

History Studies

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2008 Vol 9



UNIVERSITY of LIMERICK

OLLESCOLL LUIMNIGH

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Preface

The ninth volume of History Studies comprises a broad sweep of fresh scholarship generated by advanced post-graduate students. The diversity of the articles testifies to the vigorous health of the discipline and augers well for its future at a difficult juncture. In a departure from the standard template, the articles are complemented by a series of photographs, which show the profound changes to the historical landscape, and culture of Ireland.

Susan Grant analyses how Soviet 'Fitzkul'tura' (physical culture) was used to propagate new proletarian ideas in post civil war Russia. Andrew Kennedy sheds new light on two nursing pioneers and their role in the development of children's nursing in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The role of civic pride in Belfast during the 1852 British Association visit is thoroughly examined by Alice Johnson. Fiona Devoy evaluates the success of the 1918 Mansion House Conference and how the 'conscription crisis' impacted Irish political nationalism. Paul Hayes explores the hitherto enigmatic role of Gerald Wharton in Irish Republican Army 1939 bombing campaign in Britain. Bryce Evans offers a detailed assessment of the black market economy, which thrived in Ireland during the Emergency.

The production of this journal is a testament to the dedication and skill of its co-editors: JP O'Connor and Gavin Wilk. They are to be commended for maintaining and developing what has become a much-admired project in Irish universities. The energy and commitment of the UL History Society is also worthy of note. Those who have contributed to the production of this latest edition of History Studies have fully discharged their duties and in a manner which reflects credit on the entire endeavour.

Dr. Ruán O'Donnell
Head, Department of History,
Patron, University of Limerick History Society,

May 2009

Editorial

The editors of *History Studies* are pleased to present a body of work composed of unique and exciting articles that present a wide scope of historical research. The selected contributions are diverse in nature and deep in scope, and portray the exciting new research that is being undertaken by post-graduate scholars from a wide range of universities. This ninth volume of *History Studies* continues the tradition of providing a literary channel for outstanding post-graduate historical research. It also has a new visual dimension with the inclusion of seven photographs showing Ireland's heritage. These images work with the articles to press upon the uninformed the importance of history. For in order to understand the present, one must peer deeply into the past.

Gavin Wilk
JP O'Connor
Co-Editors

Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Dr. Ruán O'Donnell, Head of the Department of History and patron of the University of Limerick History Society for his encouragement. We also thank the University of Limerick History Society, and both Dr. John Logan and Dr. Bernadette Whelan for their unwavering commitment to this venture. The editors are indebted to Professor Tom Lodge, Assistant Dean of Research, College of Humanities, for his generous financial support. The editors would also like to thank Professor Pat O'Connor, Dean of the College of Humanities for her continued support and financial assistance. We would also like to extend our appreciation to Professor Don Barry, University President, for his generous contribution to the journal's publication. We recognise the role of the contributors as paramount to the success of *History Studies*.

Foreword

The History Society was founded in 1997 and soon became one of the most vibrant societies on campus. It was set up to promote the enjoyment of history, and rescue it from the dry and dusty confines of the classroom. The society has traditionally drawn its membership from across the spectrum of college courses with engineers, business students, Erasmus students and of course, history students coming together to explore a shared interest in and passion for our past.

The Society runs regular lectures and discussions, with guest speakers from across the country speaking on a wide range of historical topics. This year Sean Donlon, the former Irish ambassador to the U.S.A. gave a hugely informative and enjoyable talk on '*Ireland, America and the Troubles*'. We were also delighted to host Rev. Dr. Brendan Bradshaw whose talk was entitled '*Patrick Sarsfield and the Two Sieges of Limerick: Was there a Hero in the House?*' Our own Dr. Pádraig Lenihan entertained us before the Christmas break with a historical look at the '*Prophecies of Colmcille: Where hope and history collide*'.

The society is proud of its connection with '*History Studies*', Ireland's only student produced journal. The journal was originally conceived and organised by members of the History Society, including current faculty member (and founder of the society) Dr. David Fleming. Its continued high standard and success is a source of great pride and inspiration to the society members. Great credit is due to both J.P. O'Connor and Gavin Wilk, whose hard work throughout the year has resulted in such a professional and well-presented publication.

The committee are currently working on putting together a programme of fun events for the 2009-10 academic year. We are always delighted to hear from new members and can be contacted on ulhistorysociety@gmail.com

Robert O' Keeffe,
Auditor

Knocknakilla Stone Circle.



Knocknakilla Stone Circle

(Irish: *Cnoc na Cille*, meaning 'The Stone of the Church'.)

Knocknakilla is a megalithic complex between Macroom and Millstreet, Co. Cork. It is set in blanket peatland on the north-west upper slopes of Musherabeg mountain, and is estimated to be 3500 years old. The Knocknakilla area is rich with archaeological artefacts and nearby are two cashels, a ringfort, two fulacht fiadh, a possible souterrain, and a circular enclosure.

For further reading:

Power, Denis, *Archaeological Inventory of County Cork*, Vol. 3, (Cork, 1997).

O'Brien, William. 'Megalithic tombs, metal resources and territory in prehistoric south-west Ireland'. in Desmond, Angela (ed.), *New agendas in Irish prehistory : papers in commemoration of Liz Anderson* (Bray, 2000), pp. 161-176.

O'Brien, William, *Sacred ground : megalithic tombs in coastal south-west Ireland* (Galway, 1999).



A Limerick Man and the 1939 IRA Bombing Campaign in England: The Trial of Gerald Wharton

Paul M. Hayes

This article examines the trial of Limerick man, Gerald Wharton, for his alleged involvement in the 1939 Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing campaign in Britain. His arrest received wide press coverage in both Britain and Ireland and highlighted IRA activities in England during a period of public preoccupation with the growing international crisis in Europe. Wharton was among the initial wave of Irishmen to be arrested in England after the first republican bombs were set in January 1939. In September, after the outbreak of the Second World War (1939-45), he was deported to Ireland, along with over 100 other suspected IRA men.¹ Wharton's story is unique due to the fact that before being deported to Ireland for supposed republican connections, he was actually acquitted of all criminal charges connected with the bombings and was never actually proven to be an active member of the IRA. He was thus deported back to his native land as an innocent man.

In order to clearly understand how such a scenario could unfold to this particular Irishman, it is necessary to briefly examine the Anglo-Irish relationship during the period as well as the dynamics of the IRA and its reasoning and strategy for the bombing campaign. Following Fianna Fáil's victory in the 1932 Irish general election, relations between the Irish Free State and Britain steadily declined. The Irish government's refusal to repay land annuities ultimately provoked an economic war with Britain causing severe damage to the Irish economy.² The issue was resolved in 1938 when the Irish government agreed to reimburse Britain with a single repayment of £10 million in return for the British held Treaty ports of Berehaven, Queenstown (Cobh) and Lough Swilly.³ Significantly, the acquisition of these ports now guaranteed the Free State's neutrality in the event of any future European conflict. The Free State's internal security had already

¹ *Irish Times*, 24 Oct. 1939.

² These were financial loans granted by Britain to Irish tenant farmers to enable them purchase lands under the Irish Land Acts during the previous half century, a provision which was part of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty.

³ J.J. Lee, *Ireland, 1912-1985* (Wiltshire, 1993), pp. 211-4

been consolidated with the outlawing of the IRA in 1936.⁴ Earlier that year, the IRA orchestrated the murders of both British Vice Admiral Somerville and Garda John Egan. These killings led to a government crackdown of the organisation. Numerous republican leaders and supporters soon found themselves sitting in Irish prisons.⁵

The IRA remained in disarray until 1938 when long-time IRA veteran, Sean Russell was named as the new Chief of Staff. Russell, possessing an intense militant attitude, believed the republican fight should be taken across the Irish Sea and into the towns and cities of England.⁶ After re-analysing the aims and desires of the organisation, Russell along with fellow republicans, Jim O'Donovan and Patrick McGrath oversaw the development of the S-Plan (or Sabotage-Plan).⁷ This republican bombing campaign was designed to inflict enough infrastructural damage in England to compel it to withdraw fully from Northern Ireland and lead to the establishment of a thirty-two county Irish republic.⁸ According to Russell, the IRA planned '...to rain bombs on England in a do-or-die attempt to overthrow de Valera and obtain complete independence from Britain.'⁹ Transport networks, industries and public services would all be targeted with the plan implemented 'when the jumpiness and nervous expectation of the [British] government as well as the potential panic of the people can be exploited to the full.'¹⁰ Throughout the spring and summer months of 1938, the IRA prepared for its new campaign. As money raised in America poured into the organisation, republican activists attended bomb making classes and began to organise throughout England. By autumn, the necessary men, chemicals and bomb making equipment were in place to attack the British infrastructure.¹¹

As the diplomatic situation in Europe worsened and Britain and Germany edged closer to war, the IRA leadership decided to act. On 12 January 1939, republican leaders sent a four-day ultimatum to the British Government demanding an end to its occupation of Northern Ireland.¹² When the British government failed to reply, the IRA declared war by posting bills on walls across Britain, calling on the support of Irish immigrants: '... the hour has come for supreme effort to make both effective. So in the name of the unconquered dead and of the faithful living, we pledge ourselves to that task.'¹³ On 16 January, true to the proclamation, seven explosions shook power stations and electrical lines in London, Birmingham, Manchester and Alnwick. Realising the seriousness of the situation, British security forces quickly descended upon Irish neighbourhoods of major English cities, determined to arrest the republican agitators.¹⁴

On 18 January 1939, two days after the IRA bombing campaign began, Limerick native, Gerald Wharton was arrested by British police at a raid on his home in Camden Road, London. He was charged with possession of explosive material and remanded in custody for a week, along with seven other Irish men.¹⁵ This was not the first time that Wharton had seen the inside of a prison cell. Nineteen years earlier, as an active member in the IRA, he was arrested in Cork for possession of a revolver while detaining a military policeman's bicycle. This act resulted in a two year prison sentence, in which he was forced to perform hard labour.¹⁶ Shortly after his release in February 1922, Wharton took the anti-treaty republican side in the Civil War. After being captured by Free State troops, he was subsequently imprisoned in the Curragh camp. He immigrated to England in 1927 and reportedly returned to Ireland in 1937 in order to vote for Fianna Fáil in that year's general election.¹⁷

The case against Wharton rested on traces of potassium chlorate and magnetic oxide of iron that had been found in suitcases at his home. These materials were used in

⁴ John Horgan, 'Arms dumps and the IRA, 1923-32', in *History Today* (February, 1998), p.16.

⁵ Ronan Fanning, "'The Rule of Order': Eamon de Valera and the I.R.A., 1923-40", in J.P.O'Carroll and John A. Murphy (eds.), *De Valera and His Times* (Cork, 1983), p.165-6. Fianna Fáil had also set up the Army Volunteer reserve to redirect young men from the IRA.

⁶ M.L.R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland: the military strategy of the Irish republican movement* (London, 1995), p. 63.

⁷ Richard English, *Armed struggle: the history of the IRA*, (London, 2003), pp. 60-1.

⁸ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland, the Irish State and its enemies since 1922* (New York, 2000), pp.127-8; National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Chronology of I.R.A. activities up to 1945 Department of the Taoiseach Papers (Taois)/s11564A.

⁹ Chronology of I.R.A. activities up to 1945, NAI, Taois/s11564A.

¹⁰ "S" plan, p.45-50.

¹¹ J. Bowyer Bell, *The secret army: the IRA 1916-1979* (Dublin, 1989), pp. 152-3.

¹² Robert Fisk, *In Time of War* (London, 1983), p.73. Stephen Hayes, Peadar O Flaherty, Laurence Grogan, Patrick Fleming, George Plunkett and Sean Russell, as the army council, signed this declaration of war.

¹³ IRA proclamation, NAI, Taois/s11087A. This new proclamation was printed side by side with the 1916 proclamation, which was referenced in its print.

¹⁴ Bell, *The secret army*, p. 156.

¹⁵ *Irish Independent*, 18 Jan. 1939.

¹⁶ *Freeman's Journal*, 22 July 1920.

¹⁷ *Limerick Leader*, 14 June 1939.

incendiary devices that had been previously manufactured by the IRA.¹⁸ Wharton claimed that two Irish lodgers who had recently rented a room from him had mistakenly left the suitcases behind.¹⁹ One of his co-accused, Daniel Fitzpatrick, admitted that he was actually one of the men in question and took responsibility for the materials. He denied Wharton's involvement and made a short statement to the court condemning British control of Northern Ireland.²⁰

Wharton's solicitors rounded on this and argued that their client was a victim of circumstance. As the days unfolded, it was also obvious that his IRA past would come back to haunt him in the British court of law.²¹ Four years earlier, on 15 March 1935, Wharton applied for a military pension, which he and other former IRA men who fought in the Civil War were entitled to receive.²² This pension scheme offered modest payments to the former IRA activists. But more importantly for Wharton's defence team, it was a proven fact that any man accepting the pension from the Free State government forfeited the possibility of ever again partaking in IRA related activities. Accepting the pension was viewed by the IRA as a pledge of allegiance to the Free State government, which would result in immediate dismissal from the organisation.²³

Wharton's solicitors, hoping to prove that their defendant was in fact officially retired from the IRA, immediately requested an official copy from the Irish Department of Defence. The request was then forwarded to the secretary of the Department of External Affairs. After consultation with Frank Aiken, the Minister of the department, it was decided, '... that it is not the practise of this department to furnish copies of such documents as referred to in your letter and in the circumstances, the minister regrets that he is unable to comply with your request.'²⁴ The denial of the request by the Irish government proved fatal for Wharton's defence, in that it did not officially support his claim of IRA retirement.

