 1971, p.5). Far from viewing other nationalities and cultures with suspicion, Cadogan embraced interaction with people from different backgrounds and worldviews. During a daylong break in proceedings at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, he was part of a 50-strong group of British, American and Chinese delegates that toured around various sites in Virginia,

meeting locals along the way. Recounting the excursion to his wife, Cadogan wrote; “What extraordinary people – quite charming, and kind to an unimaginable degree, in some ways rather like ourselves but (as you see) so utterly different,” (Cadogan, 1971, pp.662-663). These positive reflections were not confined to Westerners either. Although Cadogan had several fundamental, ideological differences with the Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko - whose stance he found “maddening” both in the pre-UN conferences and at subsequent meetings of the UN - he was personally quite fond of the man. During the Dumbarton Oaks conference, in the midst of heated disagreements between Britain and the Soviet Union, he still described Gromyko as a “very nice and very sensible fellow” (Cadogan, 1971, pp.659, 789). In 1940, when he was working on Allied war propaganda, Cadogan also resisted calls from the French to portray all Germans as “equally wicked” – a notion that he did not accept. Instead he emphasised the need to convey that the Allies did not wish to deny Germans the right to live in peace, but that their quarrel was with Hitler and his system rather than with the German people (Cadogan, 1971, p.316).

When it came to engaging with individuals with whom he disagreed, far from being a proponent of suppression or censorship, Cadogan had a reputation for being mannerly and receptive (Cadogan, 1971, p.19). The British historian Llewellyn Woodward described Cadogan’s minutes of foreign affairs meetings as “models of open-mindedness and sound conclusion,” (Woodward, 1962, p.xxvi). As he reached the end of his tenure as the British Representative to the UN, Cadogan displayed his open-minded position, stating that the West must continue to show that “freedom, open debate and the right to criticise make for moral and material advancement,” (Cadogan, 1971, pp.790-791).

When one considers each one of the indicators, laid out in the previous chapter, of an actor having high levels of generalised trust, there can be no doubt that Alexander Cadogan falls firmly within the ‘trustees’ category.

### *Anthony Eden*

From the early stages of his political career, Anthony Eden displayed a willingness to cooperate and place trust in strangers – a willingness that would prove ill advised in some cases. In 1934, while working as the Minister for the League of Nations, he held meetings with Adolf Hitler, whom he described as charming with a pleasant smile, and with whom he felt an immediate rapport. After his meeting with Hitler, Eden displayed what could be described - with the benefit of hindsight - as an unhealthy lack of fear of exploitation, by proposing to the British cabinet that Germany be allowed enter into a phase of controlled rearmament (Peters, 1986, pp.47-49). Ultimately, he would retire from the National Government in protest at Britain’s policy of appeasement towards Germany, only to return to the position again in 1940. Such a change of heart, however, is not incompatible with an actor with high levels of generalised trust. As pointed out in the previous chapter, generalised trust is the belief that *most* - but not all - people are part of one’s moral community but it can also be informed and affected by personal experience (Uslaner, 2002, p.21) In this case, one could make the case for German aggression causing Eden to change his stance.

Eden’s willingness to engage and cooperate with people of a different background was evident right up until his first retirement from the Foreign Office. In 1938, President Roosevelt sent a telegraph to the British Government suggesting a conference of several nations in Washington to help ease the rising tensions in Europe. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain sent a chilly response to the suggestion,

without consulting with Foreign Secretary Eden. Upon finding out, Eden convinced the Prime Minister to send a more cordial response to Roosevelt's telegraph but the American President felt rebuffed and the conference never took place. In the post-War years, further evidence of Eden's ability to work with different groups could be seen in his talent for diplomatic negotiation. This was exemplified at the Geneva Summit of 1954, at which Eden achieved an "outstanding diplomatic triumph" in playing a pivotal role in bringing about a ceasefire to the First Indochina War through negotiations that involved the US, France, Russia and China. His willingness to work with a larger number of actors could also be seen in his successful attempts to enlarge the signatories of the Brussels Treaty to include West Germany and Italy (Churchill, 1959, pp.14-16). Upon Eden's death in 1977, Margaret Thatcher told the House of Commons that he had always worked towards enduring peace on the basis of mutual respect (Howard, 1977).

This mutual respect that underlined his dealings with others meant that Eden was most certainly not a supporter of the suppression of deviant sentiments. In Eden's first three months as Prime Minister in 1955, Britain saw newspaper, port and railway strikes, which took a very heavy toll on the nation's economy. Eden felt that it was wrong of the striking workers to vent their grievances at such a cost to the country. Years later in his memoirs however, Eden wrote that he respected the function of trade unions in providing a voice to ordinary workers, even if he disagreed with their methods. In fact, Eden opposed the suggestion made by some, in 1955, of introducing legislation to criminalise unofficial strikes (Eden, 1962, pp.285-287). His support for providing a voice to all was also evident in Eden's policies on the British colonies. The result of granting self-government to a territory can sometimes be the suppression of minorities, he stated, and it was the responsibility of the British Government to

ensure that such suppression did not take place in colonies going through that transition (Eden, 1962, pp.381-382).

Anthony Eden cooperated with strangers and large groups. He did not fear exploitation and he opposed the suppression of deviant voices. He could therefore, be categorised, along with Cadogan, as having high levels of generalised trust.

