Non-Governmental Organisations and lobbying strategies on EU trade policy

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Abstract

Since the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the competences of the European Union (EU) in trade policy have expanded to a large extent. As a result, EU trade policy issues have attracted the attention of various lobby groups in recent years. As Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) represent one of the biggest group of lobbyists in Europe, this study aims at investigating their lobbying behaviour and strategies specifically in the policy domain of trade. Thus, this study serves two research purposes. First, this dissertation intends to show how different European NGOs work on EU trade policy issues and in what way lobbying has been pursued so far. Second, it intends to analyse whether several factors, which were regarded as influential in existing literature, can account for the NGOs’ varying use of inside and outside lobbying in the specific case of EU trade policy. For this endeavour, interviews and an online survey were carried out. The analysis of the qualitative interview data reveals both differences and similarities between different NGOs that are active in EU trade policy. The quantitative findings demonstrate that the NGOs’ receipt of EU funding as well as access to institutions, policy-makers and public officials accounts for an explanation of the use of lobbying strategies. Moreover, it becomes evident that the public salience as well as technicality of an EU trade policy issue play an important role for the NGOs’ lobbying behaviour.
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This is for Mikey.
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List of Abbreviations

ACP states  African, Caribbean and Pacific Group states
BEUC        European Consumer Organisation
CETA        Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement
COREPER     Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSD         Civil Society Dialogue
DG          Directorate General
EC          European Commission
ECJ         European Court of Justice
EDRi        European Digital Rights
EESC        European Economic and Social Committee
EP          European Parliament
EPAs        Economic Partnership Agreements
EPHA        European Public Health Alliance
ETR         European Transparency Register
EU          European Union
FoEE        Friends of the Earth Europe
INTA        International Trade Committee
MEPs        Members of the European Parliament
NGOs        Non-Governmental Organisations
TFEU        Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TiSA        Trade in Services Agreement
TTIP        Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
WEED        World Economy, Ecology and Development
1) Introduction

EU trade policy has become an increasingly contested policy domain in recent years. This is not only because of the exclusive competence of the European Union (EU) in EU trade policy since the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, but also due to the various aspects and issues this policy domain now encompasses (Woolcock 2010a, pp.9-10). It is argued, that the EU’s “deep trade agenda” has led to the mobilisation of new actors (Young and Peterson 2006, p.800). Included among them are so-called Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which currently see their political interests at stake (Jarman 2008, p.26). Strong lobbying of European NGOs on EU trade policy became particularly evident throughout the decision making process of the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the United States (TTIP) and the proposed Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA) between 2013 and 2016.

Although European interest group research has expanded in the last decades, empirical studies on the lobbying behaviour of NGOs and their strategies are rare. In addition, EU trade policy has not gained much attention in this specific research field in the past few years. Given recent developments, however, there seems to be a need for more thorough and current research on this specific interest group type and this specific policy domain.

Consequently, this study intends to underpin European interest group research by examining the following two research questions: How do European NGOs work specifically on EU trade policy and in what way have they recently engaged in lobbying? Moreover, which factors influence the NGOs’ use of inside and outside lobbying on EU trade policy issues?
The here presented study is therefore structured as follows. The first chapter provides the reader with key definitions and general information. After that follows a chapter on the interest and lobby group system of the EU, in which the reader gains an understanding of the EU’s exchange with lobby groups, and particularly, NGOs in the policy domain of trade. The third chapter reviews existing literature, and simultaneously, points to the hypotheses that are analysed in subsequent chapters. The chapter on the dissertation’s research design reasons the applied methods, provides information on the sample and explains the process of data collection and the here conducted analyses. In the fifth chapter, the findings of the qualitative and quantitative analysis are presented. Followed by that, all obtained findings are discussed. To conclude the dissertation, the researcher offers an outlook for further research and points to broader implications of this study.
2) Definitions and general information

This chapter will present the key terms and their academic interpretations, and subsequently, offer definitions. Moreover, this chapter will introduce the study’s main actors of interest, namely Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and illustrate how they are defined in the context of this dissertation. The final section will provide basic information on the EU institutions as well as their functions and competences specifically in EU trade policy.

2.1) Definition of lobbying, lobby groups, lobbyists and interest groups

In most academic works, lobbying is understood as political act through which actors or groups seek to influence public policy or governmental decision making (Beyers 2008; Klüver 2011; Klüver 2013; Lelieveldt & Princen 2011). In the context of the EU, the term lobbying is defined in a similar way and encompasses “[…] all activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes of the European institution” (European Commission 2006, p.5). The interest groups pursuing lobbying are referred to as lobby groups, whereas individual actors are called lobbyists.

As this study focusses on groups rather than individual actors, this study adopts the term **lobby group**, which is defined as

“[a] group that focuses its efforts on influencing government officials and institutions in their interest without aiming at taking over direct government responsibilities through participation in elections […]”

(Karr 2007, p.57)
Therefore, any groups or actors that are formally part of the government are excluded. It is important to note that there is no clear distinction between lobby and interest groups. Therefore, **lobby groups** and **interest groups** will be used **interchangeably** in the context of this study.

In alignment with academic understandings, **lobbying** is defined here as political activity of different lobby or interest groups that aim at altering policy issues and outcomes in a way that is aligned with their political interests and preferences (Beyers et al. 2008, p.1106; Lelieveldt & Princen 2011, p.300).

2.2) **Definition of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)**

In this study, the researcher will focus on European “Non-governmental organisations” (NGOs) that are involved in lobbying activities in the EU. The term “NGOs” is a collective term describing a specific interest group type (Frantz and Martens 2006, p.23; Pirker 2014, p.199). Despite the different definitions in academic works, there exists a consensus on the key attributes of NGOs. As the name already implies, an NGO does not consist of governmental actors and is not managed by the government in its operations (Lewis 2010, p.1057; Willetts 2010, p.9). Moreover, an NGO is a “formally constituted organisation” (Butler 2008, p.562), that is not profit driven and does not seek governmental power (Butler 2008, p.561; Frantz and Martens 2006, p.24; Willetts 2010, p.9). Because they represent the interest of the public or civil society and are active in various areas of public action\(^1\) (Frantz and Martens 2006, p.24; Lewis 2010, p.1056), NGOs are also often termed as “non-profit organisations” or “civil society organisations” (Butler 2008, pp.561-562; Lewis 2010, p.1056).

\(^1\) It is important to note that NGOs work on different issues (e.g. environment; development, human rights, animal welfare, etc.) and also represent the interest of particular societal groups (e.g. gay people, socioeconomically disadvantaged people, etc.) (Lewis 2010).
In the context of this dissertation, **NGOs** are regarded as specific type of interest or lobby groups. They are defined as not-for-profit organisations with a formal organisational structure which do not encompass governmental actors and whose purpose is to advocate for the public interest and civil society. In the same way as other authors, the here applied definition excludes religious entities, research and academic organisations, political parties (see Charnovitz 1997, p.187), criminal groups (see Willetts 2010, p.26), businesses, trade and professional associations.

2.3) **EU institutions: Functions and competences in EU trade policy**

The European Union (EU) is a supranational organisation and currently consists of 28 member states. The EU is characterised by its institutional division of power. The European Commission (EC) holds executive competences and functions and is responsible for the initiation and development of EU legislation (Nugent 2006, pp.167-171). Together with the European Parliament (EP), the Council forms the legislative body of the EU (Horspool and Humphreys 2012, pp.38-41). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the institutional body that represents the judicial branch of the EU (Hardacre 2011, p.126).

As this dissertation focusses on EU trade policy, and particularly EU trade agreements, it is essential to outline the decision making process and role of EU institutions in this policy domain. First, it is important to mention that EU trade policy stands under exclusive competence of the EU, meaning that EU member states have no legislative power in trade matters at the national level (Bache et al. 2015, p.479; Woolcock 2010b, p.383). The Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) lays out the EU’s negotiation process of trade agreements. The EC takes on an important role as key initiator of trade agreements. On behalf of all EU member states, the EC’s Directorate General of Trade (DG Trade) negotiates with trading
partners on proposed trade agreements (Nugent 2006, p.489; Woolcock 2010b, p.388). However, as set out in the Article 218 (2) and (3) TFEU, the Council needs to authorise the EC to negotiate on a trade agreement by giving consent through a negotiation directive or mandate. Moreover, the special trade policy committee of the Council, also often referred to as the “Article 133 Committee”, functions as the EC’s assistant and advisor throughout the negotiation process (Nugent 2006, p.489; Woolcock 2010b, p.389). Besides that, the Council “[...] decides on the signature and conclusion of the agreement” (European Commission 2013, p.6).

Not only the Council, but also the EP plays a significant role in the EU’s decision making. Since the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EP has the legal rights to control and co-decide on EU trade policy (Brok 2010, p.216; Leinen 2010, p.101). It is legally binding to keep the EP “[...] immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure” (Article 218 (10) TFEU). In specific cases, which are laid out in the Article 218 (6) (a) TFEU, the EC needs to receive the consent of the EP before it can make further steps towards the conclusion of a trade agreement. In all other cases, the EP has to give its opinion in a certain time frame which has been specified by the EC. In case the EP does not comply with the set time frame, the EC is legally entitled to further proceed (Article 218 (6) (b) TFEU). However, “[t]he adoption of provisions that fall within member-state or mixed-competence are also subject to ratification at member-state level, including by national parliaments” (Woolcock 2010b, p.392).

2.4) Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to ensure comprehensibility throughout the study, which sets its focal point on European NGOs that are active in lobbying on EU trade policy. The first section defined the key terms of this dissertation in accordance with academic literature. In the second section, the reader was informed about the general
functioning of the EU and was introduced to the EU’s institutional bodies and their respective formal powers. In addition, the researcher outlined the decision making process of EU trade policy, and particularly, EU trade agreements.
3) The interest and lobby group system of the EU

This chapter will provide the reader with the necessary information on the working of the interest and lobby group system of the EU. It will discuss the purpose and the functioning of the EU’s exchange with interest and lobby groups while pointing to different academic works. Particular attention will be devoted to the exchange of EU institutions with interest and lobby groups, and especially, NGOs in the field of EU trade policy as this is important for the dissertation’s first research question.

In many scholarly works, the question was raised as to how the interest group system of the EU can be best described. Bache et al. (2015, p.315) state that the EU’s relationship with interest groups “[…] wavers between pluralism and informal institutionalization”, meaning that the EU engages with a number of different interest groups, but at the same time, organises its engagement only to some extent. According to Lelieveldt and Princen (2011, p.135), the interest group system of the EU is generally considered to be “[…] predominantly pluralist. That is, there are many interest groups, and it is easy for them to gain access to EU policy-making but they have to share this access with a range of other groups”.

What becomes evident, however, is the academic consensus on the function of interest and lobby groups in the EU. Often times, scholars speak of a “systemic dependence” on such groups at the EU level, which is naturally created as a result of the EU’s systemic features: Within the EU institutions, popular engagement is limited. Moreover, the multi-level governance system of the EU encompasses “pooled sovereignty” for its associated member states (Greenwood 2011, pp.1-2). Thus, interest groups play a major role in countervailing the lack of popular representativeness in a supranational, largely regulation-oriented political system, and therefore act as “agents of accountability” (Greenwood 2011, p.1).
Despite the importance of interest groups in the context of the EU, so far there exists no unitary approach on the engagement with such actors at the supranational level (Tanasescu 2009, p.85). According to Obradovic (2009, p.318), a common approach on interest and lobby group engagement can be hardly achieved as each body of the EU is equipped with institutional autonomy that allows them to “[…] adopt their own internal rules and procedures. Consequently, they do not have an obligation to synchronize those conventions among themselves”. Moreover, the function and competence area of each EU institution differs, which is why a common lobbying regulation scheme may not be feasible or appropriate for the needs of all institutional bodies (Obradovic 2009, p.319). Therefore, a separate look needs to be taken at different EU institutions and their engagement with interest and lobby groups in the rest of the chapter.