As the proceedings continued, the prosecution soon used this inaction by the Department of External Affairs to their favour, and seized the fact that Wharton's past proved crucial in the circumstantial evidence. The prosecution presented records of Wharton's IRA history showing that 'the defendant had declared at first that he knew nothing about the IRA., but...had himself written to the headquarters' applying for a pension for his services.²⁵ Judge Humphreys, overseeing the hearing, took a dim view of this and called Wharton 'a member of that gang which committed murders of British officers and others up to 1922... you are a hypocrite in my view, you are the worst and the most dangerous of the gang which is now before me.'²⁶ The jury, possibly swayed by the judge's statements, ultimately found Wharton guilty and he was sentenced to ten years penal servitude.²⁷

Within days of the verdict, Limerick Corporation asked the Irish government to intervene on Wharton's behalf and consider Judge Humphrey's statement a breach of the truce.²⁸ An article in the *Irish Independent* highlighted Judge Humphrey's past as crown prosecutor for military tribunals in Ireland between 1920 and 1922.²⁹ Other Irish papers also championed Wharton's case, gaining wide public support for his release. The Irish government instructed the High Commissioner, J.W. Dulanty, to raise the issue with the Dominion Secretary.³⁰ It was noted by a secretary of the Department of External Affairs that he showed 'a certain scepticism' when Dulanty brought the issue forward.³¹ On 12 June 1939 Wharton's case came before the Court of Criminal Appeal, London with Lord Chief Justice Hewart presiding.³² Wharton's new council claimed that at the original trial, Judge Humphreys had misled the jury about Wharton's present relationship with the IRA and that the defendant was no longer a member of the organisation.³³ The council for the accused also highlighted that a guilty verdict could only be returned if Wharton had knowingly kept the materials in his possession – a point

¹⁸ *Irish Independent*, 30 March 1939.

¹⁹ *Irish Times*, 7 Feb. 1939.

²⁰ Mrs Bridget Wharton also identified Fitzpatrick as the mysterious lodger; *Irish Independent*, 31 Mar. 1939.

²¹ *Irish Independent*, 1 April 1939.

²² Request by Gerald F. Wharton for military service certificate, NAI, DFA/241/25.

²³ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA: a history* (Niwot, 1994), p. 84.

²⁴ Reply to the request by Gerald F. Wharton for military service certificate, NAI, DFA/241/25.

²⁵ *Irish Independent*, 1 April 1939.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4 April 1939.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 4 April 1939.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 13 April 1939.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 17 April 1939.

³⁰ Firstly, the language used by the judge was not acceptable. Secondly, that there was no evidence to convict Wharton but anti-Irish prejudice; Note to High Commissioner, 14 April 1939, NAI, Taois/s11216.

³¹ Handwritten note to Runai don Riaghaltair from J.P. Walsh, 18 April 1939, NAI, Taois/s11216.

³² *Irish Independent*, 13 June 1939. Mr. Justice Singleton and Mr. Justice Hilbery.

³³ *Irish Independent*, 13 June 1939.

Judge Humphreys did not mention to the jury.³⁴ On 13 June 1939 Wharton's conviction was overturned and he was released from custody.³⁵ The Irish papers reported his release and printed letters received from Wharton thanking each one for their support. He soon returned to his family in London hoping to resume daily life.³⁶ However, these hopes were dashed, when on 22 August 1939, he was once again detained by British authorities, due in large part to extremely aggressive British countermeasures in eliminating the IRA security threat.³⁷

Throughout 1939, Irish immigrant districts in British cities were subjected to police surveillance and raids, which resulted in imprisonment for most suspects. Some were innocent people rounded up by police because of their close proximity to raided areas. A Home Department report found that

...in a number of cases the evidence was not sufficient to support criminal proceedings although it left no reasonable doubt that the persons in question had been concerned in the preparation or instigation of the outrages. It was decided that fresh legislation was necessary to deal with the situation.³⁸

As a result, the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, introduced the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act on 28 July 1939.³⁹ A wider ranging charge of 'conspiracy to cause explosions' extended the authorities scope to detain people. Police were also given special powers of expulsion leading to increased deportations of suspects back to Ireland.⁴⁰ These new legal measures arose as the fear of Nazi and Irish republican collaboration began to circulate in intelligence circles.⁴¹

With his previous January arrest and republican history, Wharton was obviously an individual who the authorities viewed as a potential security problem. He was soon deported to Ireland.⁴² Once back in his native country, Wharton was free to begin a new

³⁴ *Leitrim Observer*, 8 July 1939.

³⁵ The five months or so he spent away, his children had been told that he was in America and of course, they were delighted to see him. In a statement to the press Wharton said that he got a fair trial and 'that is not said because I got away. It is said because I candidly believe in it'; *Irish Independent*, 14 June 1939.

³⁶ Uinseann MacEoin, *The IRA in the twilight years*, p. 519.

³⁷ *Irish Press*, 23 Aug. 1939.

³⁸ *Annual report of his Majesty's Inspectors of Explosives 1939*, p. 10, H.C. 1946 (6976), 412.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Robert Fisk, *In time of war* (London, 1983), p. 73.

⁴¹ Coogan, *The IRA*, p. 97.

⁴² MacEoin, *Twilight Years*, p. 519.

life. The Irish government's failure to intern him like other IRA suspects at the time would suggest official belief in his innocence.⁴³

An analysis of two specific points also seems to corroborate this claim of innocence. When charged at his initial trial, Wharton did not react similarly to actual IRA members on the dock with him. His professed innocence contrasted with the identical short statements of the IRA men, explaining their prisoner of war status and condemning British occupation of Northern Ireland. S-Plan instructions had told captured volunteers to use the occasion as a propaganda opportunity.⁴⁴ Wharton's failure to do so as well as reportedly voting for Fianna Fáil in 1937 – a year after the party outlawed the IRA – cannot be considered the committed actions of a militant republican.

By the end of the year the IRA bombing campaign had been successfully contained. A total of 242 incidents, centred mainly on London, caused seven civilian deaths and ninety-eight serious injuries.⁴⁵ The most devastating explosion occurred in Coventry on 25 August in which five people died.⁴⁶ Logistical difficulties, police infiltration and a lack of support amongst Irish immigrants thwarted operational effectiveness. The heightened security situation after the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 also significantly neutralised the IRA's capability to carry out attacks. Today, historians agree that the plan was a disaster. Tim Pat Coogan describes the campaign as 'appallingly ill-conceived',⁴⁷ while Eunan O'Halpin concurs, stating that the execution of the S-Plan was so inept 'it was scarcely to be expected that Britain would meekly surrender to the IRA's demands'.⁴⁸ The disparity of chosen targets further reflected this and was aggravated by the loss of internal political guidance reaped from the jailing of many of its leaders in 1936.⁴⁹

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Exhibit 64, copy of handwritten note found on George E. Kane, National Archives United Kingdom, (NAUK), CRIM1/1086.

⁴⁵ A total of 102 incidents occurred in London. The other bombings occurred in Liverpool, Birmingham and Coventry.

⁴⁶ Fisk, *In time of war*, p.73.

⁴⁷ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, p. 91.

⁴⁸ O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, p.148.

⁴⁹ These targets included a Lancashire barracks, a Yorkshire hotel and several London public conveniences.

It can be concluded that the trial of Wharton, his subsequent conviction and ongoing saga of events which led to deportation, was a definite miscarriage of justice by a British state that had long considered its conflict with the IRA finished since 1922. Although the IRA bombing campaign was mismanaged and not viable, it is clear that the British authorities were highly concerned with the actions. As the bombs were set and ignited, panic arose from government, security and intelligence circles. And as 1939 progressed, and the fear of war with Germany grew, there was an ever-increasing concern of Nazi spies working together with the IRA men. Thus, even greater security measures throughout Britain were set forth and would be in place through the Second World War. An Irishman living in British towns and cities during this period had to be wary of any association with the IRA, or he very possibly would face the same ordeal that was cast upon Gerald Wharton.

Glendalough, Co. Wicklow



Glendalough (Irish : *Gleann dá locha* meaning 'Glen of the two lakes'). The foundation of Glendalough monastery is attributed to St. Kevin and his followers in the sixth century CE. For several centuries the monastery flourished as a place of learning until it was destroyed by English troops in the late fourteenth century. Thereafter it remained a ruin until a reconstruction scheme started in 1878. Today the restored buildings merely represent a portion of its original size. Archaeological evidence suggests that the complex also had workshops, areas for manuscript writing and copying, guesthouses, an infirmary, farm buildings and dwellings for both the monks and a large lay population.

For further reading:

Leslie, James B., *Clergy of Dublin and Glendalough : biographical succession lists; revised, edited and updated by W.J.R. Wallace.* (Belfast and Dublin, 2001).

Long, Harry, 'Three settlements of Gaelic Wicklow 1169-1600 : Rathgall, Ballinacor and Glendalough', In Hannigan, Ken and Nolan, William (Eds.), *Wicklow : History and Society : Interdisciplinary Essays on the History of an Irish County* (Dublin, 1994), pp. 237-65.

Mac Shamhrain, Ailbhe Seamus, *Church and Polity in pre-Norman Ireland : The Case of Glendalough.* (Maynooth, 1996).

Fizkul'tura in the Construction of the New Soviet Youth, 1924-1934

Susan Grant

Introduction

The initial two decades following the October Revolution of 1917 were years of dramatic political, economic and cultural upheaval. Society was in a state of constant flux as the new communist ideology sought to establish itself in Soviet life. These changes affected all levels of society, both institutions and individuals. It was during these tumultuous times when *fizkul'tura* (physical culture) found a ready and willing audience on which to impose the new proletarian ideals. Although initially used by the Bolsheviks as a military expedient during the Civil War years, physical culture soon came to represent a valuable means of helping to re-construct the new society. Faced with a bleak picture of a war-devastated, disease-ridden and fatigued population, *fizkul'tura* was viewed by many as a possible answer to these and other mounting social problems such as drunkenness, hooliganism and suicide. The agency entrusted to re-organise the physical culture movement was the Supreme Council of Physical Culture, established in June 1923. This was a coordinating body which oversaw the roles of other organisations working in physical culture, such as the *Komsomol*¹ (Communist Youth League), trade unions, commissariats of health and education, the military and other social organisations. While these institutions were instrumental in directing the policies of the new power elite, this analysis examines the individual social groups involved, but more specifically the application of physical culture to youth. Just how effective was physical culture in shaping the young children, workers and peasants into representatives of the new socialist order?

Raising Healthy and Happy Children

An initiative, which became one of the key social debates of the 1920s was *vospitanie* (nurture and upbringing). A potential marriage between *vospitanie* and *fizkul'tura* could assist in disciplining and controlling youth along socialist lines. Physical culture for its

¹ The *Komsomol* was the Communist Youth League, founded in 1918 for those aged between 16 and 20 years.

part in *vospitanie* was viewed as an important element in revolutionising children and creating strong and healthy proletarians. In 1926, Nikolai Semashko, Commissar for Health and chairperson of the Supreme Council of Physical Culture, espoused the key tenets of Communist *vospitanie* and *fizkul'tura*. In relation to *fizkul'tura* in schools, he reminded young people that physical culture was essential for the care and maintenance of the spirit and mind as well as the body.² He repeated that exercises, games and sports were significant not only in developing health, agility and endurance but also in imbuing collectivism and solidarity. In this sense, schools represented 'the *vospitanie* of the future defenders of socialism and socialist revolution.'³ Schools had their important socio-political goals to fulfil and therefore had to implement the policy of 'physical culture twenty-four hours a day.'⁴ Yet achieving this was a slow process that required increased attention. According to the Central Statistics Office, the total number of those participating in physical culture in educational institutes numbered 95,696 in 1924.⁵ Another figure estimated that in 823 schools and educational institutes this figure stood at 54 percent or 319,035 participants.⁶ This was still a modest number considering the Soviet population totalled 133,504,432.⁷ As was often the case with physical culture, turning policy into reality often proved difficult and it was not until the 1930s when physical culture in schools became systematised.

By this time, pupils were being more regularly drilled in how to behave in the Soviet manner. For instance, the repetition of certain movements and exercises were followed by vocal responses and symbolic actions. Part of these routines included children marching, holding a hammer and upon finishing the movement, declaring: 'Hit a heavy blow with the hammer.'⁸ When all the exercises were completed they were to stand to attention and march to the designated area where the living picture was to be arranged. The following verse was then recited:

*In the factory all are moving. All are at work and striving
To build, build, build again. New conditions of life.*⁹

² Nikolai Semashko, *Puti Sovetskoi Fizkul'tury* (Moscow, 1926), p. 52.

³ Semashko, *Puti*, p. 53.

⁴ Coined by Semashko, this was one of the key slogans of the mid-1920s.

⁵ RGASPI (Russian State Archive of Social-Political History), f.537, op.1, d.116, ll. 167-71 (1926).

⁶ RGASPI, f.537, op.1, d.116, ll. 167-171 (1926).

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ M. Cherevko, *Fizkul'tura v Shkole*, no.3 (1930): 28.