### *Winston Churchill*

Winston Churchill did not share Cadogan and Eden's qualities when it came to tolerance of strangers and openness to those of a different background. In 1919 during a time of unrest against British forces in Iraq, Churchill wrote in his capacity as President of the British Air Council that he was "strongly in favour of using poisonous gas against uncivilised tribes." (Younge, 2002). He told the Royal Palestinian Commission in 1937 that he did not feel that a great wrong had been done to native Americans or indigenous peoples of Australia "by the fact that a stronger race, a higher grade race, has come in and taken its place." (Ankomah, 2009, p.8). After meeting with Joseph Stalin in 1942, Churchill described the Russians as "not being humans at all. They are lower in the scale of nature than the orang-utan." (Cadogan, 1971, p.471).

Churchill's fears of opportunism can be seen in his early warnings that Germany would take advantage of a slump in the development of British warfare technology. On February 7<sup>th</sup> 1929, he requested and was granted an emergency meeting of the British cabinet at which he highlighted that German naval design "was passing into a phase which would render obsolete" Britain's existing naval fleet (Gilbert, 1976, pp.311-312). His warnings about the growing military might of Germany were regular and frequent right up until a month before the outbreak of war in 1939, when he

criticised Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's decision to call a two month recess of parliament at a point when war seemed so likely (Gilbert, 1976, p.1096).

Churchill's fears regarding German intentions in the 1920s and 30s, coupled with his notions of racial superiority, are indicative of someone with a pessimistic view of human nature. In contrast to Cadogan and Eden, Churchill was cynical when it came to placing trust in, and cooperating with, strangers. This pessimism was reflected in his apathy towards the new world organisation and his sentiments regarding the possibility of achieving enduring peace following the end of World War Two. In 1944, Sir Alexander Cadogan wrote that Churchill left a meeting – in which he was meant to partake – and left the rest of the cabinet to discuss “the Peace of the World about which, in present circumstances, I am rather lukewarm.” (Churchill quoted in Cadogan, 1971, p.645).

Churchill's preference for working in smaller rather than bigger groupings of actors – a sign of someone with low levels of generalised trust- was apparent in his localised aims for post-war organisation. A wartime letter to his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden gives a good indication of the Prime Minister's aspirations once hostilities had ended.

“I must admit that my thoughts rest primarily in Europe,” wrote Churchill. “I trust that the European family may act unitedly as one under a Council of Europe.” Later in the same letter, he added; “Of course we will have to work with the Americans in many ways, and in the greatest ways, but Europe is our prime care, and we certainly do not wish to be shut up with the Russians and the Chinese.” (Luard, 1982, pp.19-20).

In his personal life, Churchill enjoyed a happy marriage, was a proud father and grandfather, and maintained strong friendships (Bonham Carter, 1965, pp.145-146) (Pelling, 1974, pp.163-168)(Riddell, 2008). However, in most cases these friendships

were shared with individuals who would rarely have dared to deviate from Churchill's point of view. Violet Bonham Carter - a long-time friend of Churchill's - said that he viewed disagreement with his opinions as obnoxious or even as treachery, and that he "demanded partisanship from a friend," (Bonham Carter, 1965, p.132). This intolerance for opinions that deviated from his own was also reflected in Churchill's views on voting rights for women. In 1927, the British Cabinet debated the proposal of extending the franchise to women between the ages of 21 and 30 but Churchill, fearing that the opinions of this demographic would not tie in with his own, was strongly opposed to such a proposal (Pelling, 1974, p.341).

This inclination towards the suppression of deviant voices, close-mindedness when it came to cooperating with strangers, preference for working primarily with his neighbours and close allies, and fears of exploitation lead to Winston Churchill being categorised as having low levels of generalised trust.

## **Design Preferences**

The second half of the chapter will be divided into three sections, corresponding with the three negotiations issues on the structure of the UN, highlighted in the Research Design chapter. Only the positions adopted by each British actor will be discussed here, while the eventual decisions made on the structure of the institution will be discussed in the results chapter.

### *Great Power Veto*

Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Cadogan was a strong opponent of granting veto powers to any nations, because to allow the veto meant "one simply wouldn't get a World Organisation" (Cadogan, 1971, p.661). Foreign Secretary Eden

shared Cadogan's opinion and was strongly against a complete Great Power veto. However, Churchill's views on the veto differed fundamentally from those of his Foreign Office, and the topic was a major source of tension between the Prime Minister, and Cadogan and Eden. He felt that the unanimity of the Great Powers was essential and that veto powers for the US, the Soviet Union and Britain would guarantee they would be in agreement on every Security Council decision. Without that unanimity, he predicted that the world would be "subjected to inestimable catastrophe," (Hughes, 1974, pp.190-192).

In the context of negotiations surrounding the Great Power veto, Cadogan and Eden fulfil the role criteria of actors with a high level of generalised trust with their opposition to granting veto powers. Churchill, on the other hand, displayed the behaviour that one would expect from someone with a low level of generalised trust, by being a strong supporter of granting such veto powers.

### *Membership*

As outlined in the Research Design chapter, someone with a high level of generalised trust would be inclined to support a universal institution with inclusive membership conditions. The question of membership proved to be another heated point of disagreement between Churchill and his Foreign Office advisers. As far back as 1943, Churchill proposed an institutional structure to Roosevelt that would consist of separate regional bodies from the greater nations of Europe, Asia Minor, the Far East as well as confederations among smaller states (Luard, 1982, p.20). As talks on the UN became more advanced, and Churchill persisted with his regional preferences, the Prime Minister once again found himself at odds with Cadogan and Eden. In May of 1944, at a conference of prime ministers from British dominions, Eden articulated his

views that the post-war institution should be universal rather than comprising of regional bodies. During Eden's speech, Churchill subjected him to "frequent interpellations" in an attempt to garner support for his regional proposal but Eden was supported by the congregation of prime ministers (Pelling, 1974, p.518).