3.1) European Commission (EC)

Most scholars agree that the EC is of particular interest for interest or lobby groups (Bache et al. 2015, p.317; Greenwood 2011, p.29; Nugent 2006, p.341; Tanasescu 2009, p.56). Some authors presume that interest groups are a “natural constituency” of this institutional body (Greenwood 2011, p.33). Similar to this, Laffan (2002, p.130) argues that

“[…] given the paucity of Commission staff, the spatial scope of EU regulation, Europe’s deep diversity and the technical nature of EU regulation, the Commission has developed an interdependent relationship with interest groups”

(Laffan 2002, p.130)

In particular, the EC has used funding as a means for empowering rather resource-poor interest and lobby groups, such as NGOs, and to boost its democratic legitimacy and accountability (Greenwood 2011, p.136; Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011).
The rationale behind the EC’s engagement with interest groups in the policy domain of trade seems to be driven by similar reasons as mentioned above. Because of its democratic deficit, lack of legitimacy and lack of expert knowledge, the EC opened new venues for interest group access in EU trade policy, which NGOs use for their lobbying activities (Jarman 2008, pp.26-27). Another reason for the inclusion of and engagement with interest groups in EU trade policy is that it increases the EC’s bargaining leverage over member states and third countries in trade negotiations (Woll 2009, pp.277-278).

In general, it can be said that the EC’s Directorate Generals (DGs) represent important lobbying targets for interest and lobby groups, as they are in “[…] regular contact with the corresponding working group in the Council of Ministers and committee in the European Parliament” (Bouwen 2009, p.23). In 1998, the EC established the Civil Society Dialogue (CSD) within the confines of DG Trade, in order to make a step towards more formalised inclusion of interest and lobby groups (Dür and De Bièvre 2007, p.80; Kröger 2008, p.25; Woll 2009, p.281). As part of the CSD, the EC’s DG Trade “[…] organises meetings on such issues as public health, services, agriculture, environment and sustainable development, investments, competition, intellectual property […]” (Dür and De Bièvre 2007, p.85) and integrates different interest groups, including NGOs. Moreover, working groups have been established in the CSD, whereby each focuses on a specific aspect of EU trade policy (Kröger 2008, p.25). However, a number of scholars call into question to what extent NGOs and other interest and lobby groups can effectively alter the EC’s position on EU trade policy through the CSD (Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Kröger 2008; Woll 2009). Gerlach (2006, p.178), for instance, concludes that “[…] civil society meetings […] seem to provide mostly an opportunity for networking and representation”. Another lobbying venue for
interest groups to influence EU trade policy is the engagement in the EC’s set up expert groups. Here, specific policy issues are discussed among different stakeholders in order to consult and advise the EC in the pre- and post-legislative phase (Gerlach 2006, p.178). Therefore, expert groups can be regarded as “forum of discussion”, through which the EC gathers non-binding input (European Commission 2017).

3.2) European Parliament (EP)

As a result of its increased power since the Lisbon Treaty and its “[…] ability to amend and, where Treaty provisions stipulate, to co-decide upon proposed legislation” (Greenwood 2011, p.24), the EP and its directly-elected Members of Parliament (MEPs) now present attractive targets for interest and lobby groups (Joos 2014, pp.37-38; Lehmann 2009, p.50). This is also the case in the policy domain of trade (Woll 2009, p.282).

At the EP level, there exists a variety of opportunity structures for interest group lobbying (Nugent 2006, pp.343-344). Since the “[r]apporteur, shadow rapporteurs, and committee chair, with the assistance of the committee secretariat and group officials, are the main gatekeepers in forming the opinion of the Parliament […]”, they attract special attention to interest groups (Lehmann 2009, p.52). In general, it can be said that interest groups put extreme focus on the EP’s lead committee and its appointed rapporteur after the EC’s submission of a legislative proposal (Greenwood 2011, pp.40-41; Lehmann 2009, p.43; Nugent 2006, p.343). In trade matters, the International Trade Committee (INTA) of the EP mostly forms the leading committee (Woolcock 2010b, p.389), which “[…] is permitted to organise a hearing with experts, where this is considered essential to its work on a particular subject” (European Parliament Committees 2017). Moreover, the EP has clear-cut standards for those interest groups that seek or have access to the Parliament buildings and MEPs: The
registration of interest groups in the European Transparency Register (ETR), is a prerequisite before access can be granted (European Commission 2016, p.5).

An additional lobbying venue for interest groups within the EP are so-called Intergroups, which are formed by individual MEPs and consist of third parties (such as citizens’ and business interests) in order to address specific topics in more depth (Nugent 2006, p.344; Tanasescu 2009, pp.49-50). In Greenwoods words (2011, p.41), Intergroups act “[…] as an informal forum for discussion as well as a means to link politicians with various civil society stakeholders”.

A number of currently existing Intergroups deal with issues relevant or related to EU trade policy, such as common goods and public services, climate change, sustainable development and biodiversity or wine, spirits and quality foodstuffs (European Parliament 2017).

3.3) The Council and national governments

For interest and lobby groups, the Council represents a rather inaccessible target for lobbying. This is largely due to two reasons: First, the Council, which consists of ministerial representatives of the EU member states (Hardacre 2011, p. 52), comes together “[...] behind closed doors and generally, groups do not have direct access” (Bache et al. 2015, p.318). Some authors state that this exclusion of interest and lobby groups is a deliberative decision made by the Council (Nugent 2006, p.340). Second, the Council does not lack information and expertise as much as other institutional bodies, since the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) as well as a large number of national working groups support the Council’s work (Bache et al. 2015, p.318; Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, p.61). As a result, interest and lobby groups
devote their lobby efforts to national governments through which they hope to have an indirect effect on the Council (Bache et al. 2015, p.318; Nugent 2006, p.40).

**3.4) The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)**

Although the EESC has no executive or legislative power at the EU level, the EESC represents an official and institutionalised body of the EU. Westlake (2009, p.128) describes it as

“[…] a privileged interlocutor and a valuable partner. From the lobby’s point of view, the EESC potentially represents a valuable source of intelligence and an additional vector for influence”.

(Westlake 2009, p.128)

The EESC was established by the EU and dates back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Tanasescu 2009, p.43; Westlake 2009, p.128). For consultation and advisory purposes at the level of the EP, EC and Council, the EESC brings together the representatives of different economic and social interest groups (Horváth & Ódor 2010, p.168; Horspool and Humphreys 2012, pp.62-63). In the past, the EESC was restricted in its actions and therefore only allowed to provide the EC with suggestions and opinions on legislative proposals. As for today, the EESC’s has acquired the legal right to initiate on any matters relating to the EU (Westlake 2009, p.129).

EU trade policy is, among others, one of the key interests of this institutional EU body. The EESC set up a Follow-up Committee on International Trade, which “[…] is to ensure the EESC’s involvement in international trade issues on a regular and consistent basis” (European Economic and Social Committee 2017). However, it has to be mentioned that the effectiveness of the EESC in influencing the EU’s decision-making process remains largely contested in academia: While some authors doubt the EESC’s influence because of its ambiguous role and lack of involvement within the EU (e.g.
Bache et al. 2015, p.313; Nugent 2006, p.315; Wallace 2010, p.86), others regard it as important and powerful institutional body (e.g. Hardacre 2011, p.132; Westlake 2009, p.141).

3.5) Conclusion

This chapter introduced the reader to the interest and lobby group system of the EU. In general, it can be said that the EU faces different interest and lobby groups. Thus, the EU lobbying system is characterised by its interest pluralism. Moreover, it became evident that the EU offers various venues or access points for interest and lobby groups to participate in the decision making process, which is often said to emanate from the EU’s lack of representativeness and legitimacy. Nonetheless, so far there exists no shared approach on the engagement with such groups among the different EU institutions. Although it could be seen that almost all institutional bodies exchange with interest and lobby groups, some interact in more or less formalised ways. Moreover, it became evident that interest and lobby groups have a number of possibilities to participate in EU trade policy, for instance, through the meetings of the DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue, the Intergroups of the EP or the European Economic and Social Committee.
4) Literature review

The main purpose of this chapter is to review existing literature on interest and lobby groups which is directly connected to the second research purpose of this study. First, however, this chapter will locate the literature on lobbying strategies into the wider context of European interest group research. Followed by that, theoretical and empirical studies on interest groups and lobbying strategies will be introduced. It should be noted here that academic works on this specific topic can be divided into two sets of literature as scholars investigate the use of different types of lobbying strategies: While one set of literature puts special analytical focus on inside and outside lobbying strategies, the other set concentrates on national and European lobbying strategies.

As the latter is not of priority interest for the dissertation’s research, this chapter will offer a short overview of the literature focussing on the explanatory factors for national and European lobbying practices. After that follows a more thorough review of theoretical papers and conducted studies on inside and outside lobbying. Here, it will be shown how inside and outside lobbying is understood within academia and the reader will be familiarised with the theoretical arguments, applied methods and key findings. At the same time, the researcher will introduce the hypotheses that are under review in subsequent chapters. In the end, a summary of the chapter will be offered in order to pinpoint to the current research gaps this dissertation intends to fill. Moreover, the here investigated explanatory factors will be outlined.
4.1) The importance of lobbying strategies in European interest group research

As this thesis is first and foremost concerned about lobbying strategies of interest groups in the EU, it is essential to place this research topic within its overall research field. It can be seen that, as for today, this research subject represents a focal point in European interest group research. In a comprehensive scholarship review, Bunea and Baumgartner (2014) systematically analysed the current status quo of European interest group research. It became evident that the research field is dominated by two main themes (Bunea and Baumgartner 2014, pp.1421-1422): While a large body of literature is geared towards investigating lobbying strategies, forms of participation and access of interest groups (e.g. Junk 2016; Klüver et al. 2015; Chalmers 2013; Dür and Mateo 2013; Klüver 2012; Eising 2007), a set of studies analyses the determinants for interest group influence and lobbying success in the EU (e.g. Bunea 2013; Chalmers 2011; Klüver 2011; Mahoney 2007; Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Michalowitz 2007). Beyers et al. (2008, p.1114) identified a key interest of scholars in interest group access, lobbying strategies and influence as well as differences across different interest group types (e.g. Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Klüver and Saurugger 2013).