⁹ *Ibid.*

There was then a pause and the 'living picture' was organised with the appropriate slogans and posters in place. These visual aids were a popular means of relating state policy and ideology to the people. The pictures were a simple, direct and a cost-effective way of reaching a wide audience, not only in schools, but in factories, clubs and elsewhere. Posters were also a significant agitation tool, again offering a vivid visual image of conducting oneself under the new regime. Some of the *fizkul'tura* posters in schools were quite broad in their thematic scope. They ranged from informing students that smoking led to shortened life expectancy to warning students not to spit on the floor or walls. In this sense, physical culture was much more than simply sports or games, it was *culture*, an effort to inculcate some level of *kul'turnost'* in children and youth. It was an essential part of *vospitanie*, as it sought to 'develop social habits and qualities and to address the matter of how comrades conducted themselves.'¹⁰ The posters, exercise drills, talks and living newspapers were all aimed at both educating and disciplining. Just how effective these were is difficult to judge, but the constant stream of agitation and propaganda, whether in the school or the club, must have impacted children on some level.

Clubs and Yacheiki: Organising Youth

Exceptionally important and influential in the practice of physical culture were the clubs. *Komsomol* and trade union clubs attracted many young people. Males aged between eighteen and twenty-four and females aged between sixteen and nineteen represented the highest participation figures.¹¹ 54 percent of male and female participants in *fizkul'tura* were aged sixteen and younger. Girls were most likely to become involved in sports and physical culture at a younger age, with interest waning after age nineteen.¹² The cause of this was most likely marriage, work, increased household chores and children. The opposite trend could be found amongst boys, who became more involved after age nineteen. One explanation for this could be increased access to clubs at work combined

¹⁰ V. Yakovlev, 'Shkol'nyi fizkul'tplakat', *Fizkul'tura v Shkole*, 3 (1930), p. 28.

¹¹ RGASPI (Komsomol), f.1-M, op.23, d.801, l.81. Jan.-Dec. 1927.

¹² RGASPI, f.537, op.1, d.116, l.169. These referred to the period Jan. 1924-Oct. 1924.

with a social dimension. These statistics corresponded to the general trend in clubs during the late 1920s. John Hatch, in his article on the workers' club movement, noted that 44 percent of workers' club members in Moscow were under twenty-three years-of-age and that the majority of female club members were young women.¹³

A 1925 *Smena* article on clubs and *yacheiki* reiterated the common perception of the times – that 'cells' or *yacheiki* were the basis of organisation and guided working youth.¹⁴ They were there to defend the interests of the young workers, which they did through their representatives on the factory committees. The article's author, Tarakanov, wrote that it was the duty of the *Komsomol yacheiki* to ensure that the young held the 'correct' opinions and made the 'correct' decisions. Mindful of the common problems of drunkenness, hooliganism and prostitution, the role of the club was often elevated to combat cases of youth delinquency. Youth and workers' free time were to be used constructively and it was frequently stipulated that leisure should ideally include some level of cultural or political education. Yet in order for a potentially wayward youth to choose the right path, he or she had to be adequately catered for. Tarakanov provided an example of a boy who, having finished work for the day and eaten, did not want to stay at home for the evening. Instead, he hoped to relax and enjoy his free time – and the club should be able to satisfy his interests.¹⁵ In Tarakanov's view, the *yacheika* was responsible for looking after worker youth in the factory and protecting their economic interests, while the club had to direct and fulfil the cultural issues. However, Tarakanov maintained that the *yacheika* had to undertake some work in the club or else this boy, who after finishing his day's work and finding nothing of interest in a club, would then go carousing and get drunk. Therefore it was concluded that the youth clubs were to organise evenings of leisure.

Tarakanov maintained that speeches and lectures organised by the club should be measured. His concern was that the youth who wanted to be entertained in the club were in fact neglected by it. Little attention was offered by the club to entertainment, games,

¹³ John Hatch, 'Hangouts and hangovers: state, class and culture in Moscow's Workers' Club Movement, 1925-1928', *Russian Review*, 53, i, (1994), p. 100.

¹⁴ P. Tarakanov, 'Klub i Yacheika', *Smena*, 18 (1925), p. 18.

¹⁵ This is the argument also posed by John Hatch with regard to workers' clubs. Hatch stated that "clubs [which] engaged in purely 'educational' work, such as study circles, failed to serve their daily needs and 'social interests'". Hatch, 'Hangouts and hangovers', *Russian Review*, p. 103.

rest and relaxation. Therefore young people often walked away from the clubs searching for something that would satisfy them. He attested that little attention was paid by the youth section to educational work and that more needed to be done in addressing the issues of illiteracy and anti-social behaviour, the latter particularly in relation to the damage of club equipment. Yet he stated that the club was not a school. Tarakanov, like others writing on physical culture, was keen to express that *fizkul'tura* centres ought to be *interesting* as well as educational in order to attract young people. Otherwise, they would find other sources of amusement. However, the crux was that those at the forefront of physical culture insisted that *fizkul'tura* should be taken *seriously*, and as such should not be categorised as 'entertainment'. It was therefore up to those dealing with *fizkul'tura* on a daily basis in the clubs and *yacheiki* to delimit entertainment and education.¹⁶

What did *fizkultura* mean to the children in these *kruzhki* and *yacheiki*? How did state planning and protocols along with physical culture propaganda impact their lives? A report that was sent from a group of young *fizkul'turniki* from a ski *kruzhok* (circle) in Lugi (Tver' province) sheds some light on these matters.¹⁷ They wrote that the *kruzhok* numbered 250 people who, they noted, were 'ready at any given moment to help in the construction of the Soviet Union.' Their *kruzhok* consisted of school children of the first level, aged between nine and thirteen years. It had been organised in March 1930. During the course of a year, the *kruzhok* had accomplished a significant amount of work. For example, in one month they had gone to the *sovkhozy* and *kolkhozy*,¹⁸ assisting in the harvest and other rural activities. Keeping the links with the *kolkhozy*, they also helped the children in their physical culture work. In the council re-elections, the *kruzhok* had written summonses, printed posters and stayed at home with young children allowing their mothers to go and vote in the elections. The *kruzhok* also maintained that young *fizkul'turniki* should help in *Vseobuch* (general education) and in liquidating illiteracy

¹⁶ This was still an issue in some places in 1933, where one *fizkul'turnik* in Tiflis complained that physical culture in the Youth Technical VUZ was not '*fizkul'tura*' and failed to attract substantial numbers, especially with females. The instructor was a military leader who essentially turned the physical culture classes into military training exercises. A. Panteleeva, 'Ch'ya vina?', *Fizkul'tura Zakavkas'ya*, 1 (1933), p. 8.

¹⁷ RGASPI (Komsomol), f.6, op.9, d.33, l.94. *Report*. 15 Jan. 1931.

¹⁸ These were collective and state farms.

among their parents. Regarding shock work,¹⁹ they claimed that this was increasing and that young *fizkulturniki* had taken it upon themselves to turn away from the 'lazy life' and embrace a better one. In conclusion, they claimed that their *kruzhok* was quickly expanding and was working together as a harmonious collective and that in 1931 their *kruzhok* would help even more in socialist construction.

This letter was written (and presented) to please the authorities. The children (no doubt with some adult assistance), displayed a familiarity with the political dictums of the day – they would help 'liquidate illiteracy', 'increase shock-work', and travel to the villages to help in *kolkhoz* and *sovkhos* work. While it is of course almost impossible to judge the extent to which mentalities were penetrated by socialist ideology, there is no doubting that many young people (and others) were highly receptive to Soviet policies and did genuinely seek to participate in the new life. For the generation following the revolution, it was the only life they knew. Involvement in physical culture represented yet another step on the path to communist fulfilment.

Physical Culture and Sexuality amongst Schoolchildren

Disciplining young people not only concerned eliminating uncultured habits and organising militaristic routines. Discipline and *vospitanie* continued to monitor sexual currents amongst young people. It was argued that in schools, *fizkul'tura* could be used to help establish the 'correct social environment'. Social factors played a greater influential role than biological factors in the sexual *vospitanie* and habits of young people.²⁰ Owing to adverse social conditions, it was argued that this 'correct social environment' had previously been difficult to achieve. Between 1920 and 1921, many children travelled between cities while being transported to children's homes. On these journeys, eight-year-olds often had to share a room with eighteen-year-olds, an occurrence which influenced the sexual development of children.²¹ The use of *fizkul'tura* was thus endorsed to help educate these young people and to assist in creating the correct social environment. Children were persuaded to adopt a hygiene routine, wear hygienic

¹⁹ Shock work was work completed in record time and was frequently undertaken by young people from the Komsomol.

²⁰ Gerasimov, 'Fizkul'tura-faktor polovogo vospitaniya', *Fizkul'tura v Shkole*, 8 (1931), p. 12.

²¹ *Ibid.*

clothing, participate in physical exercises, and perform socio-political activities in their schools and communities.²² It could also be used to help combat onanism, still a concern in society. Onanism – ‘the main scourge of the old schools’ was considered to be a result of the passive nature of the old school system, where students would sit for hours in a stuffy room. Collective schools were charged with eradicating this ‘evil’ through physical culture. However, adopting a physical culture regime and wearing ‘hygienic’ clothing was hardly going to reverse biological or natural instincts among young people, no matter how hard the authorities may have tried.

It was further noted that relationships between boys and girls during sexual maturation were often difficult and unhealthy. The negative attitude men acquired towards women tended to continue into adulthood, sometimes affecting family and social life. In order to curb instances of the ‘incorrect’ attitudes to sexuality, several measures could be taken as a part of physical culture. One of these was to wear ‘free’ clothes without any unnecessary pleats or folds and which should not ‘draw attention to the sexual organs’, particularly for girls. Gerasimov also observed that many authorities on hygiene did not recommend pockets or zips in trousers, as these could lead to cases of sexual encounters.²³ It was the responsibility of parents and teachers to ensure that children were maturing in a healthy and hygienic manner. In higher educational schools, where students were training for work, boys were to be encouraged not to view girls as inferior, but instead as fellow comrades. An example was provided of students from various *rabfaki* who were involved in ‘storming’ the harvest, where both girls and boys would work on a farm over a twenty-four hour period. This was the perceived attitude that physical culture had to nurture in schools, developing healthy relations between the sexes, as well as a positive and enthusiastic attitude towards work and society as a whole. Another part of this healthy attitude included religion and psychology. According to S. Mileev, *fizkul'tura* offered an ideal means of addressing the religious question amongst children and teenagers.²⁴ He argued that anti-religious *vospitanie* would impart upon physical health a healthy psychology. Only when this was achieved could one speak of

‘fully developed people in a socialist society.’ Therefore physical culture incorporated an incredibly wide spectrum of objectives, especially in its *vospitanie* form.

Imposition of the New Culture and Psychology amongst Young Adults

With such a wide purview, *fizkul'tura* also found itself drawn into broader debates surrounding the attitudes of young people, family, marriage, sexuality, and the relationship between men and women. Sexual hygiene, or rather its absence, represented a serious concern for the authorities. In both the cities and countryside, there was widespread ignorance surrounding sexual health and hygiene. Writing in *Fizkul'tura i Sport*, Ivanovsky considered that the sexual question in contemporary society was ‘abnormal’.²⁵ Ivanovsky claimed that young people began their sex lives at a much earlier age than was acceptable, with drunkenness contributing to the development of sexual feelings. Such behaviour led to competition amongst youth to succeed and outdo one another in the sexual sphere. Physical culture occupied the opposite end of this spectrum. It was a ‘wonderful and healthy form of rest and relaxation; it strengthened the body and mind and developed skills such as mastery of oneself.’

Rather than loiter about drinking vodka or beer, *fizkul'turniki* engaged in sports and other healthy activities, serving as a ‘necessary diversion from sexual and emotional experiences.’ Ivanovsky also averred that sexual relations actually weakened muscle strength. He noted that sportsmen were aware of this and consequently abstained from sex when competing in events. Another advantage of physical culture and sport, in Ivanovsky’s view, was that it afforded men and women the opportunity to see one another’s bodies more freely. Therefore, men would not become so ‘excited’ at the sight of the naked female form. It would be even more useful if these habits could be developed at an early stage, amongst boys and girls. This would eliminate the experience of seeing each other as ‘objects of desire’ and instead encourage platonic relationships. He referred to a 1924 questionnaire conducted by Dr. Pinnus in Stalingrad. The questionnaire was anonymous and conducted among 2,000 Komsomol'tsy, of whom 210 were *fizkul'turniki*. Of the participants who were not *fizkul'turniki* (1,790 or 32 percent), those aged seventeen years already had an active sex life. *Fizkul'turniki* in this group

²² Gerasimov, ‘Fizkul'tura-faktor polovogo vospitaniya’, *Fizkul'tura v Shkole*, 8 (1931), p. 13.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁴ S. Mileev, *Fizkul'tura v Shkole*, 8 (1931), p. 17.

²⁵ B. Ivanovsky, ‘Polovaya zhizn' i fizkul'tura’, *Fizkul'tura i Sport*, 16 (1929), pp. 4-5.

represented only 12.5 percent. For eighteen year olds, the figure was 52 percent (non-*fizkul'turniki*) and 33 percent (*fizkul'turniki*). It would appear from this study physical culture students seemed inclined to commence sexual relations until later.