Cadogan was also a strong believer in the idea of a true 'World Organisation' and shared concerns with Eden over Churchill's preference for working on a regional basis (Cadogan, 1971, p.661). In his diary for May, 1944, Cadogan wrote of a conversation he had with Eden regarding Churchill's hopes for regional councils, and expressed a hope that they "may frighten the P.M. off his stupid line." (Cadogan, 1971, p.630).

### *Scope of Function*

At the suggestion of the American delegation, it was proposed at Dumbarton Oaks that a Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions be included as part of the structure of the UN. The US State Department voiced a preference to include as many economic and technical questions as possible within the scope of the new institution, in order to promote peace on several fronts. The proposed council would operate independently, for the most part, but if a serious social or economic matter arose, and it threatened the peace, then it could be taken up by the Security Council (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.89). Cadogan was supportive of the American proposal and joined forces with the US delegation at Dumbarton Oaks in trying to convince the Soviet delegation to agree to the widening of the institution's functions through the Economic and Social Council (Cadogan, 1971, p.662). The Soviet distinction between security and other matters, Cadogan argued, was artificial and overlooked the possibility that economic and social issues might lead to future conflict. Cadogan

informed his counterparts at Dumbarton Oaks that this was not only his position but also that of the British government, which viewed economic and social arrangements as integral parts of any world organisation (Hilderbrand, 1990, pp.86-87). It proved very difficult to find documentary evidence of Anthony Eden's direct opinion on the scope of the UN's functions or specifically his opinions on the Economic and Social Council. However, his time with the League of Nations provides evidence that he was certainly a supporter of proposing economic solutions to end conflicts. In 1935, Eden introduced a resolution calling for an embargo by the League on the purchase of Italian goods. The resolution was in response to Italy's attack on Abyssinia and consisted of an arms embargo and various economic and financial sanctions (Churchill, 1959, p.95). Eden's willingness to use economic sanctions in the days of the League makes it seem very likely that he shared Cadogan's opinion expressed at Dumbarton Oaks.

While it has equally difficult to find an explicit reference by Churchill to the Economic and Social Council, there is some evidence to suggest that this might have been one of those areas, about which the Prime Minister was "cynically jocular" and disinterested (Cadogan, 1971, p.653).

In February of 1944, Roosevelt had sent a detailed telegram to Churchill about the "manifest need for United Nations machinery for joint planning of the procedures by which consideration should be given to the various fields of international economic cooperation." On the same day, Roosevelt sent a second telegram, calling for consideration of the relationship between the proposed United Nations economic planning system and the existing Anglo-American Combined Boards. Churchill failed to respond to either telegram, and when pushed by Anthony Eden to reply, said;

All this frantic dancing to the American tune is silly. They are only busy with their own affairs and the more immobile we remain the better. My recommendation is to let it all rip for a bit.  
(Gilbert, 1986, p.700)

At most, this displays apathy - as opposed to opposition - on Churchill's part towards the idea of post-war cooperation outside of the security realm. It's worth noting, though, that several months later, on the eve of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Cadogan continued to struggle to get instruction from his Prime Minister on the matter (Cadogan, 1971, pp.645-654). One can say, at the very least, that the non-truster (Churchill) showed less enthusiasm for widening the scope of the United Nations than the trusters.

In terms of their positions on the Great Power veto and membership of the UN, each of the three actors take positions that would be expected of individuals with their levels of generalised trust. When it came to the scope of functions they preferred for the UN, the picture is not as clear. There are examples to be seen, however, of Cadogan and Eden being supportive of institutional structures that encapsulate international interests other than strictly security. Churchill, on the other hand, seemed to care far less about this aspect of the new institution. In terms of the three negotiation issues looked at here, the trusters and non-trusters expressed preferences expected of them by the generalised trust literature. That does not answer the question, however, of whether or not generalised trust influenced the eventual design of the UN. That question can only be answered by looking at the eventual design of the UN, and establishing whether the trusters or non-trusters won out in the negotiations.

## 5. - Soviet Case Study

### The Soviet Actors

#### *Joseph Stalin*

Viacheslav Molotov, the other actor being analysed later in this study, was one of Joseph Stalin's closest aides. Molotov said that the former Soviet leader's "wilfulness, harshness, even brutishness, naturally repulsed people," (Chuev, 1993, p.213). In many instances throughout his life, the repulsion was mutual, as Stalin displayed a suspicion of strangers that affected his ability to cooperate with those outside of his immediate sphere. Even in early life, when studying in a seminary, it was remarked that young Joseph Djughashvili (his birth name) would stand out amongst his fellow students for only extending friendly greetings to those with whom he was on very close terms (Ulam, 1973, pp.12, 26). In 1913, Stalin was one of many political exiles sent to the Yenisei-Turukhan region for his Bolshevik activities. There he continued to display the suspicion of strangers that would become a lifelong trait. When he was sent to the region, Stalin spurned the traditional festive reception put on by the other exiles for new arrivals, and instead went straight to his room and refused conversation with others (Ulam, 1973, p.122).

This aversion to working with strangers was also apparent in Stalin's dealings in the international system, as the leader of the Soviet Union. His guidance of the world Communist movement was marked by an innate suspiciousness of actors that did not share his worldview. He urged Communists to fight relentlessly against the leadership of Ghandi, whose movement he discredited as "reactionary". Socialist parties in Europe, according to Stalin, were an "enemy of the proletariat". Stalin welcomed the

damage caused to Western economies by the Great Depression in 1929, for the likelihood that it could lead to a revolution that would quash their capitalist systems (Ulam, 1973, pp.362-363). Even Communists of a different persuasion prompted mistrust in Stalin. He viewed the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Tse-tung, with great suspicion and orchestrated his temporary demotion from the Central Committee of his own party. Mao's crime, in Stalin's eyes, had been the "heresy" of contending that the Chinese revolution, unlike the Russian, must base itself primarily on the peasantry (Deutscher, 1966, pp.580-581). In 1948, Stalin wrote to the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, berating them for daring to question Soviet policies on Yugoslav territory, displaying that his "undying suspicion of others" had not been tempered by old age (Ulam, 1973, pp.666-667).