For the further course of this study it is crucial to have a detailed look at the academic works concerned about lobbying strategies so that the research gaps within this specific research topic can be portrayed. The subsequent table (Table 1) intends to give the reader an overview of the academic works which will be included and addressed in the rest of the chapter. It distinguishes between the two sets of literature on lobbying strategies, the interest group focus and examined explanatory factors.
Table 1: Selected studies on interest groups and lobbying strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s) and year</th>
<th>Strategy, focus</th>
<th>Interest group focus</th>
<th>Explanatory factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilts (2001)</td>
<td>National and European</td>
<td>Dutch trade and employer associations</td>
<td>Contacts with national and European authorities and agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beyers (2002)</td>
<td>National and European</td>
<td>Belgian interest groups</td>
<td>Interest group type; access to national and EU officials and institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strategy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyers and Kerremans (2007)</td>
<td>National and European strategy</td>
<td>Belgian, French, German and Dutch interest groups</td>
<td>Interest group type; resource dependency; policy domain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dürr and Mateo (2010)</td>
<td>National and European strategy</td>
<td>Irish interest groups</td>
<td>Contacts with national and European authorities and agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Klitver (2010)</td>
<td>National and European</td>
<td>French and German</td>
<td>Financial and personnel resources; embeddedness in domestic institutional context</td>
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<td></td>
<td>strategy</td>
<td>agricultural interest groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beyers and Kerremans (2012)</td>
<td>National and European strategy</td>
<td>Belgian, French, German and Dutch interest groups</td>
<td>Resources; access to national officials and institutions; policy issue; connection to domestic institutional context</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dürr and Mateo (2012)</td>
<td>National and European strategy</td>
<td>German, Irish and Spanish interest groups</td>
<td>Interest group type; expertise and information resources; access to national and EU officials and institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Klitver (2012)</td>
<td>European strategy</td>
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<td>Specialisation, professionalisation and dispersion of authorities; financial and personnel resources;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beyers (2004)</td>
<td>Inside and outside strategy</td>
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<td>Interest group type; expertise and informative resources; access to EU officials and institutions;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bindekrautz and Kroeyer (2012)</td>
<td>Inside and outside strategy</td>
<td>Danish interest groups</td>
<td>Policy goals; interest group type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junk (2016)</td>
<td>Inside and outside strategy</td>
<td>NGO:</td>
<td>Support base; financial resources; issue complexity; issue salience; public good character of policy issue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dürr and Mateo (2013)</td>
<td>Inside and outside strategy</td>
<td>Austrian, German, Latvian, Irish and Spanish interest groups</td>
<td>Group type; material resources; policy type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Klitver et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Inside and outside strategy</td>
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<td>Issue complexity; issue salience; policy type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beyers (2008)</td>
<td>Inside and outside strategy</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Issue salience; members and sponsorship; leadership autonomy; specialisation; policy type</td>
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Source: Own creation.
4.2) Studies on national and European lobbying strategies of interest groups

As already mentioned above, scholarly works on lobbying strategies can be further subdivided into two sets according to the respective focus on specific types of lobbying strategies. This section briefly outlines key concepts and arguments in studies on national and European lobbying.

In order to account for the variation in national and European strategies of lobby groups, a number of studies argued from an organisational perspective. Some authors assumed that organisational characteristics or factors of an interest group, such as its members and constituency, explain why interest groups devote more or less of their efforts to national and European lobbying (see Beyers 2002; Beyers and Kerremans 2007). Others put more emphasis on other organisational factors, like an interest group’s specialisation or functional differentiation of staff, its degree of professionalization and its dispersion of decision-making authorities (see Klüver 2012).

Moreover, a number of authors investigated this variation in strategies from a resource-based perspective. For instance, studies hypothesised on financial and personnel resources (see Klüver 2010; Klüver 2012), an organisation’s resource dependency on the national level (see Beyers and Kerremans 2007), or an interest group’s endowment of expertise and information (see Dür and Mateo 2012). The aspect of resources has also been connected with the interest group type of national interest groups, as scholars assume that some interest group types enjoy better resource-endowment than others (see Dür and Mateo 2012).

The aspect of access to national and European institutions was also connected to the interest group type and presents another factor that scholars analysed (see Beyers 2002;
A few research papers investigated whether contacts of national interest groups to different political actors and institutions affects the way in which they make use of national and European lobbying (see Wilts 2001; Dür and Mateo 2010). In addition, some scholars focussed on the explanatory power of an interest group’s embeddedness in and connection to the domestic institutional context (see Klüver 2010; Beyers and Kerremans 2012).

4.3) **Studies on inside and outside lobbying strategies of interest groups**

First, it is essential to display how inside and outside lobbying strategies are understood. The above outlined set of literature distinguishes lobbying strategies according to the geographic location where lobbying takes place (national level or EU/supranational level). The more relevant set of literature to this dissertation distinguishes lobbying strategies according to the different addressees as well as channels through which lobbying takes place. This becomes clear when looking at Table 2, which lays out the specific characteristics defining inside and outside lobbying.

**Table 2: Characteristics of inside and outside lobbying**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inside lobbying</th>
<th>Outside lobbying</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Addressed to political actors and institutions</td>
<td>1) Addressed to wider audience and public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Takes place in political sphere and generally</td>
<td>2) Takes place in public sphere and open setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closed setting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Encompasses bargaining with advisory bodies,</td>
<td>3) Encompasses media campaigns, protests, press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technical committees, agencies and parliamentary</td>
<td>releases and press conferences as well as engaging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>committees as well as contacting and engaging with</td>
<td>with reporters, journalists and editors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political actors and institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Direct influence on policies</td>
<td>4) Indirect influence on policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Direct transmission of information from interest</td>
<td>5) Indirect transmission of information from interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group to policy-makers</td>
<td>group to policy-makers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inside lobbying refers to those lobbying activities through which interest or lobby groups try to influence policy issues and outcomes **directly** by addressing **decisive**
**political actors and institutions.** Thus, interest groups pursuing an inside lobbying strategy deploy their information directly in the political sphere. Outside lobbying, on the contrary, refers to lobbying activities through which interest or lobby groups try to influence policy issues and outcomes indirectly by addressing the wider audience in the public sphere. Here, interest or lobby groups deploy their information in the public sphere, and thus, make use of media, press and protest in order to create indirect pressure on political actors and institutions. It is important to emphasise that those two strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that interest groups often combine inside and outside lobbying (Beyers 2004, p.215; Junk 2016, p.237).

In general, it can be said that existing literature has put special focus on three key sets of explanatory factors which are said to account for the interest groups’ varying use of inside and outside lobbying.

**Resources**

Many scholarly works devoted special attention to the resources or resource-endowment of lobby groups. Within academia, it is generally assumed that inside lobbying presents the more costly strategy for interest groups as it requires more material resources or stronger expertise in order to be influential in the political sphere\(^2\). Therefore, scholars predicted that the more resources an interest group encompasses, the more they are able to exert direct influence, and therefore, largely pursue inside lobbying (Beyers 2004; Dür and Mateo 2013). What becomes evident, however, is that this aspect has been interpreted and analysed differently across several studies. While Dür and Mateo (2013) evaluated the explanatory power of staff resources, Beyers (2004) construed expertise as a decisive resource which would

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\(^2\) The study of Junk (2016) presents an exception. The author predicts that financial resources increase the use of both strategies.
influence an interest group’s deployment of inside and outside strategies. Moreover, the aspect of resources has been investigated in relation to the specific interest group type and analysed as conditional factor in some research works (see Beyers 2004; Dür and Mateo 2013). Because of the different interpretations, and often times, conditional use of the aspect of resources, empirical studies reached contradictory results. The quantitative findings in the research work of Beyers (2004), for example, could not substantiate the resource-based hypotheses. In contrast to that, the effect of staff resources was partly supported for some interest groups in the study of Dür and Mateo (2013): The quantitative analysis showed that business interests pursue more inside lobbying with an increased number of staff, while other interest group types, such as citizen groups and professional associations, remain largely unaffected at higher levels of staff resources.

**Organisational factors**

It is only in recent years, that organisational factors have been analysed as potential determinants for the varying use of inside and outside lobbying. It needs to be said, however, that resources were often considered as organisational determinant, which is why the division between the two sets of factors often times seems unclear in existing literature.

Beyers (2008) presumed that lobbying is not only embedded within the political context of policies but also within the “immediate environment” of a lobby group. Therefore, aspects that are strongly related to the maintenance of an interest group, such as its members and sponsorship, are said to come into play. In addition, Beyers (2008) argued that it matters whether an interest group is specialised in a topic or rather addresses various subject areas. More specialised organisations, in contrast to more encompassing organisations, are expected to engage in more inside lobbying and seek
to influence EU institutions and EU policy-makers directly. This prediction is based on the assumption that specialised organisations hold “[...] detailed information and specialised knowledge that some policy-makers require” (Beyers 2008, pp.1201). Consequently, “[...] specialisation allows the forming of positions which contain specialised technical information and expertise [...] Such positions may be less vague and, therefore, potentially more rigid and informative” (Beyers 2008, pp.1204). In sum, specialised organisations are said to be more able to meet the policy-makers’ need for expertise, and thus, strategically deploy their technical information directly in the political sphere to gain influence in the decision-making process. The hypothesis of Beyers (2008) with regard to specialisation will be tested in the course of this study.

**H1: Interest groups that are specialised in the targeted policy domain pursue more inside than outside lobbying than interest groups which are not specialised.**

Beyers (2008) also purported that an interest group’s leadership autonomy, which is defined as the dependence of a group on its members for taking action and shaping positions, affects the way in which inside and outside lobbying is used. Beyers (2008) argued that interest groups with more leadership autonomy engage in more inside lobbying. It is argued that they are “[...] less inhibited by cumbersome internal decision-making procedures [...]” (Beyers 2008, p.1203), and thus, represent more valuable interlocutors in the political sphere as they can provide quick and coherent information to policy-makers. This hypothesis will also be evaluated in this dissertation.

**H2: Interest groups that are more autonomous vis-à-vis constituent members in their activities and policy positions pursue more inside than outside lobbying than interest groups which are less autonomous.**
Junk (2016) purported that the nature of the support base influences the NGOs’ use of inside and outside lobbying in EU environmental policy. Her argument is based on the assumption that lobbying is used as a means to influence policies as well as to sustain the funding relationship. According to the author, an NGO, “[...] always needing to secure continued funding, […] can be expected to use its lobbying to address and please its financial supporters” (Junk 2016, p.239). Consequently Junk (2016) expected that NGOs that obtain funding from governments engage more in inside lobbying through which policy-makers, public officials and governmental institutions are addressed. Although Junk (2016) could not find statistical support for her hypothesis, it will be adapted and investigated in the context of this study.

**H3:** Interest groups that are funded by the EU use more inside than outside lobbying than interest groups which are not funded by the EU.

**Policy-related context factors**

In academic works on inside and outside lobbying strategies of interest groups, researchers have taken into account the issue context of a policy or so-called policy-related context factors. A number of scholarly papers considered the public salience of a policy issue as a relevant determinant. Public salience is commonly understood as “[...] the relative political attention [a] specific policy issue gains compared to other policy issues […] among stakeholder as well as the overall public […]” (Klüver et al. 2015, p.452). More generally speaking, a salient issue is publicly visible (Beyers 2008, p.1189) and “[…] a large number of positions on the issue are already expressed […]” (Junk 2016, p.241). It is generally argued that interest groups regard outside lobbying as more effective when a policy issue receives wider public attention (Junk 2016).

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3 Junk (2016) also predicted that NGOs with a member-centred support base pursue more outside lobbying. However, this hypothesis seems to be based on a vague argumentation, and therefore, will not be further examined in this dissertation.
Junk’s (2016) binary logistic regression results reveal that the higher the public salience, the more likely NGOs pursue outside lobbying (Junk 2016, p.247). Thus, the effect of public salience seems worth investigating, and therefore, will be tested in this dissertation.

**H4:** Interest groups pursue rather outside than inside lobbying in publicly salient policy issues than in not publicly salient policy issues.

Another policy-related contextual factor analysed in studies on inside and outside lobbying is the complexity or technicality of a policy issue. Complexity is commonly understood as “[…] the degree to which a problem is intricate and difficult to analyse […]” (Junk 2016, p.243; Klüver 2011, p.487). According to Klüver et al. (2015), the more technical and complex the policy issue at stake, the more technical knowledge and expertise is required by EU institutions. As it is expected that interest groups will adapt to the informative requirements and demands of EU institutions, the complexity or technicality is said to affect the interest groups’ strategies to a large extent (Klüver et al. 2015; Junk 2016). Policy issues that are rather complex are said to lead to more inside lobbying “[…] as intricate issues can overwhelm publics who have only a limited attention span” (Junk 2016, p.240). The quantitative results of Junk (2016, pp.248-251) revealed that the positive effect on inside lobbying is not significant and that only a small negative effect of increased complexity exists on outside lobbying. Nonetheless, this thesis intends to investigate whether technicality influences the NGOs’ use of inside and outside lobbying on EU trade policy issues.