While it remains unclear whether or not this Stalingrad study was typical of all *Komsomol* or students partaking in physical culture, there is further evidence to suggest that such surveys were certainly not an uncommon occurrence. A questionnaire amongst *fabzavuchei* (factory schools for teenagers in work) in Leningrad showed that on average, *fizkul'turniki* became sexually active a year and a half later than those not involved in physical culture.²⁶ This lent weight to the theory that physical exercise was an important means of sublimating sexual desire. The surveys also testify that there was much interest in sexual matters amongst young people. Consequently, sexual mores in society was a topic frequently discussed by the party, and as Sheila Fitzpatrick noted, the 'sex problem' was one which also preoccupied students throughout the 1920s.²⁷ It is unsurprising, in light of these surveys and the increasing concern for the implications of sexual freedoms on society, that *fizkul'tura* came to be considered as an ideal means of integrating the Communist ideals of restraint in society. In two of the studies analysed by Fitzpatrick, she noted that a large number of male students considered abstinence to be physically harmful, producing a detrimental affect on their health and even causing impotence.²⁸ Ivanovsky's claims that *fizkul'tura* in fact strengthened muscle mass and the general scramble of the health and hygiene ideologues to promote *fizkul'tura* as a healthy and beneficial substitute for sexual licentiousness.

This was the view advanced by Semashko, who was one of the main advocates of the new psychology of physical culture. He wanted the sexual desires and energy of the young to be harnessed in a positive manner, not just towards 'passion and lust'.²⁹ According to Semashko, 'physical culture destroyed the physiological basis for sexual anomalies. Of these anomalies, the most frequent was onanism.'³⁰ He decried that many young people resorted to onanism. The 'best, and indeed, only cure' for onanism was in

²⁶ B. Ivanovsky, 'Polovaya zhizn' i fizkul'tura', *Fizkul'tura i Sport*, 16 (1929), pp. 4-5

²⁷ Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'Sex and revolution: an examination of literary and statistical data on the mores of Soviet students in the 1920s' in *The Journal of Modern History*, 50, ii (1978), pp. 252-78.

²⁸ Fitzpatrick, 'Sex and revolution', p. 265.

²⁹ Semashko, 'Puti', p. 56.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

Semashko's view, physical culture. In such cases, doctors and specialists advised patients to practice sports.³¹ Further proof of the promotion of *fizkul'tura* in the sexual sphere came in Ivanovsky's reiteration that *fizkul'tura* was a very useful means of redirecting youth away from alcohol or prostitutes. After all, he observed, 90 percent of men turned to prostitutes when in a drunken state. If used to combat such problems, Ivanovsky maintained, physical culture could also assist in the fight against venereal disease, which in most cases he observed, was spread through prostitution. Physical culture improved health, strengthened the body, the nervous system, and assisted in the resistance of anaemia. What then, Ivanovsky posed, could be done to regularise the sexual lives of *fizkul'turniki*? Firstly, he stated that a daily morning exercise routine and a wash or sponge down with cold water was necessary. Gymnastics routines could be performed in conjunction with the physical culture programmes on the radio. Then, he continued, young people should participate in the physical culture *kruzhki*, which were now attached to every trade union club. In the *kruzhok*, physical culture had to be practised systematically according to a plan and supervised by specialised instructors. He emphasised the axiom that physical culture was not solely exercise but in fact a way of life. Therefore, everyone involved in *fizkul'tura* had to observe the rules of work and rest, correct diet, clean living conditions, the value of fresh air, hygiene and cleanliness, sobriety, and avoidance of harmful habits such as smoking. If all of these were adhered to, then everyone would have a regular and healthy sex life. If those concerned with sexual abstinence and impotency simply followed Ivanovsky's advice and adopted an appropriate *fizkul'tura* regime, then their fears would have been allayed.

Yet this is not to downplay the significance of the matter. Sexual impotence or 'dysfunction' was at the root of much of the nervousness or 'neurasthenia' which seemed to gather pace during the 1920s.³² In fact, many who suffered from sexual problems (or

³¹ *Ibid.* This message was heeded by some doctors. For instance, concerning onanism, Dr. V. N. Voskresenskii replied in his newspaper column to Riazan peasants that: 'This is a great strain on the nervous system and the heart. The consequences of masturbation are extremely serious and often lead to impotence – that is, the inability to have normal sexual relations.' (*Derevenskaya gazeta*, 25, 3 April 1926), cited in Stephen P. Frank.

³² See Frances L. Bernstein, 'Panic, potency, and the crisis of nervousness in the 1920s' in Kiaer and Naiman, *Everyday life* for a fascinating account of sexual hygiene, where she examines accounts and surveys from various clinics and centres in Moscow. These included the outpatient clinic of the State Venereological Institute and the Institute of Social Hygiene, the Counselling Centre for Sexual Hygiene or Counselling Centre for a Healthy Lifestyle. She also examines various medical writings on the subject.

perceived problems) were utterly distraught and some were so distressed that they contemplated suicide. One sufferer of 'nocturnal emissions', who could not afford a private doctor, described how he could no longer work and had abandoned his studies at the factory school because all he could think about was his illness.³³ Another despairingly confided, 'You understand, doctor... if I can't be cured, I'll kill myself.'³⁴ According to the experts, many of their patients' fears were misplaced and predominantly psychological. They had most often mistaken impotence for sexual failures occurring as a result of drunkenness or nervousness, not some serious medical problem. In light of such nervousness and negativity, medical and scientific workers sought an antidote. There is a viable argument that physical culture represented such an antidote and was one means of dealing with the poor psychological state of the nation. If the Soviet Union was to live up to its image as a young, strong and dynamic nation, then clinics full of patients with sexual dysfunctions, shaking from nervous exhaustion and threatening suicide were unacceptable.³⁵ So as a part of the other 'new psychology' attached to *fizkul'tura* – using it to encourage feelings of collectivism and foster positive emotions and attitudes towards society – the development and significance of physical culture assumed a new dimension and a new relevance.

Conclusion

The task of constructing a new society was no easy task. In addressing the question of whether or not the Bolsheviks succeeded in such a re-construction, the overwhelming impression is that their success was limited. Rather than constructing a new society, it is more plausible to conclude that their revolutionary ideology and policies gradually become more measured as they were confronted by the magnitude of the social, political and economic problems. The quest to use *fizkul'tura* in accomplishing a new society based on exclusively proletarian and socialist ideology became amended to achieving the more fundamentally important task of developing a healthy and educated population. In many ways, physical culture was at the helm of this undertaking, entrusted with steering young people away from drunkenness, delinquency and sexual licentiousness, and

directing them towards a life of healthy and active participation in the socialist life. That they succeeded in constructing a 'new person' is questionable, but it is clear that physical culture and its psychology certainly succeeded in enrapturing much of the population and youth. It should also be acknowledged that construction of the new person was a reciprocal development between the population and the authorities, an on-going process throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. This relationship and the dichotomy between care and control underlined much of the policies directed towards youth, especially relating to *fizkul'tura*.

³³ B. Gurvich, 'O polliutsiiakh', *Za zdorovyi byt*, 6 (1929), p. 2, cited in Bernstein, 'Panic', p. 153.

³⁴ B. Gurvich, 'Polovaya slabost' muzhchin', 2, cited in Bernstein, 'Panic', p. 158.

³⁵ Many of those visiting the clinics were young students or party activists.



Cashel (Irish: *Caiseal Mumhan*, meaning *Stone Fortress of Munster*). The Rock of Cashel is an isolated elevation of stratified limestone that rises above the broad and fertile plain of the Golden Vale. Originally the capital of the Eóghanacht kings of Munster, Cashel later became an important ecclesiastical centre. In 977 Brian Boru of the Dál gCais was crowned here as the first non-Eóghanacht king of Munster. At the Synod of Cashel in 1172 the Irish bishops agreed to the lordship of Henry II of England over Ireland. This brought the Irish Church under Rome and ended the Celtic Christian system.

For further reading:

Corráin, Donnchadh, 'The Synod of Cashel, 1101 : Conservative or Innovative?'. In Edwards, David, (Ed.), *Regions and Rulers in Ireland, 1100-1650 : Essays for Kenneth Nicholls* (Dublin, 2004), pp. 13-19.

Flanagan, Marie Therese. 'Henry II, the Council of Cashel and the Irish bishops'. *Peritia*, 10 (1996), pp. 184-211.

Hourihane, Colum, *The Mason and his Mark : Masons' Marks in the Medieval Irish Archbishoprics of Cashel and Dublin* (Oxford, 2000).

Bryce Evans

During the Second World War (1939-45), Irish government propaganda was constructed around the notion that Ireland, as a spiritual nation, was aloof from the destructive material conflict occurring in the outside world.¹ The righteous tropes of such propaganda have been collectively termed moral neutrality.² Whilst most historians of 'the Emergency' have succeeded in addressing moral neutrality as myth, exposing the *realpolitik* that underlay de Valeran diplomacy, they have paid little attention to 'bottom up' social and economic conditions in Ireland.

As Clair Wills has argued, outside the diplomatic minutiae of the neutrality controversy, Irish society has been dealt with a narrative which 'is all about absence – of conflict, of supplies, of social dynamism, of contact with the outside world.'³ Much of the blame for this misrepresentation of Emergency Ireland must rest with F.S.L. Lyons who claimed that the people of Emergency Ireland were like the inhabitants of Plato's Cave: 'almost totally isolated from the rest of mankind'.⁴ But was Ireland really this dull, insular backwater barely surviving on a diet of spirituality and stoicism? The economic depredations of the Emergency are indeed striking. During this period, consumer capitalism and technology remained at an embryonic stage, while tubercular and infant mortality rates, malnutrition and unemployment rose. Irish agricultural export, which thrived during the First World War, was crippled in the Second by British price controls. As the supply of fertiliser, feed and fuel diminished, the country reverted to turf, and non-motorised modes of transport. While Tom Garvin has argued that this hiatus from

¹ This article is primarily concerned with black market activity in the twenty-six county state between 1939 and 1945. However 'Ireland' is used instead of 'Éire' to demonstrate that both the sources used and the historiography discussed in this article reflect a strong thirty-two county dimension to events.

² Donal Ó Drisceoil, 'Moral neutrality': censorship in Emergency Ireland', *History Ireland*, 4, 2 (1996), pp. 46-50.

³ Clair Wills, *That neutral island: a cultural history of Ireland during the Second World War* (Dublin, 2007), p. 10.

⁴ F.S.L. Lyons, *Ireland since the famine* (Bungay, 1973), p. 557.

modernity suited Fianna Fáil's conservatism,⁵ the place of non-elites in the Emergency has yet to be examined.

For ordinary people, perhaps the most potent symbol of deprivation during the Emergency was the black loaf of bread, a 100 percent wholegrain staple resulting from Ireland's chronic wheat shortage. Despite the black loaf, there was the black market – an underground trade in commodities that operated in defiance of the government's wartime Emergency Powers Orders. Black market activity in Ireland is not exclusive to the Emergency era. Rather, the significance of the Emergency black market lies in the conditions which resulted in its short but striking boom in these years. The Irish economy, which in 1938 limped out of the Anglo-Irish economic war, entered the Emergency already scarred by emigration, meagre growth and industrial stagnation.⁶ This situation was aggravated by conflict in Europe where supplies waned after the fall of France in June 1940 and were ultimately curtailed for the rest of the war by the Battle of the Atlantic and British sanctions aimed at undermining Irish neutrality. Reacting to this supply crisis, the Irish government's 1942 Emergency Powers Orders attempted to combat shortages by ensuring fair price and equitable distribution, which included rationing.

Despite the fact that its operation undermined the government's efforts to prevent mass poverty by controlling prices, many people actively participated in the black market to obtain goods. As one Dublin slum dweller of the era recalled, 'The only thing that seemed to be thriving was the black market.'⁷ Nor was the black market confined to Ireland's towns and cities; in the words of a Connemara native, 'There was an awful lot of racketeering and marketeering going on' during the Emergency.⁸ Along the border with Northern Ireland, smuggling already well established, increased during the Emergency. The exceptional black market activity during the Emergency – as opposed to such activity before and after this six year period – is marked by its operation in the face of an unprecedented degree of social and governmental pressure to substitute 'fairer' market customs for market-driven political economy. Such popular antipathy to

⁵ Tom Garvin, *Preventing the future: why was Ireland so poor for so long?* (Dublin, 2004), pp. 62-111.

⁶ Cormac Ó Gráda, *A rocky road: the Irish economy since the 1920s* (Manchester, 1997), pp. 1-8.

⁷ Máirín Johnston, *Around the banks of Pimlico* (Dublin, 1985), p. 122.

⁸ Raymonde Standún and Bill Long, *Singing stone, whispering wind* (Dublin, 2001), p. 80.

profiteering was termed 'moral economy' by the English social historian E.P. Thompson.⁹ A prominent facet of Irish moral neutrality was the collective efforts of government, Church and pressure groups to enforce moral economy.

According to John Hogan, the Emergency established a high-water mark for the interventionist ideas of Seán Lemass.¹⁰ During the Emergency, Lemass was made Minister for Supplies, a newly created leviathan portfolio in which he 'assumed the role and status of an economic overlord', controlling the price and distribution of all goods.¹¹ This description suggests Lemass possessed the sort of all-encompassing regulatory functions more typical of a paternalist lord overseeing a Thompsonian moral economy rather than a modern market economy. The new Ministry of Supplies (hereafter known as Supplies) brief was soon broadened following widespread allegations of profiteering and greed. Fishermen were supposedly dumping their catch and delaying deliveries, so that their fish would come into the Dublin market at a time which would justify an excessive price to the consumer.⁴ A secret 'fruit ring' was also supposedly controlling the distribution of fruit in Dublin.⁵ Bolstered by a rigorous censorship which kept the department informed of instances of profiteering, speculation and evasion of orders, Supplies soon took complete control of the import and export of all commodities.