Stalin's early political career also provides examples of his lack of willingness to cooperate with large groups, even from within his own party. Shortly before he died, Lenin voiced concern that, since he had made Stalin Secretary General of the party, the latter had concentrated much more authority in his own hands than the former had ever intended (Chuev, 1993, p.105). Upon Lenin's death, Stalin made it clear that he would not tolerate more than one solitary voice in the party and oversaw the purging of several internal opposition groups in the 1920s. His career in the Communist party would be marked by a number of purges of individuals and groups that Stalin perceived as a threat (Chuev, 1993, p.xvi). Further evidence of the Soviet leader's lack of regard for the views of other groups can be found in the infrequency with which the entire Communist Party gathered to share its views with the leadership. Between 1934 and Stalin's death in 1953, only two Party Congresses and one Conference took place (Ulam, 1973, p.435).

The above accounts strongly suggest that Stalin was in favour of suppressing voices that he considered deviant. In his personal dealings, Stalin was similar to Churchill in that he demanded partisanship from his friends, a trait that was apparent even to those who encountered him from a young age. Joseph Iremaschvili, a close acquaintance of Stalin's in his youth, said the future Soviet leader was "a good friend so long as one submitted to his imperious will," (Tucker, 1973, p.72). There are many examples from Stalin's later political career that show this requirement for submissiveness in his peers had not abated. By the 1930s, prominent figures that were seen to be involved in forms of opposition to Stalin's regime were executed for treason, many without a public trial (The Times, 1953). Of the 33 men who served on the Politburo between 1919 and 1938, 15 were shot or perished in prison, and two were assassinated. Even Viacheslav Molotov, one of Stalin's closest aides, said years after Stalin's death that the Soviet leader became "sickly suspicious" and suffered from a "persecution complex" (Chuev, 1993, pp.159-161).

The persecution complex observed by Molotov is characteristic of an individual that fears exploitation. Stalin displayed such fears of exploitation in his dealings with other nations also. In his wartime allies, Stalin saw potential enemies and he feared the Soviet Union would be exploited by its involvement with the Western nations following the war. He spoke of "certain absurd prejudices" on the part of the other Great Powers that prevented them from taking an objective attitude towards the Soviet Union (Cadogan, 1971, p.661). Based upon the criteria established in the Research Design chapter, there is strong supporting evidence for Stalin having low levels of generalised trust.

### *Viacheslav Molotov*

Known by Western leaders for being exceptionally stubborn to deal with, Viacheslav Molotov provided many examples, throughout his political career, of his aversion to cooperating with strangers that did not share his worldview. A long time ally of Stalin's, in the post-War years Molotov earned a reputation with Western diplomats for being uncooperative and unyielding. One of the most public displays of this came at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, where he accused the US and Britain of attempting to destroy agreements between the three powers. After Stalin's death, Molotov continued to cast a suspicious eye over states that didn't fall under the Soviet umbrella. He remained supportive of the isolationist policies pursued by his former chief, as shown by his opposition to reconciliation with Yugoslavia (The Times, 1986, p.20). Molotov's hostility towards strangers was also extended to his compatriots, who had left home for foreign shores. While at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, Molotov was asked to attend a party in his honour, being held by Russians that were now living in the US;

An elderly man, apparently their chairman, asked me, 'What has impressed you most about America?'

'What has impressed me? Most of all I am impressed by how poorly they know Russia in America. They know very little about Russia.' They were taken aback, for they were all Russians. But I thought, why should I stand on ceremony with them?

(Chuev, 1993, p.76).

When it came to engaging in cooperation with a large number of groups, Molotov shared Stalin's stance and was the dictator's "most loyal servitor" in the process of ridding the Communist Party of recalcitrant groups (Chuev, 1993, p.xvi). As well as being averse to working in large groupings in a domestic political context, Molotov's suspicions were also to be seen on the international political scene. At a meeting of foreign ministers in 1947 he denounced the Marshall Plan, to rebuild Europe using

American funds, as a weapon in the hands of a strong power to gain sovereignty over weaker ones. Molotov instructed all countries under Soviet influence not to participate in the programme, as it was merely a plan by the imperialists to draw other nations into their company as subordinates (Chuev, 1993, p.62).

His involvement in the silencing of political opponents is also an accurate indicator of how Molotov favoured dealing with dissenters. His stance was reflected in the process of “de-kulakisation”, in which Molotov played a leading role. “Kulak” was an ill-defined social category, which could encompass any peasant who showed insufficient enthusiasm for the collective farming approach favoured by Stalin. As head of the Politburo commission on collectivisation, Molotov engineered many antikulk measures, which exiled millions of peasants to Siberia and other inhospitable locales (Chuev, 1993, p.xvi). Molotov also defended, until his dying day, the central role he played in the deaths of over 40,000 Red Army soldiers, as part of the purge of the military in 1937 and 1938. Such methods, he continued to claim into old age, were essential in order to eliminate a potential “fifth column” emerging in Soviet society. De-Stalinisation - which occurred under Stalin’s successor Krushchev - revealed that most of the so-called military enemies of the people were innocent of all the charges levied against them. Despite this, Molotov fought against the awarding of posthumous pardons to those killed in the purge. He argued that if they had not been guilty of crimes at the time, they were guilty of what they might have done in a future crisis (Chuev, 1993, p.160).