**H5:** Interest groups rather pursue inside than outside lobbying in technical policy issues than in non-technical policy issues.

In addition, scholars have considered the policy type of a policy issue as a relevant policy-related contextual determinant. Similar to the above outlined aspect of
resources, this explanatory variable was laid out differently in existing studies. Beyers (2008), for example, distinguished between unifying, particularistic and dividing. Klüver et al. (2015) applied a different typology of policy types, whereby the author distinguished between regulatory policies (shaping behavioural practices), distributive policies (through which governments would distribute resources to societal groups) and redistributive policies (regulating the transfer of resources from one group to another). Dür and Mateo (2013) solely distinguished between distributive and regulatory policies in their empirical study. In addition, the authors predicted that distributive and regulatory policies do not affect all interest group types in their lobbying strategies in the same way. The authors’ hypotheses were only supported in some cases:

“Business associations engage in more inside lobbying than citizen groups across all policy fields, but the difference is particularly pronounced in policy fields that we characterised as distributive energy, industry and transport policy. In contrast, there is only a minor difference between the two types of groups in the case of regulatory policy fields (migration, employment and health)”.

(Dür and Mateo 2013, pp.673-674)

Scholars also recently looked at policy goals and predicted that they have an effect on the lobbying behaviour of interest groups. So far, the empirical research of Bindekrantz and Krøyer (2012), which focussed on Danish interest groups and their lobbying activities in this national context, represents the only empirical study that has investigated this aspect. The authors argued that lobbying strategies are customised to the interest group’s respective policy goal. According to Bindekrantz and Krøyer (2012, p.116), “[s]ome policy goals are well suited to capture the attention of the media, whereas others are more easily raised in direct interaction with bureaucrats”. Consequently, they tested to what extent different characteristics of policy goals (e.g. the divisibility or technicality of policy goals) influence the use of different lobbying
strategies[^4]. Bindekrantz and Krøyer (2012, p.133) conclude that policy goals in combination with the interest group type account for an explanation of the use of different lobbying strategies.

**Access**

Besides the above outlined sets of determinants, one more explanatory factor for the use of inside and outside lobbying can be found in existing literature. So far, however, this aspect only received marginal attention. The effect of the interest groups’ access to EU institutions was analysed in the quantitative study of Beyers (2004).

He predicted that those interest groups which have regular informal and formal exchange of information with public officials and policy-makers, and thus gained better access, engage more in inside lobbying. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that “[…] those with routine access to policymakers capitalize on this and invest further in [inside] strategies”[^5] (Beyers 2004, p.212). The correctness of the prediction of Beyers (2004) will be investigated in this study.

**H6:** Interest groups that have more access to decisive actors and institutions of the EU pursue more inside than outside lobbying than interest groups which have less access.

As Beyers (2004) combined the aspect of interest group type with the aspect of access, the author came to following results: His hypothesis, that access to EU institutions has a negative effect on the use of outside strategies, was confirmed for special interest groups, characterised by their concentrated and delimited constituency, but did not hold for diffuse interest groups usually defending rather broad and public interests. In

[^4]: Bindekrantz and Krøyer (2012) further divided inside strategies into the administrative and parliamentary strategies and outside strategies into the media and protest strategies.

[^5]: The change in direct quotation was made in order to adjust to the here applied terminology. The author’s content was not changed. In the study of Beyers (2004), outside strategy is labelled as voice strategy and inside strategy as access strategy.
contrast, his statistical analysis revealed that access to the EU institutions is in some cases positively correlated with outside strategies for diffuse interest groups (Beyers 2004).

4.4) Conclusion

This chapter reviewed relevant literature to this dissertation’s second research question. It has been shown that lobbying strategies present an important object of research within European interest group research. Moreover, two different sets of literature were identified, while each concentrates on different types of strategies. In the course of this chapter, it became evident that authors in both sets of literature put emphasis on different factors which are expected to explain the interest and lobby groups’ use of one or the other strategy. It is interesting to see that studies with a specific focus on national and European lobbying and studies on inside and outside lobbying investigated similar sets of explanatory factors (see Table 1). Still, it needs to be mentioned that explanatory factors were often interpreted and operationalised differently. In particular, this became clear in academic works on inside and outside lobbying that included the aspect of resources. Furthermore, it has been shown that studies often times combined different determinants, expected conditional relations between factors or focussed specifically on different interest group types.

By looking back at Table 1, the major research gaps in the set of literature that focusses on inside and outside lobbying become clear. First, the explanatory power of organisational factors has not been investigated sufficiently enough in this context. While Beyers (2008) hypothesised on a set of organisational factors, his predictions have not been tested empirically yet. Only one study (Junk 2016) investigated the effect of the support base or source of funding on inside and outside lobbying. Third, the explanatory power of access to public officials, policy-makers and institutions has
not gained much of attention in empirical works and has only been examined in the study of Beyers (2004). Finally, the use of inside and outside lobbying has not been analysed in EU trade policy until now. Consequently, the objective of this dissertation is to underpin existing literature and fill these four research gaps. In addition, this study intends to show that the inclusion of the most relevant determining factors accounts for a more holistic and accurate explanation for the varying use of inside and outside lobbying. As Figure 1 displays, this dissertation takes a closer look at three different sets of explanatory factors.

Figure 1: The three sets of explanatory factors

- **Organisational factors:**
  - Specialisation in policy domain
  - Leadership autonomy
  - Source of funding

- **Access:**
  - Access to decision-making political institutions, public officials and policy makers in policy domain

- **Policy-related context factors:**
  - Public salience of a policy issue
  - Technicality of a policy issue

*Source: Own creation.*
5) Research design

The previous chapter offered a systematic overview of European interest group research which is focussed on lobbying strategies of interest and lobby groups. Besides that, the chapter provided an outline of the explanatory factors and related hypotheses this study intends to investigate. In this chapter, the research design of this study will be presented. For the avoidance of possible ambiguities, the first section will state the research questions of this research project and will refer to the respective research methods. The second section of this chapter will provide information on the sample of this study and will point out to its limitations. In the following sections, it will be explained how data was collected and how the data was analysed in order to answer this study’s research questions.

5.1) Research questions and methods

This dissertation is interested in two different, however, related research questions. The first goes as follows: How do NGOs work specifically on EU trade policy and in what way have they pursued lobbying in this policy domain? The more specific research question of this study refers to two specific lobbying strategies: Which factors influence the way in which NGOs pursue inside and outside lobbying on EU trade policy? Thus, this study intends to obtain valuable descriptive and explanatory findings.

In order to answer the first research question, the researcher decided to apply a qualitative method and collect data through interviews. The decision for a qualitative method has not been made arbitrarily. With the help of qualitative methods researchers are able to “[…] develop an understanding, an interpretation, of the way in which those they study understand their actions and the context in which they act” (Keman and Woldendrop 2016, p.309). As the first research question asks for in-depth information
on the NGOs’ working and lobbying behaviour specifically in EU trade policy, the collection of qualitative interview data represented the most appropriate method. Numeric data obtained through quantitative methods would not have provided adequately detailed information.

For the second research question, however, the researcher decided to apply a quantitative method and to conduct a survey. The research question is geared towards the assessment of potential explanatory factors which might account for the NGOs’ varying use of inside and outside lobbying in EU trade policy. Thus, it would have been difficult to test the proposed hypotheses on specific explanatory factors through qualitative data which lacks the required precision for this endeavour. In contrast, quantitative survey data “[…] can be used for theory testing or hypothesis testing to try to understand why things happen” (Halperin and Heath 2012, p.262).

5.2) Sample

A specific excerpt of the European Transparency Register (ETR) was used to get a list of NGOs which potentially pursue lobbying on EU trade policy. As part of the wider European Transparency Initiative (European Commission 2006), a new register for interest and lobby groups has evolved and developed over the last decade. In 2011, the EC and EP jointly launched the ETR which comprises different registered interest groups that seek to influence the decision-making and implementation of EU policy (European Commission 2011). So far, the registration is carried out on a voluntary basis. Recently, however, efforts have been made towards the implementation of a mandatory register for the EC, EP and the Council (European Commission 2016).

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6 It is important to note here that survey and interview participants were both selected from the specific ETR excerpt.
7 The registration in the ETR is a prerequisite for obtaining access rights to the EP (see p.12).
With the help of the selection options of the ETR, the researcher was able to create a list of NGOs that are interested and potentially active in EU trade policy. Thus, the study only included interest and lobby groups that were a) registered under the section III: Non-governmental organisations, platforms and networks and similar b) reported to have a European and global level of interest[^8] and c) reported interest in the field of trade. In total, this specific excerpt of the ETR comprised 505 interest and lobby groups which met the three criteria.

After an extensive error correction, however, the number of NGOs relevant to this research project was reduced to 303. In total, 202 organisations were excluded for several reasons: First, a large number of interest groups, such as business or professional associations, trade unions, research or academic institutions, was falsely categorised as NGO and therefore excluded (85 groups or 42.1 percent). Second, organisations not established in a European country were excluded since the study refers to European NGOs (37 groups or 18.3 percent). Third, organisations that did not provide an e-mail address could not be incorporated into the study (78 groups or 38.6 percent[^9]). Also double entries were excluded (two groups or less than one percent).

Although the ETR remains one of the largest databases encompassing relevant information on interest and lobby groups in the EU, it shows some deficiencies. In general, it can be said that the ETR lacks in correctness and preciseness: While inspecting the ETR excerpt for erroneous entries, the researcher observed that interest and lobby groups often times assign themselves to a group category they do not fit in.

[^8]: Interest groups that solely focus on the national and/or regional/local level were not incorporated in the study. Reason behind this was the assumption that those groups which are interested in EU trade policy would also indicate to have a European and/or global level of interest, as this policy field is highly internationalised.

[^9]: The researcher could not include NGOs that did not provide an e-mail address or could only be contacted through a contact form since relevant information about the study and data collection had to be passed on via e-mail correspondence and attachments.
Moreover, the researcher noticed that the information of organisation was partly not up-to-date (e.g. inaccessible homepages or outdated names of organisations). It also remains doubtful whether the ETR is representative and comprises the whole population of interest and lobby groups which try to influence EU trade policy as the registration is carried out on a voluntary basis. Despite these shortcomings, the ETR still presents a valuable data source. So far, it remains the only lobby register which allows to search by various interest and lobby group criteria at the same time. As this largely simplifies the creation of a study’s sample, the researcher decided to utilise the ETR while accounting for and eliminating entry errors.

5.3) Data collection and data analysis

As already stated above, relevant data for the first research question was collected through interviews, whereas data for the second research question was obtained from surveys. Prior to the data collection, both interview and survey participants were contacted via e-mail. As the ETR only lists links to homepages, the researcher had to take the NGOs’ e-mail addresses from their websites. Although it was tried to reach NGO staff that focusses on EU trade policy or trade-policy related areas and issues, some invitations for the interviews and online survey had to be sent to general enquiry addresses (e.g. contact@... or info@...).