In an era in which the lack of dynamic departmental coordination was marked, historians have viewed Supplies as a sort of mammoth interventionist exception to an old mould.⁶ Lemass has been described as exhibiting 'superlatively good public relations... everybody put up with a lot because they had been prepared to have to put up with so much more.'⁷ C.S. ('Todd') Andrews credits Lemass's ministerial secretary, John Leydon as securing the equitable distribution of clothes and fuel during the Emergency. According to Andrews, Leydon was 'ruthless in dealing with the numerous spivs and

⁹ E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century', *Past & Present*, 50 (1971), pp. 76-136.

¹⁰ John Hogan, *Seán Lemass: the enigmatic patriot* (Dublin, 1997), p. 110.

¹¹ Ronan Fanning, *Independent Ireland* (Dublin, 1983), p. 148.

⁴ Dáil Éireann, 'Price of Fish', vol. 80, col. 1205, 29 May 1940.

⁵ National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Hilda Tweedy Papers, 98/17/5/5/43.

⁶ See J.J. Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: politics and society* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 277 and Fanning, *Independent Ireland*, p. 152.

⁷ James F. Meenan, 'The Irish economy during the war' in *Ireland in the war years and after*, eds. Kevin B. Nowlan and T. Desmond Williams (Dublin, 1969), p. 31.

black marketers which a rationing system inevitably spawns...⁸ That Leydon was uncompromising when it came to enforcing a moral economy was exemplified with a letter the ministerial secretary wrote to Eamon de Valera in 1945 in which he appears to have little time for commercial patronage. Replying to de Valera's appeal for clemency on behalf of an erstwhile associate convicted for a rationing offence in 1943, he insisted to the Taoiseach that 'we must support the Gardaí in confronting these people of standing.'⁹ Such an ethic echoed Lemass's assertion that 'The criminals who deal in the black market...are not of the Bill Sykes type...they are pompous and respectable looking citizens...robbing others of their fair share.'¹⁰

Supplies intensified its war on the black market in early 1942, when Ireland was experiencing its worst shortages and launching advertisements in the press encouraging people to 'break the backbone' of the black market by informing. In August 1942 they revealed 700 people had been prosecuted for rationing offences during a nine month period.¹¹ Such convictions included 'pompous and respectable looking citizens'. In November 1943, for instance, Arthur Hamilton Whiteside, secretary of eight Irish trade associations including the Chocolate Manufacturers Association and the Food Manufacturers' Federation, was jailed for insider trading on sugar supplies.¹²

The assault on the black market was also led by a number of voluntary bodies. Ex-teacher Hilda Tweedy founded the Irish Housewives Association (IHA) in 1941, claiming 'women are apt to grumble about high prices and food scarcities but too slow to realise their duty to try to remedy these social evils.'¹³ The IHA's well publicised 1941 memorandum exhibited some markedly socialist tendencies, calling on the government to institute a fair price for producers and consumers, a minimum wage for workers, greater market regulation, communal feeding centres and 'the suppression of all black markets.'¹⁴ Similarly, General Eoin O' Duffy reacted to the increase in thefts of bicycles

during the Emergency by founding a 'new Dublin movement' against bicycle thefts. Speaking at the 'movement's' initial meeting in May 1942, O'Duffy claimed '410 machines were stolen during the last month' in a trend that was becoming 'a menace to the public' orchestrated by a 'sophisticated operation' who used vans and cars to transport the bikes.¹⁵

Catholic Action also had its part to play in the war on the black market. John Charles McQuaid, who became Archbishop of Dublin in 1940, oversaw the creation of the Catholic Social Service Conference (CSSC), a federation of thirty-nine existing Catholic charities established in April 1941. The CSSC which concentrated its work on the material needs of the community was distinct from the overtly moralistic and emigrant focused Catholic Social Welfare Bureau (CSWB).¹⁶ The Dublin poor were heavily reliant on the CSSC, which provided thousands of free meals to hungry schoolchildren and by March 1942 had an impressive seventy seven free clothing guilds alone.¹⁷

Unfortunately, the combined efforts of Supplies, voluntary organisations and the Church failed to stymie Emergency Ireland's black market. There was a lack of coordination and trust between these various groups. McQuaid embraced the practical application of an Emergency moral economy on none but his own sectarian terms. And older Edwardian Catholic charitable bodies such as the St. Patrick's Guild and the Catholic Protection and Rescue Society of Ireland were formed with the set intention of protecting the Catholic poor against proselytism.¹⁸ In Belfast during the Emergency, social services were sharply delineated between faiths.¹⁹ Unsurprisingly, McQuaid was virulently opposed to the IHA because of its largely Protestant membership. Similarly, when asked to endorse the Mount Street Club, a secular urban co-operative for unemployed men, he refused, claiming that 'whatever its good work, of set purpose it excludes consideration of the Catholic faith.'²⁰

⁸ C.S. Andrews, *Man of no property* (Dublin, 2001), p. 173.

⁹ John Leydon to Eamon de Valera, 1 September 1943, NAI, Department of the Taoiseach (DT), RA 103/44.

¹⁰ *Irish Times*, 13 Dec. 1941.

¹¹ *Leitrim Observer*, 15 Aug. 1942.

¹² *Evening Herald*, 18 Nov. 1943.

¹³ Hilda Tweedy to Women's Social and Progressive League, 11 November, 1943, NAI, Tweedy Papers, JUS/98/17/5/1/2.

¹⁴ Irish Housewives Association, 'Memorandum on the Food and Fuel Emergency', 5 May, 1941, NAI, Tweedy Papers, JUS/98/17/5/1/1.

¹⁵ *Irish Times*, 13 May 1942.

¹⁶ Lindsey Earner-Byrne, 'In respect of motherhood: maternity policy and provision in Dublin city, 1922-1956' (Ph.D. thesis, University College, Dublin, 1996), p. 100.

¹⁷ Dublin Archdiocesan Archives, McQuaid papers, AB8/B/XIX/1a.

¹⁸ Earner-Byrne, 'Motherhood', p. 34.

¹⁹ Mary Muldowney, *The Second World War and Irish women: an oral history* (Dublin, 2007), p. 121.

²⁰ 'The Mount Street Club', DAA, McQuaid papers, AB8/A/XVIII/37.

Lemass and Supplies also viewed the IHA as an antagonistic organisation, for it pressed the government to enforce a moral economy fully and declared themselves 'For the Community, Not for Profit',²¹ sentiments unpalatable to a Fianna Fáil political elite still reliant on the support of the native bourgeoisie. The IHA challenged the system instituted by Supplies whereby people registered at their local shop to exchange coupons for food, questioning whether 'a voluntary curtailment of consumption' was working and calling instead for a more comprehensive system of rationing.²² Members even marched through Dublin in March 1942 with placards that read 'The Children Must be Fed' and 'Fair prices'.²³

The government's new interventionist streak was also causing problems with church relations. Priests were generally unfaltering advocates of moral neutrality, often reflected in their sermons. In his Lenten pastoral of 1942, Bishop McNamee of Ardagh and Clonmacnoise attacked the 'materialistic conflict in Europe' and went on to remind people that a lack of 'co-operation with the civil authority' by involvement in the black market would result in 'a shortage of food more terrible than the failure of the potato crop in the Black Forty - Seven'.²⁴ However, vocationalism and the Catholic social teaching which underpinned it, called for a corporate order - an influential 'third way' during the Emergency - which held a clear disdain for state interventionism and a sometimes hysterical anti-socialism. Although supporting moral neutrality, priests often had difficulty accepting the government's enforcement of aspects of moral economy when it threatened their use of cars.

In 1942, Supplies discontinued the sale of cooking appliances. Electricity and gas were rationed to combat the chronic shortage of fuel in the country.²⁵ To complement these largely domestic-targeted measures, Lemass introduced a ban on non-essential motoring. Under this measure, and unlike the lay population, priests were still allowed to use their cars but were restricted to 'urgent and necessary' clerical duties such as visits to people who were gravely ill or dying. The letters of 75 year old Derry priest Father Felix

²¹ NAI, Tweedy Papers, 98/17/5/1/2.

²² *Irish Times*, 22 Feb. 1942.

²³ 'Irish Housewives Protest', 13 Mar. 1942, NAI, Tweedy Papers, JUS/98/17/5/1/3.

²⁴ Bishop James Joseph McNamee, 'Lenten Pastoral', *Leitrim Observer*, 12 Apr. 1942.

²⁵ Tony Gray, *The lost years: the Emergency in Ireland 1939-45* (London, 1988). pp. 87-8.

O'Neill to de Valera exhibit the outrage felt by many priests who had been reprimanded by the Gardaí for driving their cars for 'non-essential circumstances'.

After Supplies denied Father O'Neill a permit to drive his car in summer 1944, he resorted to a series of letters to de Valera. He complained of having to travel by foot to anoint a boy killed by lightning and attacked the government's 'tyrannical disregard' for 'priestly dignity'. 'Don't touch the Lord's Anointed!' he warned, reminding him, 'You owe your position to people like me!' In later letters he asks the Taoiseach, 'Are the days of the priest hunters going to be renewed in Ireland?' and criticises the 'insular and narrow-minded bureaucracy' that was now running the country.²⁶

Such tensions within the loosely termed, moral economy camp were played out against a backdrop of mass popular involvement in black market activity. Convictions for theft in Éire trebled from 1,160 in 1939 to 3,395 by 1943.²⁷ This increase in crime was, of course, a direct consequence of wartime shortages. With material scarcity forcing cracks in moral neutrality, however, the government was keen to emphasise the spiritual failings of the Irish populace. In 1943, Minister for Justice, Gerald Boland attributed the spate of burglaries, housebreakings and larcenies since the start of the Emergency to a lack of moral courage. 'People are short of commodities and I am afraid our morality is not as deep-seated as it ought to be' he explained.²⁸ Boland was referring to those 'who, as far as the Guards are aware, never had the habit of stealing before'.²⁹

Engagement with the black market was the product of more than just hunger-induced impulses or moral shortcomings. Alongside the material and moral underpinnings of the Emergency black market lay the shaky political legitimacy of the state itself, which mitigated qualms about turning to the black market or stealing, particularly in the border region. This illegal traffic was sustained by price discrepancies between the two territories and centred on the railway services that served as the link. The Great Northern Railway (GNR) route between Belfast and Dundalk proved popular with 'Sunday excursionists' and Clair Wills details the snobbery that arose at the sight of

²⁶ Father Felix O'Neill to Eamon de Valera, 4, 6 and 8 Aug. 1944. NAI, DT, RA 103/44.

²⁷ *Irish Times*, 6 Feb. 1943.

²⁸ Gerald Boland, 'Committee on Finance - Vote 32 - Office of the Minister for Justice', *Dáil Éireann*, vol. 89, col. 1834, 8 Apr. 1943.

²⁹ *Irish Times*, 6 May 1942.

working class women from Belfast eating in train dining cars.³⁰ This amusing phenomenon soon became a problem, however. As the Chief Superintendent of the Drogheda Gardaí complained to the Garda Commissioner in 1940, 'the quantity taken by individuals is small though the aggregate is large.'³¹ The Drogheda guard was referring to 'middle-aged women, all armed with capacious shopping bags', 'excursionists' from Belfast who 'will develop from being a joke into being a huge drain on the food reserves of this town.'³²

Wills pays little attention, however, to a similar Emergency excursion which operated on the GNR route from the large County Tyrone town of Omagh to Bundoran, County Donegal. Due to the opportunity it presented to overcome the restrictions imposed by rationing in the North, the people of Tyrone nicknamed it 'The Sugar Train'. Besides appealing to housewives, this train also featured young boys involved in smuggling goods. Oliver Gibson of Sixmilecross, County Tyrone remembers

a young lad...would be supplied with a list of items...sugar, orange peel, raisins, sultanas...You got a pound note, you were to make the purchases. Above all, you weren't to lose it to the Customs man. So you learned the guile of being able to look innocent, to keep the parcel...out of the Customs' man's eye.³³

Brian O'Neill, another child smuggler during the Emergency, recalls as one of his earliest memories the 'nervous tension that went right through the train' when the words 'Anything to Declare' were heard and the determination 'not to lose the bob or the tenner you'd been lent by your neighbours'; smugglers would open the carriage windows and a young boy would be lifted out to balance the smuggled items on the side of the train farthest from the platform.³⁴ This tension was heightened by the rumour, which would usually begin at Pettigo Junction, that customs men had boarded the train.³⁵ For those smugglers travelling in the 'Quiet Carriage' (reserved for women) the 'Lady Searcher'

was to be reckoned with.³⁶ Even those GNR employees, such as Joe McGrew, who joined the company in 1944, would fear customs inspection. In 1945, Joe's fear of apprehension for smuggling butter led him to empty a station's fire bucket of its sand, replace its contents with his smuggled butter, turn it upside down and sit on it, while customs men walked by.³⁷ McGrew's recollection is corroborated by references in the GNR Mechanical Engineers' Letter Index, a yearly log book which fastidiously details files on everything affecting the day to day operation of the railway. Although the files themselves do not survive, the indexes refer to documents detailing 'smuggling of merchandise (butter etc.) into Northern Ireland by enginemen' and 'smuggling of foodstuffs by road motor staff'.³⁸

Smuggling was often a larger and more sophisticated operation though. In March 1940, over 100 young men, accompanied by several dozen donkeys and ponies, over which were slung bags of smuggled flour, quietly passed over the border from Fermanagh into Cavan. At around 3am, and two miles into the southern state, they unwittingly marched straight into a customs patrol. A moonlight battle ensued between smugglers, armed with sticks and stones, and baton-wielding Gardaí. Donkeys and ponies, terrified, added to the confusion as they charged through the crowd of fighting men. The gardaí were forced to retreat and called in the military from Sligo for assistance. The men escaped but left two tons of abandoned flour and several donkeys behind them.⁴⁷

As a 1941 *Irish Times* piece correctly identified, the black market thrived on the political dividend which the contested nature of the border afforded. 'The authorities on both sides of the border seem to be shutting their eyes to this pleasant little game of money-making' the columnist mused; 'unless the civic conscience of the people can be mobilised it will continue.'³⁸ Civic conscience was one variable, but the prevalent political culture in independent Ireland was another altogether. While 'Sunday

³⁰ Wills, *That neutral island*, p. 154.