One of Molotov’s driving forces during his career was a fear of exploitation. He saw his main task as Soviet Foreign Minister to protect and “extend the frontier of the Fatherland to the maximum.” He was a proponent of achieving security through territorial expansion, a position informed by the belief that war with the West was

inevitable. This led to the establishment and consolidation of communist regimes, primarily through Soviet military power, in countries around the Soviet perimeter (Chuev, 1993, pp.xix, 6). Ever before the Cold War, Molotov perceived attempted exploitation against the Soviet Union by its World War Two allies. In 1977, while recalling the wartime conferences, Molotov offered this recollection of Winston Churchill;

Not without reason did England lose a little more than 20,000 people while we had more than twenty million victims. That's why they needed us. That man hated us and tried to use us. But we used him too. We made him work with us. (Chuev, 1993, p.49).

The above statement, along with his satisfaction of the other criteria, strongly suggests that Molotov, like Stalin, is classified as having low levels of generalised trust.

## **Design Preferences**

### *Great Power Veto*

In response to Soviet demands for a Great Power veto in advance of Dumbarton Oaks, the British and Americans had indicated that they might have been agreeable to a veto in limited circumstances. The Soviets, however, insisted that they would require a veto power “on all matters, procedures and actions, as well as discussion” for the proposed five permanent members of the Security Council. In the end, the matter could not be agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks and instead was put aside until the Yalta Conference when the leaders of the big three nations would debate the issue (Harbutt, 2010, pp.262-263). In the run up to Yalta, Stalin reiterated to Roosevelt in a telegram that, in terms of Security Council decisions, there would have to be “full agreement of powers, which are permanent members of the council, bearing upon themselves the main responsibility for maintenance of peace and security,” (Hilderbrand, 1990,

p.250). By insisting on the full agreement of the permanent members of the Security Council, Stalin was asking for a Great Power veto. If unanimity is required between these states, it is implied that each state has a veto. At the Yalta Conference in February, 1945, general agreement was reached between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin on the voting procedures – including the issue of the veto – that would be applied once the UN was established. However, the issue once again reared its head and became a subject of debate at the San Francisco Conference in April of 1945. In his address to the conference, Molotov spoke of deeply embedded anti-Soviet prejudice amongst many of the proposed members and potential future members. Under such circumstances, he said, the Soviet Union could not be expected to rely upon the impartiality of other nations when voting upon disputes that might affect its interests. The Soviet Union, he continued, also had to take cognisance of “subtle obstructionists” who were still active in influential British and American government circles (Prince, 1945, p.459, note 11a). Such a sentiment from the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs highlights that he was in agreement with his leader when it came to the issue of the Great Power veto.

### *Membership*

At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the non-truster Soviets seemed initially to have gone against their predicted design preferences by calling for all 16 Soviet republics to be given separate membership at the UN. This should not be perceived, though, as a preference for inclusive membership informed by a willingness to work with strangers and a lack of fear of exploitation. This demand was widely perceived by the other Great Powers as an attempt to grab more Soviet votes in the General Assembly. Not even the most pro-Russian American or British officials believed that any of the

Soviet republics had or were likely to have a foreign policy independent of Moscow (Ulam, 1974, pp.372-373). Nonetheless, Stalin said in a telegram to Roosevelt at the time of Dumbarton Oaks that he attached “exceptional importance to the issue of membership for the republics (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.99).

As early as 1943, the Soviet actors had displayed preferences for an exclusive institution. At the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference that year, Molotov had strenuously objected to the inclusion of China in the Four Power Declaration on General Security (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.61). When negotiations began in Dumbarton Oaks the next year, the Soviets initially requested that no fascist or fascist-type states be granted membership. This suspicion continued after Dumbarton Oaks, and at the San Francisco Conference, Molotov argued forcibly against granting membership to the “fascist government” of Argentina (Hilderbrand, 1990, pp.92, 254). They also questioned whether or not “associated states”, not formally at war with the Axis powers, should be allowed into the UN (Luard, 1982, p.31). By 1945, Communist Party publications had already identified about 20 states, which were likely to become members in the future, but had failed to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, “thus displaying their unfriendly attitude,” (Prince, 1945, p.458). When agreement was reached between the Great Powers on what members would be admitted, Soviet preferences for an exclusive organisation persisted, with their insistence upon the right to expel a member in future (Luard, 1982, p.64).

As one would expect from actors with low levels of generalised trust, the Soviet Union displayed a preference for the UN being organised on a regional rather than universal basis. Stalin – like Churchill – favoured an organisation that was based on the Council of Europe. He proposed a European Commission, featuring the US, Britain, the Soviet Union and possibly one other European state to handle security

problems on the Continent. He also envisioned a Far Eastern Commission for that part of the world and a worldwide organisation, of which the two commissions would be a part (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.45). Despite predictions from some Foreign Ministry officials that such a path would be fraught with difficulties, Molotov supported his leader in his proposals for a regional system of security (Roberts, 2002, p.43).

### *Scope of Function*

As the literature would predict for a non-truster, Stalin showed very little enthusiasm for the UN outside of its security function. The key to the institution's success, as far as the Soviet leader was concerned, was in the policing power of the troika of the Great Powers. His preferences were reflected in the Soviet delegation's reaction, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, to the American proposal of an Economic and Social Council. If the other Great Powers desired the fostering and furthering of economic and social relations, the Soviets proposed, such cooperation should take place through a separate organisation or organisations, that were not attached to the international security institution. Stalin likened the difference of preference between the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans on the issue of the Council, to that between the Westerner's "algebra" and his "practical arithmetic". "I do not wish to decry algebra," the Soviet leader stated on the matter, "but I prefer practical arithmetic," (Hilderbrand, 1990, pp.46, 86). At the San Francisco Conference, disagreements persisted on the fields of responsibility of the UN, with Molotov continuing to argue strenuously against the institution overseeing non-security affairs (Roschin, 1990).