Interviews

In total, 43 NGOs were contacted for the interviews. The potential interview participants were selected from the specific excerpt of the ETR. Thereby, the researcher ensured variation in the NGOs’ size, prominence and overall focus of

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10 The researcher received ethical approval for both the survey and interviews from the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee of the University of Limerick (2017_06_31_AHSS). Throughout the whole research process it was ensured that all steps followed the ethical regulations and requirements.
interest. 34 NGOs with an office in Brussels were asked for a face-to-face interview, while a total of nine NGOs from different EU countries were asked for a Skype interview. In the end, the researcher was able to conduct five face-to-face interviews at the NGOs’ offices in Brussels and two interviews via Skype\textsuperscript{11}. The average length of the semi-structured interviews was 30 minutes. The researcher used the online survey as rough interview guide. For the most part, however, the researcher ensured to leave space for additional questions and responses coming up in the course of the interview. In general, the interviews consisted of questions on past and present lobbying activities on EU trade policy issues, the use of inside and outside lobbying and the organisational set-up of the respective NGO. All interviews were audio recorded with the help of the IPhone app Dictaphone.

The researcher transcribed all audio recorded interviews and read the transcripts thoroughly. After that, the interviewees’ answer responses were organised in a separate document in order to detect similarities and differences across the seven NGOs. As most interviews contained very detailed information, the decision was made to report on the key findings. Moreover, special attention was given to interview material that is related to the second research question and the quantitative analysis of this dissertation.

Survey
The anonymous online survey was created with the survey software unipark (www.unipark.com). At the start, the link to the online survey was sent to 260 NGOs. After the researcher received feedback for the face-to-face and Skype interviews, the researcher sent out 30 more e-mails for the completion of the survey\textsuperscript{12}. Within one

\textsuperscript{11} Unfortunately, only two German NGOs were willing to hold a Skype interview.

\textsuperscript{12} NGOs that replied that they were not available for interviews or did not reply at all within two weeks were asked to fill out the online survey. Three out of 34 NGOs invited for a face-to-face interview and
month, 31 out of 290 contacted NGOs completed the online survey, which corresponds to a response rate of approximately 10.7 percent.\(^\text{13}\)

The online survey (see Appendix A) included questions through which the researcher aimed at investing the three sets of explanatory factors that possibly influence the NGOs’ varying use of inside and outside lobbying in EU trade policy. In order to measure the dichotomous dependent variable, namely more inside and more outside lobbying, interview participants were first asked how they usually pursue lobbying on EU trade policy issues. Since inside and outside lobbying are not regarded as mutually exclusive (see p.20), three different answer categories were offered: 1) “Inside lobbying” 2) “Outside lobbying” 3) “Both”. Survey participants that said to pursue “Both” were led to a filter question and were asked to indicate in what proportion their respective NGO would pursue inside and outside lobbying.

In this dissertation, the existence of departments or divisions that devote most of their time to lobbying activities on a specific policy area was treated as indicator for the specialisation of an interest group. Consequently, survey participants were asked to indicate whether their respective NGO has divisions or departments specifically geared towards lobbying activities on EU trade policy issues.

As already stated in this dissertation’s literature review, leadership autonomy describes to what extent an interest group is autonomous vis-à-vis its constituency in its political positions and actions (see p.22). In the survey, this factor was measured directly: Survey participants were asked to indicate how they would describe the leadership

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\(^{13}\) The software programme unipark revealed that a total of 86 NGOs accessed the survey. Therefore, the response rate generated on the basis of the number of accesses accounts for 36 percent.
autonomy of their respective NGO. Here, the researcher offered four answer categories (see Appendix A).

Moreover, the survey included a question on the NGOs’ sources of funding. In the context of this study, the EU and associated institutions, private individuals, national governments and member organisations were seen as the most relevant sources of funding for the here observed NGOs. Consequently, the survey included the four sources of funding as answer options.

In order to assess the explanatory power of the two policy-related context factors, survey participants were asked how lobbying would be pursued in four different scenarios. The level of technicality and public salience varied in each of the four scenarios: 1) “Highly technical and publicly salient” 2) “Highly technical and not publicly salient” 3) “Non-technical and publicly salient” 4) “Non-technical and not publicly salient”.

For the purpose of measuring the explanatory factor or concept of “access”, the researcher decided to use three different indicators. It was assumed that the contact frequency with public officials or policy-makers indicates to what extent an interest group has access to the respective political system. Therefore, the survey included a question on the NGOs’ contact frequency with public officials and policy-makers of the EU. Besides that, the survey asked whether the participant’s respective NGO holds access rights to the EP as this was treated as second indicator for the concept of “access”. The participation in institutional bodies, working groups or committees was

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14 Survey participants were able to choose more than one answer category since NGOs receive funding from various sources.

15 This variable could have been measured directly by including a question on how the survey participants would judge their organisation’s access to the EU in the area of EU trade policy. However, this would have led to the measurement of the NGOs’ perceived access. Therefore, the researcher decided to measure the de facto access of NGOs by using three different indicators.
treated as a third indicator for interest group access. Important to note here is that NGOs were asked about their participation specifically in the EESC, Intergroups of the EP and meetings of the DG Trade CSD. All three were regarded as the most important participation venues for interest groups in EU trade policy.

Most of the quantitative data obtained from the surveys was analysed with the help of cross-tabulations that were created with the statistical software programme SPSS. It should be mentioned here that different answer categories had to be collapsed or merged together due to the survey’s small sample size (see Appendix B). In order to evaluate the effect of the different explanatory factors, the researcher calculated the direct effect size by using the results from the cross-tabulations. Moreover, the researcher used the Pearson’s chi-squared test and Fisher’s exact test to see if a statistically significant association between the two variables under investigation exists\textsuperscript{16}. For general judgements on the investigated hypotheses, however, a strict reliance on the statistical significance (p value) at a confidence level of 95\% seems problematic. Since the study’s survey only encompasses 31 observations, \(\alpha\) errors (null hypothesis is falsely rejected) and \(\beta\) errors (null hypothesis is falsely accepted) are more likely to occur. Consequently, the researcher relied on the measure of the direct effect size, while, at the same time, accounting for the probability with which the results have been generated by chance.

For the evaluation of the effect of technicality and public salience, the researcher created four bar charts displaying the answers given in the four different scenarios. The results of the four bar charts were compared with each other so that the effect size

\textsuperscript{16} The Fisher’s exact test has to be used in cross-tabulations in which more than 20 percent of the columns have an expected count less than five.
of salience and technicality could be investigated. Moreover, this allowed to uncover potential interactive effects between technicality and public salience.

5.4) Conclusion

In this chapter, the research design of this study was outlined. It has been shown that the decision was made to use a qualitative research method for the first research question, whereas a quantitative method was applied for the study’s second research question. An excerpt of the ETR offered a list of NGOs which possibly engage in lobbying on EU trade policy. Potential participants for the online survey and semi-structured interviews were contacted via e-mail. In the end, the researcher conducted seven semi-structured interviews (five face-to-face interviews in Brussels and two Skype interviews) and received 31 completed online surveys. A content analysis was used to analyse the qualitative interview data. The quantitative survey data was analysed with the help of cross-tabulations and bar charts which were generated in SPSS.
6) Analyses

In this chapter, the conducted analyses will be offered. In the first section, the reader will be provided with the key findings of the seven semi-structured interviews with NGO staff. As already stated above, the interviews were conducted with the purpose to gain more in-depth knowledge on how NGOs work specifically on EU trade policy and in what way the respective organisations have pursued lobbying in this policy domain. In the second section, the quantitative analysis will be presented which aimed at investigating the explanatory power of three sets of factors which were expected to influence the use of inside and outside lobbying. This section will demonstrate the results obtained from generated cross-tabulations and bar charts and point to the proposed hypotheses.

6.1) Qualitative analysis of interview data

The interviewed NGOs cover various fields of interest and are active in different issue areas such as financial services, climate, energy, development, sustainability, consumer and digital rights, trade, food security and agriculture (see Appendix C).

Interesting to see is that almost all NGOs have participated in meetings of the DG Trade CSD. However, the functioning and purpose of these meetings were contested by most interview participants. They similarly stated that the meetings or dialogues can be regarded as information sessions or public speaking events rather than as meetings in which lobbying on the EC can take place. The representative of the organisation European Digital Rights (EDRi) made a critical statement: “These [meetings] are mostly attended by industry. So it’s not very balanced”. In addition, the representative of the European Public Health Alliance (EPHA) reported that, in his view, meetings of the DG Trade CSD can be regarded as “tick box exercise […] from the Commission”.
None of the interviewed NGOs are a member of the EESC or use it for lobbying purposes. Still, some organisations reported to make use of this institutional body for information sharing. The representative of the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC), for example, stated that the organisation engages with the EESC through its own member organisations or that trade policy staff attends events or conferences of the EESC. The representative of EPHA reported:

“We engage and follow the committee but we are not member. [...] So yes, we follow the EESC developments. The committee adopted an opinion on TTIP. For example, there was a hearing. We were invited as speakers there, I think several times”

(Interview EPHA)

Moreover, none of the interview participants reported that their organisation has worked within Intergroups of the EP on EU trade policy issues.

What became evident from the interviews is that Brussels-based NGOs have similar internal decision-making processes for their lobby work on EU trade policy and other policy domains. Most Brussels-based NGOs are umbrella organisations which encompass a variety of member organisations. Thus, NGOs, such as BEUC, EDRi, EPHA and Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), create a position paper which sets the baseline for the lobby work on behalf of all member organisations. Despite the specific trade team of BEUC and EPHA, both organisations incorporate technical expertise from other sources within their organisation. The representative of BEUC explained the following:

“We have colleagues from other teams whose main role is not trade. But they also deal with their topic in the context of trade. [...] Our trade team, we can obviously do a lot of things but sometimes you end up with a very very minute level of detail and then we need other policy colleagues”

(Interview BEUC)
In addition, most NGOs located in Brussels hold access rights to the EP and make use of them for their lobbying activities. Several interview participants reported that they have been invited to committee meetings of the EP or other events. According to the representative of ACT Alliance Europe, this simplifies the lobby work of NGOs to a large extent:

“It means basically you have different possibilities to participate: The one is you can just go at last minute also to meetings that are organised without having to register [...] The other one is that you can organise more easily meetings with other organisations or you can very simply and importantly meet up with individual parliamentarians or staff of the [European] Parliament”.

(Interview ACT Alliance)

Furthermore, the researcher found out that NGOs like BEUC, EDRi, EPHA or FoEE try to engage with policy makers and public officials of the EU in various ways in order to influence specific EU trade policy issues. This is either done through email contact, face-to-face meetings or invitations to the NGOs’ conferences and internal events.

From the interviews, it became evident that different organisations have worked on different EU trade agreements in the past few years. TTIP, CETA as well as the broad Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) were the most commonly named trade agreements, and thus, have been addressed by most NGOs. However, those NGOs with a strong focus on developing countries, such as ACT Alliance Europe or Germanwatch, have worked extensively on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group states (ACP states).

As regards lobbying strategies, the researcher received different answers from interview participants. The two German NGOs, Germanwatch and World Economy,
Ecology and Development (WEED), reported that their lobbying activities at the European level remained limited in the last few years. According to the interviewees, this is mainly due to the NGOs’ lack of funding. Consequently, Germanwatch focuses on inside lobbying activities geared towards national decision makers and the German Parliament, whereas WEED mostly pursues outside lobbying: “So it is mainly through the public work we do with the press or so that we maybe reach the politicians” (Interview WEED).