³¹ 'Purchase of quantities of foodstuffs by people traveling on Belfast Excursion Trains', NAI, JUS 8/868.

³² 'Belfast Excursion Trains', NAI, JUS 8/868.

³³ Oliver Gibson, 'Sugar Train to Bundoran',

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/88/a5865988.shtml>.

³⁴ Brian O'Neill (b. 1937, Omagh, Co. Tyrone). Interviewed 4 Aug. 2008.

³⁵ Joe McGrew (b. 1929, Omagh, Co. Tyrone). Interviewed 4 Aug. 2008.

³⁶ Sheila O'Neill (b.1928, Omagh, Co. Tyrone, now resident in Surrey, England), letter received 29 Sept. 2008.

³⁷ Joe McGrew (b.1929, Omagh, Co. Tyrone). Interviewed 4 Aug. 2008.

³⁸ Great Northern Railway Mechanical Engineers' Office Letter Index 1940, Louth County Archives, Paddy Mallon collection, PP206/002, pp. 353, 386.

⁴⁷ *Leitrim Observer*, 30 Mar. 1940.

³⁸ *Irish Times*, 8 Sept. 1941.

excursionists' did not go as far as to make 'shopping bags the weapons in a new economic war',³⁹ they certainly used the politically contested nature of the border to legitimate their activity. Likewise, appealing to popular republicanism, the flour smugglers of Dowra could have reasonably complained that their apprehension and prosecution buttressed the very border which their government and constitution opposed.

Somewhat paradoxically, the Irish urban poor and working class were active participants in the black market as well, but these people suffered its hardest consequences including overblown prices and the undermining of the government's already inadequate efforts to ensure equitable distribution. In 1942, North Dublin TD Alfie Byrne described how 300 people were queuing outside a bread shop in Wexford Street.⁴⁰ From other sources, there were reports of Dublin women fainting in bread queues. Shortages of clothes, food and fuel led to widespread scavenging in Corporation refuse dumps as well. Tragically in 1942, a young boy was buried alive in a refuse dump in Inchicore.⁴¹

In the country, popular engagement with the black market was legitimated by a scorn for Dublin centralism and a perception that interventionism represented ignorant and parsimonious encroachment on the honest work of the farmer. A 1941 Dáil debate on agricultural prices illustrates the continued primacy of this archetypal hard working, frugal man in political discourse during the Emergency. When Labour TD James Hickey claimed 'the people in the cities are concerned in this matter also', Martin Corry, a fellow Corkman, bellowed back, 'The only concern the city people have, or ever had, is how to drag as much as they can out of the farmer.'⁴²

The pitfalls of Dublin centralism are vividly illustrated in a recollection by León Ó Broin, one of seven *Gauleiter*-esque regional commissioners established by the government amid the panic about German invasion in July 1940. Hurried to a remote Irish-speaking area in West Mayo by an aide, Ó Broin recalls the eerie spectacle of emaciated people carrying sacks and moving down from the hills towards his car. It became clear that the villagers expected the sacks to be filled with flour. Disappointed,

³⁹ Wills, *That neutral island*, p. 153.

⁴⁰ Dáil Éireann, 'Bread Supplies', vol. 87, col. 6. 26 May 1942.

⁴¹ Gerard Fee, 'The effects of World War II on Dublin's low-income families, 1939-1945' (Ph.D thesis, University College, Dublin, 1996), p. 133.

⁴² Dáil Éireann, 'Cereal Prices', vol. 84, col. 2335, 23 July 1941.

angry men and women harangued the commissioner in Irish, complaining that telegram messages to Dublin officials had gone unanswered and that they feared a recurrence of the Famine.⁴³

Such occurrences as depicted in West Mayo were exceptional. In fact, as part of the Grow More Food campaign, in 1941 the department of Agriculture began to send out tillage inspectors to nearly every farm in Ireland ensuring that enough wheat was being grown. In the same Dáil debate of 1941, such interventionism was justified in explicitly moral economic terms by both James Ryan, Minister for Agriculture, and Martin Corry, Fianna Fáil TD for Cork South-East. Both invoked the middleman, the scourge of the honest small farmer, in Corry's words those 'get-rich-quick gentlemen...living on the farmers' sweat.'⁴⁴ Ryan, for his part, resisted calls from both his own ranks and those of the opposition to revert to *laissez-faire*, arguing that this would enable the middleman to 'corner supplies'.⁴⁵

Frequently, it was not some shady folk devil of a middleman who overrode government efforts to ensure fair price and distribution during the Emergency. Instead the plain attraction of profit proved irresistible, exemplified in late 1942, when Supplies successfully brought charges against Drinagh Co-operative Creamery. The management was heavily fined for selling sugar, equivalent to the weekly ration of 14, 933 people, to a businessman in Sligo.⁵⁷ After unsuccessfully appealing the fine, Michael McNamara, the manager of the co-operative, was ordered to pay £100 of these costs himself. A year after the case was brought before Dunmanway District Court, Supplies published an order that eggs be sold at a maximum price in Cork city so the urban poor would receive a fair share, a suggestion McNamara might have been expected to heed. Instead, he wrote to the secretary of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society scoffing at the order. 'A Dublin man is anxious to get some eggs for himself and his pals', he wrote, revealing that the Dublin black market price was more lucrative than the maximum price in Cork.

⁴³ León Ó Broin, *Just like yesterday: an autobiography* (Dublin, 1986), p. 142.

⁴⁴ Dáil Éireann, 'Cereal Prices', vol. 84, col. 2334, 23 July 1941.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*

⁵⁷ *Southern Star*, 3 Oct. 1942.

'Naturally we shall endeavour to sell all our eggs in Dublin... and if we succeed in doing so then Dublin will have plenty of eggs and everyone else can whistle for them.'⁴⁶

In common with others who engaged in black market activity during the Emergency, McNamara inverted the moral economic principles which Supplies claimed to be enforcing. Refuting the maximum prices fixed by Supplies, he argued that 'fair distribution' had been impeded by such government orders.⁴⁷ McNamara's rationale was, however, almost solely profit-driven and certainly crass, given that it was articulated against a backdrop of mass unemployment, poverty and malnutrition.

Amongst co-operatives, the Drinagh creamery was certainly exceptional. Despite denying involvement in 'outrageous black marketing',⁴⁸ the firm was later fined for petrol rationing offences as well.⁴⁹ Although Drinagh creamery faced fines, similar businesses, whose crimes were harder to detect than those of the lowly shopkeeper, often evaded the penalties. For instance, the Milk Tribunal of 1945 heard that a businessman who supplied milk so contaminated it made hundreds of Dublin schoolchildren ill, had successfully appealed against conviction because the relevant act did not provide for the sampling of milk distributed in one-third pint bottles.⁵⁰

Small shopkeepers received the greatest number of convictions for unfair pricing during the Emergency. In July 1944, Nora Barnes, a Waterford shopkeeper, was given the rather disproportionate sentence of two months imprisonment for receiving a stolen coat.⁵¹ Typically, Supplies fined small retailers for overcharging on the most sought-after commodities such as tea and cigarettes or for watering down milk. Unlike Nora Barnes, few faced prison, but fines could seriously damage small businesses. In November 1943, a Connacht grocer declared himself 'finished' after Supplies successfully won £520 worth of fines for offences under the Emergency Powers orders.⁵²

Ireland's supply crisis during the Emergency was lent an extra poignancy by the historical memory of the Famine. The impending centenary of that cataclysmic event

⁴⁶ Michael McNamara to Dr Kennedy, 26 Oct. 1943, NAI, Irish Co-Operative Organisation Society (ICOS) records, 1088/348/36.

⁴⁷ McNamara to Lemass, 25 May 1943, NAI, ICOS, 1088/348/37.

⁴⁸ McNamara to Lemass, 17 Nov. 1942, NAI, ICOS, 1088/348/37.

⁴⁹ McNamara to Reverend EJ Coyne S.J., 13 April 1943, NAI, ICOS, 1088/348/37.

⁵⁰ 'Evidence of the Irish Housewives Before the Milk Tribunal', NAI, Tweedy Papers, 98/17/5/1/6.

⁵¹ *Munster Express*, 14 July 1944.

⁵² *Connacht Sentinel*, 30 Nov. 1943.

gave an impetus to efforts to ensure firstly, that more food was grown and secondly, that it was distributed equitably. However, as the IHA argued, government efforts nearly always fell short of the decisive action that such extraordinary conditions demanded. By the end of 1941, Ireland was importing 1,000 tons of grain a week while consumption was 1,000 tons a day.⁵³ To combat this unsustainable situation, self-imposed frugality was urged. The *Irish Times*' 'No Bread For Breakfast League' (NBBL or 'Nibble')⁵⁴ is a fine example of the inadequate and voluntary nature of many government measures aimed at enforcing moral economy during the Emergency.

And yet, as illustrated, Irish people shared a common disdain towards state interventionism and most participated to varying degrees in the black market. Involvement in the black market during the Emergency was popularly legitimated by a *mentalité* specific to the war conditions, which despised the middleman but saw little wrong in dabbling in his trade now and again to procure tea or white bread. Utilising its censure powers, the government also had to downplay the undercurrent of anti-semitism that market regulation excited. This was espoused most notably by the quasi-fascist *Ailtiri na hAiseirghe* and Oliver J. Flanagan TD, who in 1943 proposed that emergency orders be 'directed against the Jews, who crucified our Saviour nineteen hundred years ago and who are crucifying us every day of the week.'⁵⁵

On the other hand, to represent black market activity as rooted in righteous scorn for an overbearing state rather than the rumblings of hungry stomachs or avariciousness would be somewhat cloying. De Valera felt confident enough to announce to a Clare crowd in 1943 that 'there is nobody in this country who is not getting proper food.'⁵⁶ To put it bluntly, there is no evidence that anyone starved in Ireland during the Emergency. Although conditions were straitened, involvement in the black market even at the lowest level, satisfied greed and compromised equitable distribution. As a Roscommon

⁵³ Wills, *That neutral island*, p. 241.

⁵⁴ Gray, *The lost years*, p. 185.

⁵⁵ Oliver J. Flanagan, cited in Stanley Price, *Somewhere to hang my hat: an Irish-Jewish journey* (Dublin, 2002), p. 117. See also Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland: the Irish State and its enemies since 1922* (Oxford, 2002), pp 223-4.

⁵⁶ Eamon de Valera, speech in Kilrush, Co. Clare, June 1943, cited in Share, *The Emergency*, p. 36.

clergyman insisted in 1944, the black market, with its 'grisly train of injustice and perjury,' had led to the 'exploitation of the needs of the poorest in the land.'⁵⁷

With the end of hostilities in 1945, Ireland's supply situation improved and the material hardship of the Emergency years became memory as rationing was lifted in 1948. People in the south no longer experienced absence of tea, sugar, flour, clothing, coal, rubber, oils, petrol, batteries, candles and soap. Those to the north of the border no longer suffered the scarcity of butter, bacon, eggs and beef. Consequently, the moral dimension to black market activity became less pronounced. Whatever the moral issues surrounding the Emergency black market, its operation evidences the poverty of Emergency historiography in general and the narrative of absence in particular. If Plato's Cave is to be applied to the inhabitants of Emergency Ireland at all, the black market highlights its neglected aspect: the possibility of escape.

KILCREA FRIARY, CO. CORK.



KILCREA (Irish: *Cill Chr  meaning the Cell of Cere*). Located near Ovens, Co. Cork, Under the protection of his home the nearby Kilcrea Castle, Cormac Laidir Mc Carthy the founder of Blarney castle built for the Franciscan friars the monastery of Kilcrea. He fell by the hands of his own brother at Carrignamuck Castle, Dripsey in 1495 and was buried in a tomb reserved for him in the north east corner close to the high altar in the friary.

For further reading:

McCarthy, J. P. 'In search of Cork's collecting traditions : from Kilcrea's library to the Boole library of today'. *Journal of the Cork Historical & Archaeological Society*, (1995) p. 100.

  Murch , Miche l (Ed.). *Kilcrea Friary: 500th anniversary of foundation, 1465-1965*, (Kilcrea 1966),

Ryan, Salvador. "The most contentious of terms": towards a new understanding of late medieval 'popular religion', *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 68 (2003), pp. 281-290

⁵⁷ Father D. Doorly, Lenten Pastoral on the black market, cited in *Leitrim Observer*, 26 Feb. 1944.

Florence Nightingale and Charles West:
Conflicting Visions of Children's Nursing

Andrew Kennedy

For over a century, children's nursing has been regarded as a specialised branch of general nursing, just as children's hospitals are now perceived to be merely specialised versions of general hospitals. An examination of the profession's early days provides evidence that the hospital care of children developed from a different tradition compared to that of the adult branch. A crucial development in the tradition was the debate over professionalism and in particular, registration, which led to the assimilation of children's nursing into the mainstream.