In terms of the Soviet case study, it is also apparent that the actors fulfilled the roles expected of them by the literature on generalised trust. Both Molotov and Stalin

desired the granting of the Great Power veto, a restrictive membership and a limited scope of functions for the UN. The next chapter will look at the results of the negotiations on the three highlighted issues, with a view to establishing whether the preferences of the trusters or non-trusters were realised.

## **6. – Results**

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the decisions that were arrived at by Britain, the US and the Soviet Union in relation to the three negotiation issues that were highlighted earlier. This chapter will be divided into sections, one corresponding with each of the three issues. Within each section, the design that was agreed upon - and whether or not that decision more closely realises the preferences of the trusters or non-trusters - will be established.

### **Great Power Veto**

When agreement could not be reached at Dumbarton Oaks between the Soviets, British and Americans on the Great Power veto, it was decided to put the issue aside until the Yalta Conference the following year. There, it was hoped that the leaders of each nation would be able to arrive at a system of Security Council voting that would be to each member's satisfaction. Initially, those hopes seemed realistic as Stalin accepted an American voting proposal early in negotiations. The voting system, to which Stalin was giving approval, removed the veto power for questions of peaceful settlement from members of the Security Council if they were parties to the dispute. However, on all other non-procedural matters - including questions of enforcing the peace - permanent members retained the veto, regardless of whether they were party to the dispute (Rathbun, 2012, p.149).

The issue of the veto again proved contentious at the San Francisco Conference in May of 1945, when the Soviet delegation changed its position, by demanding that permanent members would have veto power on all discussion topics in the Security

Council, even if they were party to a dispute. However, Stalin eventually relented on the matter when Harry Truman – who had succeeded the recently-deceased Roosevelt - sent one of his predecessor’s closest advisors, Harry Hopkins, to Moscow. There, Hopkins persuaded Stalin to give his approval to the voting procedure initially agreed upon at Yalta (Cadogan, 1971, p.749).

Although there is no mention of a veto in the wording of the UN Charter, the voting formula agreed upon for non-procedural matters required the positive votes of seven (later changed to nine to reflect the increase in the size of the council) members of the Council, “including the concurring votes of the permanent members” (UN Charter, 1945, Art. 27). In effect, this means that one negative vote from one of the permanent members blocks the resolution and has the effect of a veto. As agreed upon by the leaders at Yalta, the only instance in which a Great Power does not have this veto is when a vote is taking place on a question of peaceful settlement on that Power’s territory. This exception is explained under paragraph three of article twenty-seven.

The agreed upon Security Council voting procedure represents a minor step-back from Soviet proposals that had called for an “absolute veto”, which would allow a permanent member to block, without limitation, any resolution of the Council. The Soviets had preserved their state sovereignty and ensured that their fellow Security Council members would not be able to use the policing function of the UN against them (Harbutt, 2010, p.262). It also comes very close to requiring the absolute unanimity preferred by Winston Churchill (Hughes, 1974, pp.190-192). However, the formula was far from what Alexander Cadogan and Anthony Eden had desired. They had fought for a system in which a party to a dispute could not vote on any resolutions relating to that dispute (Cadogan, 1971, p.661).

Given that the only non-procedural issue to which the Great Power veto does not apply is a specific circumstance that does not involve the use of UN force, the non-trusters would seem to have had their preferences realised to a much greater extent than the trusters in this instance.

## **Membership**

One of the main points of contention in negotiations related to membership – how many Soviet republics would be permitted entry to the UN – was solved during the Yalta Conference. Molotov told the Western delegations on November 7<sup>th</sup>, 1944 that the Soviet Union would be willing to accept membership for three Soviet republics, as opposed to the 16 they had initially requested (Ulam, 1974, p.373). Much to the dissatisfaction of the Soviet Union though, Argentina was admitted as a member at the San Francisco Conference. This was despite Molotov having labelled the state as being “fascist” earlier in the conference (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.254).

Measures were taken, however, to exclude other states from the UN, going against the aspirations of those with high levels of generalised trust who were expecting a universal organisation. At San Francisco it was decided that entry would be open to “peace-loving” states. The “peace-loving” clause, however, meant that entry was not available to “any regime installed with the help of the armed forces” of the Axis powers. This meant that a number of states, including Spain and Italy, were not considered eligible for membership. It was also agreed that future membership would be decided upon by a vote of the General Assembly but such a vote could only be made on the recommendation of the Security Council. The need for a Security Council recommendation meant that the Great Power veto would apply to questions of membership. The first decade of the UN would be marked by many disputes

regarding membership as a result of applications having to pass through these two separate rounds of approval (Luard, 1982, pp.361-365). The Soviet Union was also successful in its efforts to insist upon the right to expel members from the UN, further detracting from the universal constitution desired by generalised trusters. With the agreement of the other Great Powers, a mechanism was included in the design of the UN that allowed for both expulsion and suspension of membership on the recommendation of the Security Council (Luard, 1982, pp.64-65).