In general, most Brussels-based organisations said to pursue more inside lobbying while, at the same time, engaging in outside lobbying activities. The representative of ACT Alliance Europe, for instance, elaborated on the organisation’s work on the EPAs. Besides media and campaign work, ACT Alliance Europe worked closely with the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly which consisted of representatives from the ACP states as well as MEPs of the EU. As member of the special expert group of the EC, the so-called TTIP advisory group, EPHA tried to influence the TTIP negotiation text. Moreover, inside lobbying activities were complemented by outside activities: “We either did briefings, we made legal and political analyses, we published them. We published articles in different newspapers”. FoEE, on the contrary, started off with public awareness raising through media work in the case of TTIP. At later stages, the NGO strongly pursued inside lobbying at both the national and European level:

“[…] we were also in contact with MEPs. We were at one point in contact with different trade ministries in different countries also via own [member] groups and coalitions with other [NGOs]”

(Interview FoEE)
6.2) Conclusion

The above outlined interviews revealed how NGOs have worked on EU trade policy issues, which venues they have used for their lobbying activities and which strategies they have pursued in the past. Interesting to see is that the EESC, Intergroups of the EP as well as meetings of the DG Trade CSD are not used to pursue lobby work in the policy domain of trade. Particularly striking was that most Brussels-based NGOs have similar internal working processes on EU trade policy. In addition, Brussels-based NGOs maintain strong contacts with different policy-makers and public officials of the EU in order to get their voices heard. The obtained access rights to the EP are used extensively for that purpose. In some cases, NGOs are included at the EU level as experts and are invited to meetings and events of the EU. In general, Brussels-based NGOs seem to have a broader action repertoire than nationally-based NGOs. Moreover, most Brussels-based NGOs seem to diversify their lobbying activities on EU trade policy issues.
6.3) **Quantitative analysis of survey data**

This section presents the quantitative analysis of the survey data which was carried out with SPSS. First, it is essential to show in what way the NGOs represented in the survey pursue lobbying on EU trade policy. From Table 3, it can be seen that 9.7 percent of all survey participants indicated that their organisation engages in outside lobbying only (three respondents). 35.5 percent of the represented NGOs uses relatively more outside lobbying (11 respondents). One survey participant indicated that the respective NGO devotes just as much time on inside lobbying as on outside lobbying (3.2 percent). 12.9 percent of the respondents stated that their NGO engages in relatively more inside lobbying (four respondents). 38.7 percent indicated that their NGO pursues inside lobbying only (12 respondents). Thus, it can be concluded that 14 out of 31 NGOs in the survey (45.2 percent) utilise only (9.7 percent) or relatively more outside lobbying (35.5 percent), while 16 NGOs (51.6 percent) engage in relatively more inside lobbying (12.9 percent) or inside lobbying only (38.7 percent).

**Table 3: Use of lobbying strategies on EU trade policy issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of lobbying strategies on EU trade policy issues</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only outside lobbying</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only inside lobbying</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As already stated in the dissertation’s research design, different value labels or categories of variables were collapsed due to the small sample size of the survey (see Appendix B). Moreover, a new dependent variable had to be created so that the here proposed hypotheses could be tested with the help of cross-tabulations. The variable
“Engagement in inside and outside lobbying” encompasses the responses on the usual use of inside and outside lobbying and the responses on the relative use of inside and outside lobbying. The researcher divided the answer options of both survey questions and formed the two value labels “More outside lobbying” and “More inside lobbying” for the dependent variable (see Appendix B). Important to note here is that one survey observation could not be used because of a presumably arbitrary response. Consequently, this variable includes 30 out of 31 survey observations.

### Table 4: Dependent variable “Engagement in inside and outside lobbying”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 demonstrates the dependent variable “Engagement in inside and outside lobbying” and lists the frequencies of the two value labels. For 14 out of 30 NGOs represented in this survey it can be said that more outside lobbying is pursued on EU trade policy. This accounts for 46.7 percent of the corrected survey sample. In contrast, for 16 out of 30 NGOs represented in this survey it can be said that they engage more in inside lobbying (53.3 percent). Hence, the frequencies of the value categories are quite balanced, which forms a viable basis for the analysis.

17 The survey participant stated that the respective NGO pursues both inside and outside lobbying. In the filter question the participant indicated that inside and outside lobbying is used in a balanced ratio (50:50).
Specialisation

Table 5 presents the cross-tabulation of the engagement in inside and outside lobbying by existence of special divisions or departments for lobbying activities on EU trade policy issues. Out of all NGOs that do not have special divisions or departments, 54.5 percent pursue more inside lobbying. In contrast, 50 percent of the NGOs which have special divisions or departments engage in more inside lobbying.

Table 5: Inside vs. outside lobbying by existence of special divisions or departments for lobbying activities on EU trade policy issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</th>
<th>Special divisions or departments</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Fisher’s exact test: p=1.000.
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 3.2% missing.

Thus, the results of Table 5 show that the existence of special divisions or departments for lobbying activities on EU trade policy issues only has a minor negative effect on inside lobbying (difference of -4.5 percentage points)\(^{18}\). Consequently, the researcher’s hypotheses (H1) that a specialised organisation in the targeted policy area engages in more inside than outside lobbying does not find support here. In addition, the Fisher’s exact test shows that the association between the two variables is not statistically significant (p=1.000).

\(^{18}\) The effect on outside lobbying always represents the opposite effect on inside lobbying. Accordingly, the existence of special divisions or departments for lobbying activities on EU trade policy has a minor positive effect on more outside lobbying (difference of +4.5 percentage points).
Leadership autonomy

Table 6 presents the cross-tabulation of the NGOs’ engagement in inside and outside lobbying by leadership autonomy. From this table, it can be seen that most NGOs represented in the survey indicated that they are more autonomous vis-à-vis their constituency in their activities and policy positions (21 out of 29 or 72.4 percent). In contrast to the researcher’s expectations, a large share of NGOs which are less autonomous pursue more inside lobbying (75 percent). Less than half of the NGOs that are more autonomous engage in more inside lobbying (47.6 percent).

Table 6: Inside vs. outside lobbying by leadership autonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying by leadership autonomya,b,c</th>
<th>Leadership autonomy</th>
<th>Less autonomous</th>
<th>More autonomous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</td>
<td>More outside lobbying Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying Count</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Count</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Fisher’s exact test p=0.238.
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 6.5% missing.

This leads to the conclusion that there exists a quite substantive negative effect on inside lobbying for NGOs with a rather more leadership autonomy (difference of -27.5 percentage points). Therefore, H2 is not substantiated by the survey results. The value of the Fisher’s exact test reveals that the association between the dependent variable and the here investigated explanatory factor is not statistically significant (p=0.238).
Funding

Table 7 shows that 18 of the represented NGOs in the survey do not receive EU funding (60 percent), while 12 NGOs (40 percent) reported that they receive EU funding. The cross-tabulation provides strong evidence for the proposed hypothesis on the effect of the NGOs’ receipt of EU funding (H3): Only 44.4 percent of those NGOs which do not receive EU funding pursue more inside lobbying.

Table 7: Inside vs. outside lobbying by EU funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying by EU funding</th>
<th>EU funding</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Pearson's chi-squared test: p=0.232.
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 3.2% missing.

In comparison, 66.7 percent of those NGOs which receive EU funding pursue more inside lobbying. This indicates that the receipt of EU funding has a considerable positive effect on inside lobbying (difference of +22.3 percentage points). In other words, the results of Table 7 demonstrate that there is a trend towards inside lobbying when an NGO is funded by the EU. However, this analysis is plagued with quite a bit of uncertainty: The Pearson’s chi-square test shows that the association between the two variables is not statistically significant (p=0.232).

As the survey participants were able to choose more than one answer category in the survey’s question on the sources of funding, it is worth investigating whether the
receipt or non-receipt of other funds can also provide an explanation for the varying
use of lobbying strategies.

Table 8 depicts that 57.1 percent of those NGOs not receiving funding from private
individuals pursue more inside lobbying. In contrast, half of the NGOs which obtain
funds from private individuals pursue more inside lobbying (50 percent). Hence, it can
be concluded that the receipt of funding from private individuals has a small negative
effect on inside lobbying (difference of -7.1 percentage points). Also here, the value
of the Pearson’s chi-squared test does not indicate a statistically significant association
between the two variables (p=0.696).

Table 8: Inside vs. outside lobbying by funding from private individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</th>
<th>Funding from private individuals</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Pearson’s chi-squared test: p=0.696.
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 3.2% missing.

In Table 9 it can be seen that more than half of the NGOs which are not funded by
their member organisation pursue more inside lobbying (60 percent). Only 46.7
percent of the NGOs that indicated to receive funding from their member base engage
in more inside lobbying (46.7 percent). Consequently, the receipt of funding from
member organisations has a substantive negative effect on the use of inside lobbying.
(difference -13.3 percent). Again, the Pearson’s chi-squared test depicts that the association between the two variables is not statistically significant ($p=0.464$)\textsuperscript{19}.

Table 9: Inside vs. outside lobbying by funding from member organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying by funding from member organisations$^{\text{a,b,c}}$</th>
<th>Funding from member organisations</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>40,0%</td>
<td>53,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>60,0%</td>
<td>46,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Pearson’s chi-squared test: $p=0.464$.
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 3.2% missing.

\textsuperscript{19} The receipt of funding from national governments has only a small inconsiderable negative effect on the NGO’s use of inside lobbying (see Appendix D). Consequently, this aspects is not further investigated here.
**Access**

As already explained in the chapter on the dissertation’s research design, this study operationalised the concept of access in three different ways: 1) by the contact frequency with public officials and decision-makers of the EU 2) by the obtainment of access rights to the EP 3) by the participation in important institutional groups or bodies of the EU as regards trade policy. Table 10 presents the cross-tabulation of the NGOs’ engagement in inside and outside lobbying by contact frequency with public officials or policy-makers of the EU.

**Table 10: Inside vs. outside lobbying by contact frequency with EU public officials and policy-makers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying by contact frequency with EU public officials and policy-makers</th>
<th>Contact frequency</th>
<th>Less contact</th>
<th>More contact</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</td>
<td>More outside lobbying Count</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More inside lobbying Count</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.  
b. Pearson’s chi-squared test: p=0.047.  
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 6.5% missing.

It becomes clear that only a minor share of those NGOs which indicated to have less contact pursue more inside lobbying (33.3 percent). In contrast, most NGOs that stated to have more contact to public officials and policy-makers of the EU engage in more inside lobbying (70.6 percent). Therefore, the results of this table demonstrate that having more contact to public officials and policy-makers of the EU has a strong positive effect on the use of inside lobbying (difference of + 37.3 percentage points). To put it differently: NGOs with more contact tend to pursue more inside lobbying. Consequently, the results support H6. According to the Pearson’s chi-squared test, the
relationship between the engagement in inside and outside lobbying and contact frequency is statistically significant (p=0.047).

Table 11: Inside vs. outside lobbying by access rights to the EP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</th>
<th>Access rights to the EP</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Fisher’s exact test: p=0.046.
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 3.2% missing.

In Table 11, the second indicator for the NGO’s access is analysed. Here, it can be seen that only a small share of those NGOs which do not have access rights pursue more inside lobbying (22.2 percent). However, most NGOs that hold access rights to the EP pursue more inside lobbying (66.7 percent). This indicates that holding access rights to the EP has a substantive positive effect on the use of inside lobbying (difference of +44.5 percentages points). Again, this substantiates the predictions of H6. Moreover, the Fisher’s exact test points to a statistically significant association between the two variables (p=0.046).