A brief account of the origins of children's nursing was written by Alan Glasper and Imelda Charles-Edwards in 2002.¹ This description is however, largely concerned with the campaign for registration and subsequent developments, and touches lightly upon the profession's origins. S.F. Bradley examines the history of the training of children's nurses, but refers only briefly to the profession's origins.² Other accounts are similarly superficial or take for granted the model created by the well known Florence Nightingale.³

Even after revisionists have put her contribution into context, it is clear that Nightingale played an important role in articulating and publicising the orthodox nursing doctrine. One reason for the eclipse of children's nursing as a distinct discipline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was Nightingale's lack of experience and interest in the nursing care of children. It is instructive to compare her views on the matter with those of Charles West, whose 1854 booklet *How to Nurse Sick Children* predated Nightingale's *Notes on Nursing* by five years.⁴

¹ Alan Glasper and Imelda Charles-Edwards, 'The child first and always: the registered children's nurse over 150 years' in *Paediatric Nursing*, xiv, no. 4, (May 2002), pp. 38-43, xiv, no. 5 (June 2002), pp. 38-44.

² S.F. Bradley, 'Pride or prejudice – issues in the history of children's nurse education' in *Nurse Education Today* (5 July 1993), pp. 362-7.

³ See for example, DM Saunders, 'Sick children's nursing' in P. Allan and M. Jolley (Eds), *Nursing, midwifery and health visiting since 1900* (London, 1982), pp. 141-9.

⁴ Charles West, *How to nurse sick children; intended especially as a help to nurses at the Hospital for Sick Children: but containing directions which may be found to be of service to all who have charge of the young* (London, 1854); Florence Nightingale, *Notes on nursing: what it is, and what it is not* (London, 1859).

In 1836, Lutheran Pastor Theodore Fliedner and his Order of Deaconesses founded and ran one of the first formal nursing training schools. This institution, located in Kaiserwerth, Germany, undertook a broad social mission dividing its efforts between nursing, poor relief and the care of children. Four years later, British social reformer Elizabeth Fry visited the Order of Deaconesses mother house. She returned to London and began the Institute of Nursing Sisters (INS). The work of the Order of Deaconesses also provided the inspiration for the Anglican-orientated Training Institution for Nurses in Hospitals, Families, and for the Poor (TIN).⁵ Trainees from both INS and TIN gained practical experience in hospitals, although the INS aimed to produce nurses for private service.⁴

For three months in 1850, Florence Nightingale trained with the Kaiserwerth sisters and emerged a critic of the religious model. She objected to sectarianism and concluded that religious orders practiced poor hygiene in their hospitals.⁷ In 1853, Nightingale worked as an unpaid superintendent at an establishment for gentlewomen. And from 1854 to 1856, her nursing skills proved vital in caring for British soldiers during the Crimean War, after which she publicly campaigned for the sanitary reform of all military hospitals.⁸ Reports in the *Times* of Nightingale's exploits in the Crimea stirred the public's imagination, and in 1855 the Nightingale Fund was established, supported by popular subscription, to promote the continuation of her work. A council was created to make recommendations as to how the money should be appropriated.⁹ Among those appointed to the council was Dr. Henry Bence Jones, who along with Charles West founded Great Ormond Street Hospital, which specialised in the care for children. Despite Jones' presence, the council made no reference to the needs of children.⁵

When Nightingale did turn her attention to the fund, she focused on creating an independent institution which would train nurses according to her unique principles. In Nightingale's eyes, nursing was viewed as a generic skill, and no allowances were to be made in training nurses to care for children.⁶ The lasting

⁵ M.A. Nutting and L.L. Dock, *A history of nursing*, ii (New York and London, 1907), pp. 13, 33-4, 72-82.

⁴ John F. South, *Facts relating to hospital nurses* (London, 1857), pp. 24-6.

⁷ Monica Baly, *Florence Nightingale and the nursing legacy* (2nd ed., London, 1997), p. 12.

⁸ Baly, *Florence Nightingale*, p. 13.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁵ L. Seymour, *Florence Nightingale's nurses: the Nightingale School 1860-1960* (London, 1960).

⁶ Glasper and Charles-Edwards, 'The child first and always', xiv, no. 4, p. 40.

consequences of her belief in the generic nature of nursing were illustrated in the arrangements for the registration of nurses which became mandatory in 1919. The new register was for nurses who had trained in general hospitals. Those who worked solely in children's hospitals did not meet the necessary criteria for registration and were subsequently cast aside to one of a number of supplementary registers. This action ensured that children's nurses would be prevented from working with adults, and ultimately the care for children remained very much on the profession's periphery. In 1922 there were only 191 names on the supplementary register for children's nurses, against 10,887 on the general register.⁷

Surgeon John Flint South's 1857 published *Facts Relating to Hospital Nurses* conveys the belief of the period that a nursing training school required a formal attachment to a particular hospital. This school would then fall under that hospital's influence. It became apparent under these premises that if Nightingale's trainees were to gain the necessary practical experience, then they would need to be attached to a hospital.⁸ In 1858, the Nightingale Training School and Home for Nurses was opened in London on the grounds of St. Thomas' Hospital, an institution which had no particular expertise in the treatment of children.⁹

Nightingale objected to demands for a children's hospital believing that the main cause of child mortality was poor household management.¹⁸ She had further issues with admitting children to hospital, which rested on her theory of disease and certain practicalities related to their care. She believed in the miasma theory, maintaining that disease arose spontaneously wherever there was dirt and then spread in the resulted foul air. And she also denied the possibility of diseases spreading by contagion, concluding that 'diseases, as all experience shows, are adjectives, not noun substantives.'¹⁹ In other words, diseases were merely symptomatic of the prevailing conditions, and had no independent existence as entities in their own right. In Nightingale's mind, children's diseases did not exist. Instead, the health of children was affected by the same influences as that of adults.²⁰

⁷ Bradley, 'Pride or prejudice', p. 363.

⁸ South, *Facts relating to hospital nurses*, p. 30.

⁹ Baly, Florence Nightingale, p. 30.

¹⁸ Nightingale, *Notes on nursing*, p. 15.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

Charles West, on the other hand, made the point that 'the signs of disease differ... according to the age of the child.'¹⁰ According to Nightingale, the chief threat to health arose from foul air, especially at night, and in her views, children would react to this more quickly than would adults. Thus, children could quickly become foci of disease. She was doubtful as to the prospects of successfully diagnosing and treating children, since they were unable to make their opinions known coherently. While West agreed with this view up to a point, he maintained that accurate observation by competent nurses could provide the necessary information.¹¹ He presumably had more faith in the ability of nurses than did Nightingale.

The practicalities of caring for children also presented problems for Nightingale. She believed each child patient required one-on-one nursing care and was convinced that the only way to provide the necessary level of care in a cost-effective fashion was to mix children with female patients, requiring the women to help care for the children.²³ This assistance would also be of benefit to the women whilst in hospital, in that it would keep them usefully occupied. It would, moreover, have the effect of diluting the concentration of disease which children would otherwise create.¹² Nightingale also opposed the creation of separate children's wards within adult hospitals.¹³ While the nursing care of children demanded that the work be shared with the older patients and the miasmas diluted by the presence of adults, she was concerned about the moral harm to which children were vulnerable whilst in hospital. There was the risk of children being exposed to the opposite sex. She believed that not only should there be separate bathing facilities, but classrooms and chapel should be segregated and even the garden should have distinct areas for boys and girls.¹⁴

The views shared by Nightingale regarding the separation of the sexes were clearly led by moral rather than health considerations. This is emphasised by her insistence that girls should always wear a frock when being bathed unless their condition made this impossible.¹⁵ West shared a very different view and advocated bathing every child on admission, not just because it was a pleasant and calming

¹⁰ West, *How to nurse sick children*, p. 23.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²³ Florence Nightingale, *Notes on hospitals* (3rd ed., London, 1963), p. 124.

¹² Elizabeth Lomax, *Small and special* (London, 1996), p. 15.

¹³ Nightingale, *Notes on hospitals*, p. 126.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

experience, but because it would enable the nurse to conduct a complete physical examination while the child was naked.¹⁶ Above all, Nightingale believed that men should not be permitted in a children's hospital: 'Women must be in undisputed charge of a children's hospital, saving, of course, the direction of the medical service.'¹⁷ In this, she was making a practical, rather than proto-feminist point, figuring that women were more suited for nursing, while also concluding the practice of medicine should be undertaken by men. Nightingale deplored nurses being placed under male authority, but objected equally to the notion that nurses should be in overall charge of the hospital. Even in the segregated garden which she advocated for children, general supervision should be overseen by a 'sister', but exercises should be led by a male 'professor'. Sentimental illusions about children did not exist in Nightingale's mind. A footnote in her *Notes on Hospitals* refers with distaste regarding 'certain children's habits, which I can no more than elude to here... which render the strictest supervision necessary.'¹⁸ Although she wrote that 'it is the real test of a nurse whether she can nurse a sick infant',¹⁹ she appears to have treated the matter chiefly as an administrative rather than a human problem.³³

Considerable thought during the period was also given to the characteristics that proper nurses should display. Nightingale noted that the 'commonest' nurses are often the most tender,³⁴ and that the best nurses are created 'not from persons of superior manners and education', but rather from 'women of somewhat more ordinary intelligence belonging to women who are habitually employed earning their own living.'³⁵ South, meanwhile, alluded to the class division which meant that sisters were drawn from a higher social class than the nurses they managed, and gained their first experiences by shadowing the Matron, whereas the nurses acquired skills while working in the wards. There was therefore, little chance of promotion from nurse to sister.³⁶ Some commentators during the time believed that hospitals were 'schools for immorality and impropriety', and that no decent woman could partake in the activities

¹⁶ West, *How to nurse sick children*, p. 27.

¹⁷ Nightingale, *Notes on hospitals*, p. 132.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹⁹ Saunders, 'Sick children's nursing', p. 145.

³³ Nightingale, *Notes on nursing*, pp 83-4, 89, 91, 133-6.

³⁴ Nightingale, *Notes on hospitals*, p. 125.

³⁵ Peter Mayhew, *All saints: the birth and growth of a community* (Oxford, 1989), ch. 3, cited in Baly, *Florence Nightingale*, p. xi.

³⁶ South, *Facts relating to hospital nurses*, pp. 12, 16-17.

that nurses were required to perform.³⁷ However, it was generally agreed that hospitals would benefit from the recruitment of intelligent women as their nurses.

West agreed with both Nightingale and South, but for slightly different reasons. He later wrote that the lower classes made the best nurses for the poor, but he also mistrusted upper-class lady superintendents as being too likely to challenge doctors' authority.²⁰ West had acquired extensive experience in the care and treatment of sick children before founding his hospital. Initially trained as an obstetrician, he attended the Rotunda lying-in hospital in Dublin in 1834, at a time when it would have provided care for infants up to two years old.²¹ By 1839, West was employed at the Royal Universal Dispensary for Sick Children, until his resignation in 1849.²² At this time he also held an appointment for the treatment of children at the Middlesex Hospital.²³ It would be these previous experiences along with work at Great Ormond Street Hospital that shaped West's views on children's nursing and formed his published ideas during 1854. West, however, was very much open to discuss his views with others, and the Great Ormond Street Archives actually hold his correspondence with Nightingale on the subject.²⁴

The medical journals at this time acknowledge the need for a greater study and education of the diseases of children. There was some dispute however, as to whether children's surgery presented any distinct characteristics at all. In 1851, a correspondent in *The Lancet* felt the need to emphasise this argument.⁴⁴ The general prohibition on the admission of children to general hospitals was directed at medical cases, and it was towards these that the new children's hospitals were orientated. It was accepted that surgical treatment was freely available to children,⁴⁵ and in fact the original admission criteria for Great Ormond Street Hospital specifically excluded 'children suffering from accidents or external injuries or their after-effects', since

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

²⁰ Lomax, *Small and special*, pp. 69-70.

²¹ D. Corrigan, 'Clinical cases' in *Dublin Hospital Gazette*, 6 (15) (1859), pp. 10-17.

²² West actually resigned because he failed to persuade the trustees to open beds for the treatment of in-patients. AW Franklin, 'Children's hospitals' in FNL Poynter (ed.), *The evolution of hospitals in Britain* (London, 1964), pp 103-21.

²³ A. Hess, 'On the necessity of practical instruction in the treatment of the diseases of children' in *The Lancet* (24 Mar. 1849), pp. 341-2.

²⁴ Glasper and Charles-Edwards, 'The child first and always', i, p. 40.

⁴⁴ 'Report from the Surrey Dispensary: fistula in a child three years and a half old, under the care of Mr. Forster' in *The Lancet* (22 Feb. 1851), p. 204.