In terms of the membership structure for the institution, there was general agreement amongst the Great Powers by early 1945 that the UN would be organised along worldwide lines, as opposed to regional. The system - proposed by Churchill and the Soviets - incorporating a few separate security organisations under the umbrella of the UN, would not be realised (Hilderbrand, 1990, pp.45-46)(Cadogan, 1971, p.630). However, a number of amendments were adopted at the San Francisco Conference, in relation to the delegation of powers to regional organisations. This undermined the universal nature of the membership structure. While this section is concerned with the universality of the membership, the breakdown of powers between the UN and regional organisations is relevant to the membership discussion. The motivating factor for non-trusters, in prioritising a regional institution over a universal one, is a concern over exploitation. They fear that, by joining an institution with nations from each corner of the globe, they will be obliged to make certain guarantees – particularly in the area of security - to states that hold no strategic interest for them (Uslaner, 2002, pp.19-25). This fear of exploitation was allayed for the non-trusters, however, by introducing measures that made it less likely that the international community would have to address every instance of conflict.

In response to calls from the Soviet Union and Latin America, it was agreed between the Great Powers that there would be exceptions to the law, which forbade action being taken by regional organisations without the approval of the Security Council (Luard, 1982, pp.51-54). The first exemption concerned a scenario in which an individual state was taking “measures against an enemy states” as a result of the Second World War. The second set of circumstances allowed for;

Regional arrangements directed against a renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such a time as the organisation may, on the request of the government concerned, be charged with the responsibility of preventing further aggressions by such a state.  
(Luard, 1982, p.53)

According to Luard, this amendment made it “substantially less likely that the new UN enforcement machine would ever come into use,”(Luard, 1982, p.54). Security - the most important function of the UN according to those with low levels of generalised trust – had been delegated, in large part, to individual states or regional organisations (Hilderbrand, 1990, p.46). As it turned out, Churchill’s desire to not be “shut up” with nations other than their traditional allies was, to a large degree, realised.

## **Scope of Function**

After much discussion with their British and American counterparts, and several consultations with Stalin and Molotov in Moscow, the Soviet delegation at Dumbarton Oaks dropped their objection, in principle, to the establishment of an Economic and Social Council within the overall framework of the UN. This paved the way for the new institution to pursue world stability and peace through means outside of the security sphere. Soviet acquiescence came with some conditions, however. The draft plan for the Council that had been prepared by the US delegation at Dumbarton

Oaks contained specific references to “educational and cultural problems”, a reference which the Soviets insisted be removed. The US delegation subsequently asked that any reference to “technical cooperation” be removed from plans for the Economic and Social Council, for fear such cooperation would compromise secret military information. The inclusion of human rights as one of the concerns of the new council also resulted in several further requests for alterations from the Great Powers. The British feared that the focus on human rights might give the UN grounds to criticise the internal organisation of members. The main British fear here was that the institution would put unwanted attention on colonial rule in India and other British territories. The Soviets argued that it was not the main task of an international security organisation to oversee human rights and basic freedoms. In the end, it was agreed that one of the responsibilities of the Economic and Social Council would be to “promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Any fears that the delegates had about this responsibility interfering with their own internal workings was solved by a British proposal, forbidding the Security Council from involving itself in domestic affairs unless they presented a direct threat to world peace. The Economic and Social Council would have the power to make recommendations to the General Assembly and Security Council but not decisions. (Hilderbrand, 1990, pp.89-93).

Jens Martens, director of Global Policy Forum Europe, has decried the decision in 1945 to give the Economic and Social Council this limited power of recommendation, which he says had the effect of making it a “second class body” (Martens, 2006). The fear of exploitation held by non-trusters was largely taken care of by the fact that the Council cannot interfere in domestic matters. Although states that disagree with the views of the Council do not have the means to suppress it, they are under no

compulsion to follow through with its recommendations. While the scope of the UN's functions was widened through the introduction of a council through which non-security questions could be addressed, the Economic and Social Council itself turned out quite watered down.

## 7. – Conclusion

Viewed through the prism employed by this study, one can infer from the findings that generalised trust played so small an influence on the design of the UN that it could be considered minimal or even negligible. Of the International Relations schools of thought looked at in Chapter Two, a theory employing generalised trust would appear to fit best within constructivism. However, the results of this study can be much better accounted for by rational institutionalism. This chapter will summarise the findings, highlighting how rational institutionalism best explains the outcomes in each instance. An account will be provided of what these findings mean for other theories that incorporate generalised trust. Recommendations will also be made for further lines of enquiry that could be followed in this area in future studies. It should be borne in mind that this analysis is only looking at the institutional design of the UN, as agreed upon in 1945, and is not considering the changes that have taken place in the institution since that period.

### *Rational Institutionalism and the UN*

The Great Power veto, which generalised trusters opposed, was ultimately written into the design of the UN. The only exception to the use of this veto power was one specific circumstance that did not involve the use of force. In terms of this design feature, generalised trust had little, if any, influence. Because they recognise that states are motivated by self-interest and prepared for the worst-case scenario, rational institutionalist scholars would not have been surprised at this outcome (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, pp.781-782).

The list of founding UN members, as agreed upon in 1945, excluded certain states that were perceived to have uncertain intentions – a very important motivating factor, according to rational institutionalists. This was despite efforts from those with high levels of generalised trust to achieve a world organisation. In order to counter uncertainty regarding the intentions of those states that *were* accepted as members, regional groupings were granted the right to engage in military action in circumstances that are open to interpretation, without having to fear reprimand from the Security Council. Introducing this kind of flexibility undermined the universal nature of the institution. To a large degree, it removed the responsibility from all member states to come to the aid of another, regardless of their geographic location. Increasing flexibility to institutional arrangements to deal with uncertainty between states is another expectation of rational institutionalists (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, pp.778, 793).

While the scope of function of the UN was widened, following bargaining between the Great Powers, the main council through which non-security matters would be handled was ultimately given secondary status in 1945. The downgrading of the Economic and Social Council to a recommendation-making body was largely in response to fears of exploitation, a characteristic of those with low levels of generalised trust. The widening of scope of the UN with the creation of the Council, however, is in line with the expectations of rational institutionalism, which contends that such widening occurs when there is a large number of heterogeneous states (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, p.785).