The last section of the quantitative analysis looks at the third indicator of access and its explanatory power on the use of inside and outside lobbying. Table 12 depicts the engagement in inside and outside lobbying by the NGOs’ participation in an Intergroup of the EP. Only 45 percent of those NGOs that do not participate in an Intergroup of

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20 The results of the cross-tabulation of engagement in inside and outside lobbying by participation in the EESC will not be presented. Reason behind this is that the researcher lacks the needed variation in the survey sample as most participants (90 percent) indicated that their NGOs are not part of the EESC (see Appendix D).
the EP pursue more inside lobbying. However, most of those NGOs engaging in an Intergroup pursue more inside lobbying (77.8 percent). This leads to the conclusion that participating in an Intergroup of the EP has a substantive positive effect on the use of inside lobbying (difference of +32.8 percentage points), which substantiates H6. However, the value of the Fisher’s exact test does not point to a statistically significant relationship between the two variables (p=0.130).

Table 12: Inside vs. outside lobbying by participation in an Intergroup of the EP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</th>
<th>Participation in an Intergroup of the EP</th>
<th>No Count</th>
<th>Yes Count</th>
<th>Total Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Fisher’s exact test: p=0.130
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 6.5% missing.

Table 13 demonstrates the engagement in inside and outside lobbying by participation in meetings of the DG Trade CSD. 58.8 percent of those NGOs which have not participated in meetings pursue more inside lobbying. Interesting to see is that the share of NGOs which have participated in meetings and pursue more inside lobbying is smaller (46.2 percent).
These findings contradict the prediction of H6: There seems to exist a substantive negative effect on inside lobbying for those NGOs which have participated in meetings of the DG Trade CSD (difference of -12.6 percentage points). However, the value of the Pearson’s chi-squared test does not indicate a statistically significant association between the two variables (p=0.491).

In conclusion, it can be said that the researcher obtained different findings as regards the explanatory factor of access and the associated hypothesis (H6). While Table 10 and 11 provide strong support and also show statistical significance, the results of Table 12 and 13 can be regarded as more puzzling.

Table 13: Inside vs. outside lobbying by participation in meetings of the DG Trade CSD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</th>
<th>Participation in meetings of the DG Trade CSD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Pearson’s chi-squared test p=0.491.
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 3.2% missing.
Public salience and technicality

In order to see if the public salience and technicality of a policy issue influences the engagement in inside and outside lobbying, a closer look has to be taken at the answers that respondents provided in the different issue scenarios. The effect of salience is evaluated by comparing the answer responses given in the technical and not salient issue scenario (non-technical and not salient issue scenario) with the answers provided in the technical and salient issue scenario (non-technical and salient issue scenario). Thus, the level of technicality is held constant in the two comparisons. In contrast, the effect of technicality is investigated by comparing the answer responses given in the non-technical and salient issue scenario (non-technical and not salient issue scenario) with the answers provided in the technical and salient issue scenario (technical and not salient issue scenario). Here, the level of salience is held constant in the two comparisons.

In a technical and publicly salient issue scenario, less NGOs would pursue inside lobbying than in a technical and not publicly issue scenario. This indicates that the salience of a policy issue has a substantive negative effect on the use of inside lobbying (difference of -27.85 percentage points). The share of NGOs pursuing outside lobbying does not differ considerably in the two scenarios (difference of -0.32 percentage points). Interesting to see is that the share of NGOs that would pursue both strategies is greater when a technical and publicly salient EU trade policy issue is faced. Consequently, the salience of a policy issue has a strong positive effect on the use of both inside and outside lobbying (difference of +28.17 percentage points).
Figure 2: The effect of salience in technical issue scenario

Lobbying on technical and not publicly salient EU trade policy issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside lobbying</td>
<td>63.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside lobbying</td>
<td>10.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>25.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lobbying on technical and publicly salient EU trade policy issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside lobbying</td>
<td>35.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside lobbying</td>
<td>9.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>54.84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: The effect of salience in non-technical issue scenario

**Lobbying on non-technical and not publicly salient EU trade policy issue**

- Inside lobbying: 53.33%
- Outside lobbying: 13.33%
- Both: 33.33%

**Lobbying on non-technical and publicly salient EU trade policy issue**

- Inside lobbying: 22.58%
- Outside lobbying: 16.13%
- Both: 61.29%
Similar observations can be made by comparing the results of the non-technical and not salient issue scenario with the results of the non-technical and salient issue scenario. While in the non-technical and not salient issue scenario 53.33 percent indicated to engage in inside lobbying, only 22.58 percent would pursue inside lobbying when a non-technical and salient EU trade policy issue is faced. Again, it can be concluded that the salience of a policy issue has a strong negative effect on the use of inside lobbying (difference of -30.75 percentage points). Also here, no major difference in the share of NGOs that engage in outside lobbying becomes visible (+2.8 percentage points). However, the share of NGOs that would engage in both strategies is bigger in a non-technical and publicly salient issue scenario, which points to a substantive positive effect of salience on the use of both inside and outside lobbying (+27.96 percentage points).

In conclusion, the results show that the salience of an EU trade policy issue does not necessarily lead NGOs to pursue rather outside lobbying as it was expected. However, it became evident that NGOs would tend to use a mix of both inside and outside lobbying when a salient EU trade policy issue is faced. Moreover, less NGOs would engage in inside lobbying. This implies that NGOs would pursue more outside lobbying in a salient policy issue than in a non-salient policy issue. Thus, the results indirectly support H4. Moreover, it has been shown that the effect of salience does not depend on the level of technicality.

21 The effect sizes in the two comparisons do not differ considerably from each other (Inside lobbying: -27.85/-30.75; Outside lobbying: -0.32/+2.80; Both: +28.17/27.96). A strong difference would have indicated that the effect of salience is conditional to the level of technicality.
For the investigation of the effect of technicality, the researcher needs to compare the results of different scenarios. In a non-technical and salient issue scenario, 22.58 percent would engage in inside lobbying. A smaller share of NGOs, namely 35.48 percent, would pursue inside lobbying in a technical and salient EU trade policy issue. Therefore, the survey data shows a strong positive effect of technicality on the use of inside lobbying (difference of +12.90 percentage points). Compared to the non-technical and salient issue scenario, less NGOs would engage in outside lobbying in a technical and salient issue scenario (difference of -6.45 percentage points). In addition, the share of NGOs that would use both strategies is smaller in a technical and salient EU trade policy issue than in a non-technical and salient EU trade policy issue (difference of -6.45 percentage points). Thus, the results point to a negative effect of technicality on the use of outside lobbying and use of both inside and outside lobbying.

Also here, similar observation can be made when looking at the other scenario comparison. A larger share of NGOs would pursue inside lobbying in a technical and not salient issue scenario than in a non-technical and not salient issue scenario. This also indicates a strong positive effect of technicality on the use of inside lobbying (difference of +10.00 percentage points). While 13.33 percent of the NGOs would pursue outside lobbying when a non-technical and salient EU trade policy issue is faced, 10 percent would engage in outside lobbying in a technical and salient issue context. Consequently, the negative effect size of technicality on outside lobbying remains extremely small (difference of -3.33 percentage points). Furthermore, the share of NGOs that would use both strategies is smaller in in a technical and not salient issue scenario than in a non-technical and not salient issue scenario. Also here, the results point to a negative effect of technicality on the use of both strategies (-6.66 percentage points).
Figure 4: The effect of technicality in salient issue scenario

Lobbying on non-technical and publicly salient EU trade policy issue

Lobbying on technical and publicly salient EU trade policy issue
Figure 5: The effect of technicality in not salient issue scenario

**Lobbying on non-technical and not publicly salient EU trade policy issue**

- **Inside lobbying**: 53.33%
- **Outside lobbying**: 13.33%
- **Both**: 33.33%

**Lobbying on technical and not publicly salient EU trade policy issue**

- **Inside lobbying**: 63.33%
- **Outside lobbying**: 10.00%
- **Both**: 26.67%
In sum, the results show a strong positive effect of technicality on the use of inside lobbying. In other words: the technicality of an issue leads more NGOs to pursue inside lobbying. Thus, the survey results support H5. Furthermore, it has been shown that there exists a negative effect on the use of both inside and outside lobbying. Whether a negative effect of technicality exists on outside lobbying, however, cannot be judged from the survey data. Important to note is that the effect of technicality is not conditional on the level of salience according to the here obtained results.\footnote{The effect sizes in the two comparisons do not differ considerably from each other (Inside lobbying: +12.90/10.00; Outside lobbying: -6.45/-3.33; Both: -6.45/-6.66). A strong difference would have indicated that the effect of technicality is conditional on the level of salience.}

6.4) Conclusion

The quantitative analysis provided valuable information on the proposed hypotheses and the three sets of explanatory factors under investigation. The specialisation of NGOs in EU trade policy has no positive effect on the use of inside lobbying. Thus, no support for H1 could be found. In addition, the hypothesis that less autonomous NGOs pursue more inside lobbying on EU trade policy (H2) was not substantiated. In contrast, the survey results indicated a strong negative effect on inside lobbying when the leadership autonomy of an NGO is rather weak. Interesting to see is that the positive effect of EU funding on inside lobbying (H3) was supported by the survey data. However, it has to be mentioned that the statistical test showed a high probability that the results were generated by chance (no statistical significance). Moreover, the effects of other sources of funding were investigated. The results implied that the receipt of funding from both private individuals and member organisations has a negative effect on inside lobbying. Furthermore, the survey data supported the hypotheses on the effect of public salience and technicality (H4 and H5). Besides that, it was shown that the level of technicality does not influence the effect of public
salience and vice versa. Finally, the expected effect of access was partly supported by the survey data. The analysis showed strong supportive findings for H6 when access was measured by the first two indicators, namely 1) contact frequency to public officials and policy-makers of the EU and 2) access rights to the EP. In particular, the findings were statistically significant in both cases. However, the third indicator for access led to puzzling results.
7) Discussion of findings

In this chapter, the key findings of the dissertation are discussed. From the qualitative analysis, it can be suggested that the location of NGOs plays a significant role for their work and lobbying behaviour on EU trade policy and largely determines their action repertoire. Despite their different fields of interests, Brussels-based NGOs seem to share many similarities. In contrast, nationally based organisations appear to work and lobby differently compared to their Brussels-based colleagues. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the generalisation of the interview findings for the whole population of NGOs active in EU trade policy remains questionable. Reason for this is the small sample size and unequal number of interviews with Brussels- and nationally based NGOs.

The qualitative analysis revealed that only one of the investigated organisational factors, namely the receipt of EU funding, has the expected effect on the use of lobbying strategies. Although the effect of other sources of funding remain largely neglected in current studies, the here analysed data gives reason to further investigate the effect of the receipt of private funding and funding from member organisations. The specialisation of NGOs in EU trade policy, which was measured by the existence of special divisions or departments for lobbying activities on EU trade policy, did not prove to affect the lobbying strategies to a large extent. Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether another measure or operationalisation of specialisation would lead to different results. Moreover, the data showed that NGOs which are more autonomous pursue more outside than inside lobbying. This strongly contradicted the expectations of the proposed hypothesis (H2). Consequently, this aspect requires further investigation in future.
In addition, this study’s quantitative analysis also demonstrated that policy-related context factors have explanatory power. Because of the specific measurement in this dissertation, however, the respective statistical significance could not be evaluated. Thus, there is a need for empirical studies to analyse the effect of technicality and salience in a way that not only allows to detect the direct effect size but also allows to examine whether a statistically significant association between the variables exists.

The hypotheses on the effect of access was partly supported by the survey data. However, not all indicators or measures of the concept of access seem to lead to concrete findings. The analyses with the more direct indicators of access, namely “contact frequency” and “obtainment of access rights to the EP”, strongly supported the here proposed hypothesis. In contrast, the third and more indirect measure, namely participation in institutional bodies, working groups or committees, led to inconclusive results. Consequently, this speaks for the use of more direct measures of the concept of access in future studies.

