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PPEGS Seminar Series - Culture, Creditor Rights and Dividend Policy
Date: 30th April 2014Time: 14:00
Location: KB1-14
Dr. Julie Byrne, Smurfit Graduate Business School, University College Dublin. Julie joined the UCD Smurfit Graduate Business School as lecturer in Banking and Finance in January 2014.
Titled: Culture, Creditor Rights and Dividend Policy
Date: Wednesday, 30th April, 14h00-15h00
Venue: Kemmy Business School, KB1-14
All are welcome to attend with tea and coffee provided before the seminar begins.
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the relationship between dividends, national culture and creditor rights. Using a sample of 17,544 firms across 28 countries, we find that both creditor rights and culture, measured by individualism and uncertainty avoidance play a role in explaining dividend policy. However, we find that the relationship between culture and dividends previously established in the literature holds only when creditors are well protected. When creditor rights are weak, the relationship between culture and dividend policy is very different. We find that poorly protected creditors do not always substitute their poor legal rights with lower dividends. Whether they choose to do so or not depends very much on national culture.
Titled: Culture, Creditor Rights and Dividend Policy
Date: Wednesday, 30th April, 14h00-15h00
Venue: Kemmy Business School, KB1-14
All are welcome to attend with tea and coffee provided before the seminar begins.
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the relationship between dividends, national culture and creditor rights. Using a sample of 17,544 firms across 28 countries, we find that both creditor rights and culture, measured by individualism and uncertainty avoidance play a role in explaining dividend policy. However, we find that the relationship between culture and dividends previously established in the literature holds only when creditors are well protected. When creditor rights are weak, the relationship between culture and dividend policy is very different. We find that poorly protected creditors do not always substitute their poor legal rights with lower dividends. Whether they choose to do so or not depends very much on national culture.