### *Uslaner*

The work of Eric M. Uslaner, which provided most of the generalised trust data for this study, has been reinforced by the findings of this study. Using indicators, based upon Uslaner's work, actors were categorised as generalised trusters or non-trusters.

Again using Uslaner's theories on generalised trust, design preferences were predicted for the trusters and non-trusters. Analysis of UN negotiations showed that these predictors proved accurate, as the actors expressed design preferences that would be expected of them, based upon their categorisation.

Other aspects of Uslaner's generalised trust work were also fortified by the findings here. The inconsistent effect that living in a democratic state can have on generalised trust was seen, with the actors from Britain being a mix of trusters and non-trusters. Uslaner's theory, regarding communist and authoritarian regimes being damaging to trust, was reinforced by the actors from the Soviet Union having undoubtedly low levels of generalised trust. His contention that generalised trust levels are established early in life and remain basically stable thereafter also proved accurate (Uslaner, 2002, pp.26-27, 225-230). For each of the actors analysed, indicators of high or low levels of generalised trust were selected over long samples of time. In every case, the categorisation of each actor remained stable, despite indicators being identified several decades apart in some cases.

### *Rathbun*

Some of the findings of this study contradict those of Brian C. Rathbun, who contends that generalised trust has driven American multilateralism and is reflected in the design of multilateral international institutions (Rathbun, 2012, p.xi) (Rathbun, 2011, p.244).

Rathbun studied plans prepared by the US State Department in advance of the UN planning conferences, and accurately surmised that initial American drafts were heavily influenced by generalised trust. These plans granted no veto to the Great Powers - even on matters relating to the use of their own armed forces - and also contained an automatic guarantee that obliged the Great Powers to respond to a breach of the peace. In order to gain congressional approval, later drafts watered down these conditions to appease the mostly non-trusting Republicans that dominated the Senate. Even the Republicans, however, agreed to a condition that states would not resort to force to resolve disputes (Rathbun, 2011, pp.262-265). These draft plans - and Rathbun's analysis of the American policy-makers responsible for them - led to his inference that generalised trust levels informed the design preferences of trusting and non-trusting actors. The analysis carried out in this study, of British and Soviet actors, arrived at the same conclusion.

However, Rathbun's claim that generalised trust is reflected in the design of the UN becomes problematic when one considers that each one of the above conditions, contained in the US proposals, did not feature in the institution's eventual design. The absolute veto was awarded to the Great Powers, barring one exceptional circumstance. This means, of course, that no action taken by the Council would be automatic, as it can be prevented by any one of the Security Council permanent members when the time comes to vote. The exceptions to the rule forbidding nations or regional organisations from taking military action also watered down the condition intended to prevent states from resorting to force to resolve disputes. Generalised trust, as Rathbun states, did allow certain actors to commit to multilateralism but in terms of the UN, most of the multilateral commitments started and finished on the pages of a US State Department draft. The design eventually agreed upon could be

much better explained by a series of rational institutionalist hypotheses offered by Rathbun himself in 'Before Hegemony' (Rathbun, 2011, pp.252-253).

Rational institutionalism, he states, relies on a particular notion of trust - the strategic variety. This is the kind of trust that emerges "when actors have information that leads them to believe that specific others have a self-interest in reciprocating cooperation rather than violating their trust." This conception of trust, he claims, cannot account for instances where states make binding commitments, particularly security guarantees, without knowing the conditions of their having to fulfil that commitment (Rathbun, 2011, p.244). However, the findings of the study provide no examples of states making such commitments. In each of the negotiation issues looked at here, the decisions arrived at were influenced more by rational choice and strategic trust than generalised trust.

The Great Power veto gave the architects of the UN the power to approve or disapprove of their "commitments" as they saw fit. It was retained in almost every circumstance, thus guaranteeing the Great Powers their sovereignty and protection from exploitation. Membership was restricted to states that had intentions with which the Great Powers were comfortable. The scope of the UN's function was indeed widened but one would be hard pushed to argue that a large degree of trust was required on the part of the Great Powers to create a council that was restricted to just making recommendations. The prevailing form of trust evident in the UN negotiations was the strategic kind. Specific information, or a lack thereof, can be seen to have played a strong influence in each of the design features of the institution that were studied here. A lack of knowledge about future intentions drove the institutionalisation of the veto; specific information about non-Great Power states' loyalties dictated if they were permitted to join the UN; and the impulse to protect

specific information from scrutiny – whether it was US military secrets, British colonial practices or Soviet domestic policies – resulted in the watering down and disempowering of the Economic and Social Council.

### *Further Studies*

An obvious line of enquiry to next pursue in this area would be to look at other design features of the UN. The negotiation issues discussed here were amongst the most contentious but several other features of the institution's design created heated debate and could be analysed also. Using the same generalised trust literature and indicators, one could further examine the role, if any, played by generalised trust in the design of the UN through study of these other features. As well as broadening the number of design features looked at, one could also widen the number of actors to be analysed. Although the actors looked at in this study did play pivotal roles, future research could take in secondary actors in policy-making or advisory roles.

Another worthwhile possibility would be to look into the effect that generalised trust had on the establishment of other international institutions. As well as studying the UN, Rathbun has also researched the role of generalised trust in the establishment of the League of Nations and NATO (Rathbun, 2012). Like his UN work, however, Rathbun's analysis of these other two institutions focuses primarily on American multilateralism. Analysis of these institutions from the perspective of the non-American founding nations could provide further insight into what role generalised trust plays in informing the design of international organisations.

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