Nonetheless, the measurement of access by the third indicator still offered valuable information. The survey data revealed that the participation in meetings of the DG Trade CSD has a substantive positive effect on the use of outside lobbying. Consequently, it can be presumed that NGOs which have participated in such meetings choose to influence the decision-making process indirectly through the public as the experiences made in the DG Trade CSD have signalised limited direct influence in the political sphere. The interviewees’ critical statements on the DG Trade CSD can be regarded as supportive for this presumption. In addition, it was shown that most European NGOs do not participate in any Intergroup of the EP. However, it was striking to see that NGOs which take part in Intergroups tend to pursue more inside lobbying. From this, it can be assumed that NGOs make important contacts to MEPs
throughout their engagement in Intergroups and that these are used for inside lobbying activities on EU trade policy. Moreover, both qualitative and quantitative data revealed that the EESC, despite its official institutional status, does not take on an important role for NGOs and their lobbying activities on EU trade policy. This gives reason to doubt the purpose and effectiveness of this institutional body.

Finally, this discussion chapter needs to address a puzzling aspect of the quantitative analysis. The results of the cross-tabulation revealed that the receipt of EU funding has a strong positive effect on the use of inside lobbying. Despite the strong effect size, however, the results were not statistically significant according to the Pearson’s chi-squared test. Similar observations could be made in other cross-tabulations, which showed a strong effect sizes but statistically insignificant associations between the investigated variables (see Table 6; 8; 12; 13). As already stated in the dissertation’s research design (see p.36), this can be explained by the small number of observations in the survey sample. Thus, future research should ensure to receive a larger number of observations in order to obtain unambiguous results.
8) Conclusion

This dissertation investigated the lobbying behaviour of NGOs and their lobbying strategies on EU trade policy. The rationale behind this study was to address the increasing need for an in-depth analysis of this specific interest group type, which recently appears to become more present in the policy domain of trade.

In this study, it was shown that different EU institutions exchange with various interest and lobby groups on EU trade policy issues. Moreover, lobbyists face different participation opportunities at the EU level through which their voices can be heard. So far, however, it remains questionable how European NGOs actually work on EU trade policy issues and in what way they make use of the various participation venues for their lobbying activities. As an answer to these questions presented the first research purpose of this dissertation, seven interviews were conducted with European NGOs both based in Brussels and at the national (German) level. The findings revealed that Brussels-based NGOs with different fields of interests similarly work and lobby on EU trade policy issues. While the engagement in Intergroups of the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee do not seem to be of high importance, many organisation have participated in the meetings of the DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue. However, these meetings do not present a relevant lobbying venue for NGOs. Lobbying at the Brussels level is mostly pursued directly, and for this purpose, access rights to the EP and contacts with policy makers and public officials are used extensively. Thus, inside lobbying represents the dominating lobbying strategy. Nonetheless, Brussels-based organisations also make use of outside lobbying in order to address and inform the European public. In contrast to that, the interviews of the two German NGOs revealed that lobbying at the EU level remains limited due to funding reasons.
The second research purpose of this study was to investigate potential factors that might influence the NGO’s varying use of inside and outside lobbying on EU trade policy. The extensive literature review showed that existing studies of European interest group research analysed a wide range of explanatory factors, such as resources, access, organisational factors and policy-related context factors. Until now, however, organisational factors and the aspect of access remain largely understudied. Moreover, it became evident that no empirical study has been conducted in the context of NGOs and EU trade policy. Therefore, it was decided to investigate already existing hypotheses on the effect of organisational and policy-related context factors as well as the effect of access in this dissertation. The quantitative results of the conducted survey demonstrated that the NGOs’ use of lobbying strategies is determined by one organisational factor, namely the receipt of EU funding, the public salience and technicality of a policy issue as well as the degree to which the organisation holds access to EU institutions, policy-makers and public officials.

To conclude, this dissertation entails implications for the EU’s democratic governance and future research on the lobbying practices of interest and lobby groups. The study demonstrated that there exists exchange between interest and lobby groups and EU institutions on EU trade policy issues. Moreover, it was shown that EU institutions offer formal as well as informal participation venues for NGOs. Nonetheless, it remains questionable to what extent the inclusion and participation of NGOs actually influences EU trade policy outcomes and whether the NGOs’ interests are in fact represented in this specific policy domain. Due to the limited scope of this dissertation, however, this question remains unanswered and requires further investigation in future studies.
Moreover, this study showed that explaining lobbying practices of interest groups is a highly complex endeavour. Thus, future studies need to ensure to account for this complexity by investigating multiple factors related to the interest groups’ organisational structure and political relations as well as the policy-related context.
Bibliography


Appendices

Appendix A: Online survey

1. What percentage of time and effort has your organisation devoted to EU trade policy issues since 2010? (Slider)

2. Does your organisation usually pursue inside or outside lobbying activities on EU trade policy issues?

   Note: Inside lobbying refers to lobbying activities that are geared towards EU institutions as well as advisory bodies, technical committees, agencies and parliamentary committees. This form of lobbying takes place in the political sphere. Outside lobbying refers to lobbying activities that are geared towards the European public. This form of lobbying takes place in the public sphere and encompasses media campaigns and protests.

☐ Inside lobbying
☐ Outside lobbying
☐ Both

2.1. If “Both” filter question: What proportion of time does your organisation devote on inside rather than outside lobbying activities? (Slider)

   Note: The percentage refers to inside lobbying activities. A rough estimation suffices.

3. How would your organisation lobby on a highly technical EU trade policy issue, which is salient to the public?

   Note: A technical policy issue is characterised by high complexity and a requirement for specialised knowledge to fully understand its implications. A publicly salient policy issue is covered heavily by mainstream media and prominent on the public agenda. Inside lobbying refers to lobbying activities that
are geared towards EU institutions as well as advisory bodies, technical committees, agencies and parliamentary committees. This form of lobbying takes place in the political sphere. **Outside lobbying** refers to lobbying activities that are geared towards the European public. This form of lobbying takes place in the public sphere and encompasses media campaigns and protests.

☐ Inside lobbying
☐ Outside lobbying
☐ Both

4. **How would your organisation lobby on a highly technical EU trade policy issue, which is not salient to the public?**

   Note: A **technical policy issue** is characterised by high complexity and a requirement for specialised knowledge to fully understand its implications. A **publicly salient policy issue** is covered heavily by mainstream media and prominent on the public agenda. **Inside lobbying** refers to lobbying activities that are geared towards EU institutions as well as advisory bodies, technical committees, agencies and parliamentary committees. This form of lobbying takes place in the political sphere. **Outside lobbying** refers to lobbying activities that are geared towards the European public. This form of lobbying takes place in the public sphere and encompasses media campaigns and protests.

☐ Inside lobbying
☐ Outside lobbying
☐ Both

5. **How would your organisation lobby on a non-technical EU trade policy issue, which is salient to the public?**

   Note: A **technical policy issue** is characterised by high complexity and a requirement for specialised knowledge to fully understand its implications. A **publicly salient policy issue** is covered heavily by mainstream media and prominent on the public agenda. **Inside lobbying** refers to lobbying activities that are geared towards EU institutions as well as advisory bodies, technical committees, agencies and parliamentary committees. This form of lobbying takes place in the political sphere. **Outside lobbying** refers to lobbying activities that are geared towards the European public. This form of lobbying takes place in the public sphere and encompasses media campaigns and protests.

☐ Inside lobbying
6. How would your organisation lobby on a non-technical EU trade policy issue, which is not salient to the public?

Note: A technical policy issue is characterised by high complexity and a requirement for specialised knowledge to fully understand its implications. A publicly salient policy issue is covered heavily by mainstream media and prominent on the public agenda. Inside lobbying refers to lobbying activities that are geared towards EU institutions as well as advisory bodies, technical committees, agencies and parliamentary committees. This form of lobbying takes place in the political sphere. Outside lobbying refers to lobbying activities that are geared towards the European public. This form of lobbying takes place in the public sphere and encompasses media campaigns and protests.

☐ Inside lobbying
☐ Outside lobbying
☐ Both

7. Is your organisation part of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)?

☐ Yes
☐ No

8. Is your organisation part of the Association for Former Members of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)?

☐ Yes
☐ No

9. Does your organisation hold access rights to the European Parliament?

☐ Yes
☐ No
10. Does your organisation participate in an intergroup of the European Parliament?
☐ Yes
☐ No

11. Has your organisation taken part in meetings of the DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue?
☐ Yes
☐ No

12. On which occasions has your organisation taken part in meetings of the DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue?

Note: Please indicate the name and year of the meeting.

For example: Update on EU-Mercosur trade negotiations (2017); Update on TiSA negotiations (2016); Trade and Sustainable Development (2014).

13. Does your organisation interact with public officials or policy makers of the European Union?
☐ Yes
☐ No

13.1. If “Yes”, filter question: How often does your organisation interact with public officials or policy makers of the European Union?

Note: Essentially meant here are government representatives, staff of the European Commission, Commissioners, staff of the European Parliament, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), Director-Generals and staff of the Directorate-Generals.

☐ More than once a week
☐ Once a week
☐ Once a month
☐ Once a year

14. Does the membership of your organisation consist of other organisations or of private individuals?

☐ Other organisations
☐ Private individuals
☐ Both

15. How is your organisation financed?

Note: You can tick more than one box.

☐ By private individuals
☐ By national governments
☐ By the European Union
☐ By member organisations

15.1. If “By the European Union” filter question: What percentage of your organisation’s funding comes from the European Union? (Slider)

Note: A rough estimation suffices.
16. *How would you describe your organisation’s leadership autonomy?*

Note: Leadership autonomy describes how autonomous an organisation is vis-à-vis its constituent members for its activities and policy positions.

☐ Completely autonomous  
☐ Largely autonomous  
☐ Semi-autonomous  
☐ Rather not autonomous  
☐ Not autonomous

17. Does your organisation have special divisions or departments for its lobbying activities on EU trade policy issues?

☐ Yes  
☐ No

*Thank you for your participation!*
### Appendix B: Variables

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<th>Question 2</th>
<th>Usual use of inside and outside lobbying</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Answer options</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Filter question 2.1: Relative use of inside and outside lobbying (for respondents that indicated "Both")

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<th>51≤x≤99</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<td>New value labels</td>
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### Appendix C: Interviews

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<th>Position of interviewee</th>
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<th>Location of interview</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European Consumer Organisation (BEUC)</td>
<td>Communications Officer (Trade, sustainable mobility)</td>
<td>04.07.2017</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Digital Rights (EDRi)</td>
<td>Senior Policy Advisor</td>
<td>04.07.2017</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT Alliance EU</td>
<td>Senior Policy Officer (Food security)</td>
<td>05.07.2017</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Public Health Alliance (EPHA)</td>
<td>Policy Coordinator for Healthy Trade and Health Equity</td>
<td>07.07.2017</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED)</td>
<td>Policy Advisor (Financial markets)</td>
<td>10.07.2017</td>
<td>(Skype)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE)</td>
<td>Policy Advisor (Food, agriculture, biodiversity)</td>
<td>10.07.2017</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germanwatch</td>
<td>Team leader (World, food, land use and trade)</td>
<td>14.07.2017</td>
<td>(Skype)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: Remaining cross-tabulations

### Engagement in inside and outside lobbying by funding from national governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</th>
<th>Funding from national governments</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Fisher’s exact test: \( p = 1.000 \)
c. Total number of completed surveys 31, 3.2% missing.

### Engagement in inside and outside lobbying by participation in the EESC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement in inside and outside lobbying</th>
<th>Participation in the EESC</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More outside lobbying</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More inside lobbying</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Table shows column percentages.
b. Fisher’s exact test: \( p = 1.000 \).
c. Total number of completed survey 31, 3.2% missing.