⁴⁵ T.W. Cooke, 'On some distressing sequelae of the diseases of infancy' in *The Lancet* (13 July 1850), pp. 44-6.

their condition was not considered to be specific to childhood.⁴⁶ West himself was originally opposed to the appointment of a surgeon to the new hospital, since in his opinion there were no childhood ailments which required any special surgical skill or study.²⁵ It is not clear whether West changed his mind or was overruled, but he did include a surgeon among the first appointments to the hospital.²⁶

Nightingale's attitude towards children was practical rather than sentimental. She believed that young children should be permitted to crawl and amuse themselves, and insisted that they should never be distracted when so occupied.²⁷ Her instrumental view of play is demonstrated by her insistence that older children should be occupied just enough to promote recovery.²⁸ This contrasts sharply with West, who made it clear that 'grown people need amusement sometimes, and children, even when well, cannot always be reading wise and useful and instructive books... After all, God created things which had no use other than to be beautiful.'²⁹ Elsewhere, he wrote 'that a sick child should retain its fondness for its attendants during the whole period of its illness,' and he gave this reason, among others, for rejecting treatment which involved the use of blistering and mustard poultices.³⁰ Indeed, shortly after the opening of Great Ormond Street Hospital, a correspondent noted that in contrast with other hospitals, Great Ormond Street was light and airy and had a table full of toys, which he suggested would do more good than pills. Fun and amusement were the guiding theme, and as a result the children were happy.³¹ On the subject of the administration of medicines, West himself ordered that '...if after persevering trials you cannot succeed in administering what has been prescribed without fighting and struggling with the little one, it is better to desist from the attempt till the doctor's next visit...'³² This was evidently a matter of some concern to West, and he returned to the topic in 1859, when he considered at some length how (and whether) to gain a child's co-operation. He advised concealing medicine in food, which a reviewer of his book actually deplored on the grounds that the child would notice and would then become

⁴⁶ Higgins, *Great Ormond Street*, p. 18

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁷ L. Macdonald (ed), *Florence Nightingale on public health care* (Ontario, 2004), p. 147.

²⁸ Nightingale, *Notes on Hospitals*, p. 129.

²⁹ West, *How to nurse sick children*, pp. 62-3.

³⁰ Charles West, 'Clinical and pathological report of the pneumonia of children as it prevails among the poor in London' in *Dublin Journal of Medical Science*, xxiii (1843), p. 362.

³¹ *Medical Times and Gazette* (Jan.-July 1852), p. 523.

³² West, *How to nurse sick children*, p. 54.

mistrustful.³³ Overall, West set a tone which persisted after his departure. Catherine Jane Wood, Lady Superintendent of Great Ormond Street Hospital from 1878-8, advocated the use of named nurses for specific children, continuity of care, and open visiting. She believed in order and discipline, but held that children required more flexibility in this respect than did adults: 'Toys and games are as much a part of treatment as physic, and the ceaseless chatter and careless distribution of the toys are surely consistent with a well-ordered children's ward.'³⁴

Charles West had campaigned for the creation of Britain's first hospital specifically for sick children in large part because he saw the need to overcome the very ignorance of children's health and care needs which are embodied in so much of Florence Nightingale's writings on the subject. West's vision was, moreover, of a broad discipline which incorporated practice in the hospital, in the community, and in individual households, whereas Nightingale, whilst recognising the importance of good household management, perceived the nurse's role as narrowly confined to the care of hospital patients. Florence Nightingale made no provision for a separate discipline of sick children's nursing because she did not believe that the care of children presented any problems which were fundamentally different from those involved in caring for adults, and because she felt that children should ever be admitted to hospital. West's belief was widely shared among doctors who practised among the young, and was consistent with the holistic view of care indoctrinated at Kaiserswerth in 1836, but in the end it was Nightingale's ideology, fortified by her Crimean War fame and the large endowment of the Nightingale Fund which would prevail through the early twentieth century.

³³ Anonymous, 'Review of West, C. (1859) Lectures on the Diseases of Infancy and Childhood, 4th edition', in *Edinburgh Medical Journal*, 5 (1859-60), p. 856.

³⁴ Saunders, 'Sick children's nursing', p. 143.



ROSS CASTLE (Irish: Caisleán an Rois)

Built in the fifteenth century by the O'Donoghue clan, Ross Castle is located on the edge of Lough Leane, in Killarney National Park, Co. Kerry. The castle was amongst the last to surrender to Parliamentarian troops during the Irish Confederate Wars, when river-borne artillery forced the garrison to submit.

For further reading:

Dempsey, Noel. 'Ross Castle : official opening July 1993', *The Kerry Magazine*, 7 (1996), pp. 37-9.

Fenlon, Donal and Jane, 'Ross Castle', in Lerner, Jim (Ed.), *Killarney : history & heritage* (Cork, 2005), pp. 63-73.

Lenihan, Padraig, (Ed.), *Conquest and Resistance : War in seventeenth-century Ireland* (Leiden, 2001).

Fiona Devoy

William O'Brien M.P. praised the 1918 Dublin Mansion House Conference as, '...the first and last occasion on which all descriptions of Nationalists – Parliamentary, Republican and Labourite – acted unitedly together.'¹ This unprecedented gathering established a scheme of coordinated resistance to David Lloyd George's Military Service Bill and was later dubbed a "National Cabinet" by Sinn Féin's *Irish Bulletin*.² The present article evaluates the success of the conference and outlines how the conscription crisis altered the course of Irish nationalism.

Although the majority of Ireland united in opposing conscription, Thomas Johnson later wrote that not all delegates were 'a happy band of brothers.'³ Driven by the fear of how the meeting would affect their party's interests, members were cautious in even attending. Pauric Travers and Michael Laffan record the reservations of various Sinn Féin and Irish Volunteer leaders, including Cathal Brugha and Michael Collins. Some objected to even temporary collaboration with the Irish Party, who they viewed as traitors for attending the House of Commons.⁴ Also, the Conference was seen as a potential restriction on the Volunteers' ability to fight conscription by whatever means necessary.⁵ Irish Party leader, John Dillon was similarly apprehensive about co-operating with Sinn Féin, fearing that it would legitimise the radical party, and assist their growing dominance of Irish nationalism. Yet it was two Irish Party members, Alfred Byrne and Lorcan Sherlock, who initially suggested such a Conference at a Dublin Corporation meeting in February 1918, when the threat of conscription was a growing probability. Writing on 15 April, Sherlock insisted that the attendance of Dillon and John Devlin was imperative to defeating conscription, and securing their party's future success. He argued

¹ William O'Brien, *The Irish Revolution and how it came about*, (London, 1923), p. 357.

² *Ibid.*, p. 361; Dorothy Macardle, *The Irish Republic*, (Great Britain, 1937), p. 232. Conscription was the final straw for many nationalists who were disappointed by the unfulfilled promises of Home Rule and angered by the 1916 executions. Others still were tired of the prolonged war.

³ NAI, *Bureau of Military History 1913-21 Witness Statements*, Thomas Johnson, Witness Statement No. 1,755, p. 33.

⁴ Sinn Féin advocated an abstentionist policy.

⁵ Pauric Travers, 'The Irish Conscription Crisis 1918', MA thesis, University College Dublin, 1977, p. 72, and Michael Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland – The Sinn Féin party 1916-1923*, (Cambridge 1999), p. 138.

that their refusal to partake in united resistance might divide the country, encouraging the Government to go ahead, and leaving the Irish Party to explain

...why they did not come to Ireland for joint action.' Sherlock urged that the people were demanding leadership and '...want the Conference at once....' He stressed the danger of further delay, as de Valera was threatening to take independent action.⁶

Both organised labour, represented by the Irish Trade Union Congress and Labour Party, and the All-For-Ireland League wished to be involved, although they each had concerns. Labour leaders were anxious that their involvement in a coalition would undermine their independent political status.⁷ Indeed, with the absence of any unionist delegates, the Conference was viewed as distinctly nationalist and Catholic.⁸ In his biography of William O'Brien (Labour), Thomas Morrissey reminds us that members of the labour movement were also drawn by other political allegiances apart from the workers' cause, including nationalism and unionism.⁹ Therefore, labour leaders needed to maintain a distinct political identity in order to preserve unity amongst organised labour. Their attendance would associate the movement with nationalism, threatening to alienate unionist and Protestant workers. Consequently, when entering the conference, the labour newspaper *Irish Opinion* made it clear that labour would keep '...its entire and complete independence...'¹⁰ However, Morrissey's book demonstrates that the Irish labour movement was already strongly politically associated with nationalism, particularly after Connolly's involvement in the 1916 Rising, and O'Brien's (Labour) assistance in reorganising Sinn Féin during 1917.¹¹ Labour's independence was arguably compromised from the outset when O'Brien (Labour) declared that they would only attend the Conference if '...Sinn Féin was going to agree...'¹² This stipulation reflects the strong influence of nationalism on the labour movement and undoubtedly the Rising, the threat of partitioned Home Rule, and the Conscription Crisis prioritised the question of

Ireland's national status. David Fitzpatrick contends that they lost their independent voice during these revolutionary years as 'Labour and the Republican movement were sucked together...'¹³

All-For-Ireland league leader, William O'Brien, also appeared to adopt a cautious attitude to attending the Conference and O'Neill repeatedly informed him of who else would be there.¹⁴ League members were old adversaries of the Irish Party, disagreeing on the best method of inducing unionists to accept Home Rule. Like labour leaders, O'Brien progressively identified with Sinn Féin after the Rising, particularly their policy of abstaining from Westminster, as he began questioning whether representation could achieve anything for Ireland.¹⁵ As early as January 1918, O'Brien claimed that Sinn Féin had saved the country from partition, parliamentary corruption, and the previous threat of conscription in 1916, stating that the radicals '...were the only force in Ireland that could have done it...'¹⁶

Despite the various conflicts, allegiances, and party considerations, any party wishing to remain a strong political entity could not ignore the Conference. As the politicians reviewed their position, the Lord Mayor urged that the country was impatiently awaiting the Conference.¹⁷ O'Neill was a natural choice to unite the various political parties as a non-partisan nationalist, and he hoped the conscription threat would be an opportunity to unite nationalist Ireland.¹⁸

The first meeting was dominated by the business of adopting a declaration and pledge against conscription. Both were written by de Valera, and Jerome Aan De Wiel contends that '...the meeting had all the hallmarks of a handing over of power to Sinn Féin.'¹⁹ The declaration denied Britain's right to enforce conscription on a distinctly separate nation like Ireland, without the consent of the people. The Conscription Bill was proclaimed, '...a declaration of war on the Irish nation...,' and the statement argued that

⁶ TCD, *John Dillon papers*, MS 6835/1, Letter Lorcan G. Sherlock to Aston, 15 April 1918.

⁷ Deirdre Lindsay, 'Labour against Conscription', in David Fitzpatrick, (ed.), *Ireland and the First World War*, (Dublin, 1986), p. 82.

⁸ Connor Kostick, *Revolution in Ireland: Popular Militancy, 1917-23*, (London, 1996), p. 36.

⁹ Thomas J. Morrissey, *William O'Brien, 1881-1968, Socialist, Republican, Dail Deputy, Editor and Trade Union Leader*, (Dublin, 2007), p. 70.

¹⁰ *Irish Opinion - The Voice of Labour*, 27 April 1918.

¹¹ Thomas J. Morrissey, *William O'Brien, 1881-1968, Socialist, Republican, Dail Deputy, Editor and Trade Union Leader*, (Dublin, 2007), p. 122.

¹² William O'Brien, *Forth the Banners go - Reminiscences of William O'Brien as told to Edward MacLysaght*, (Dublin, 1969), p. 163.

¹³ David Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish life 1913-1921 - Provincial experience of war and revolution*, (Cork, 1998), p. 209.

¹⁴ NLI, *William O'Brien M.P. papers*, MS 7998, 21 and 23, letter to William O'Brien M.P. from Lord Mayor of Dublin, 10, 13 April 1918.

¹⁵ O'Brien, *The Irish Revolution*, pp. 321-87.

¹⁶ UCCA, *William O'Brien M.P. papers*, UC/WOB/PP/AS/161, O'Brien to F.D. Gallagher, 3 January 1918.

¹⁷ NLI, *O'Brien M.P. papers*, MS 7998, 25, Telegram from O'Neill to O'Brien M.P.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 21, Letter from O'Neill to O'Brien M.P., 13 April 1918.

¹⁹ Jérôme Aan De Wiel, *The Catholic Church in Ireland 1914-1918 - War and Politics*, (Dublin, 2003), p. 221.

to accept the measure would be ‘...to surrender our liberties and to acknowledge ourselves slaves.’ The document also claimed that enforcing conscription ‘...is in direct violation of the rights of small nationalities to self-determination...,’ which the Allies claimed to be fighting to uphold in Belgium. The pledge vowed resistance to conscription ‘by the most effective means at our disposal.’²⁰ All Conference members signed these statements, and about midday, it was proposed that the Conference send a deputation to present the Pledge and Declaration at a meeting of the Catholic Hierarchy, which was being held that day in Maynooth.²¹

De Valera and Michael Curran, secretary of the Archbishop of Dublin, had primarily arranged this visit. Both were concerned that the Archbishop of Armagh, Cardinal Logue, would only endorse passive resistance to conscription.²² De Valera feared this would alienate Irish Volunteers who preferred a more open, militant campaign.²³ Curran sympathised with de Valera, and knowing that Walsh was similarly anxious that the vagueness of passive resistance could impede effective opposition,²⁴ he instigated a meeting between the Lord Mayor and Walsh to arrange for the Conference to liaise with the Bishops’ meeting.²⁵ There de Valera would present his statements, and attempt to prevent the Catholic Hierarchy from issuing any statement that would preclude other forms of resistance. The delegation comprised of O’Neill, Healy, Dillon, de Valera and O’Brien (Labour). In Maynooth, the Bishops supported the Conference and decided to assist resistance by holding meetings of intercession in every church the following Sunday to avert the conscription scourge. There priests would publicise details of a public meeting when the pledge would be administered, and announce that a church-gate collection would be taken up to provide an anti-conscription defence fund.²⁶ However, de Valera and Logue predictably did not agree on resistance methods. De Valera called on the Bishops to not condemn or alienate the Volunteer movement, as they would still fight

if conscription was enforced, and ‘...had no use for passive resistance.’ Cardinal Logue apparently replied that passive resistance did not mean letting ‘...people walk over us...’²⁷ However, he agreed to compromise, and the bishops issued a statement advocating opposition by all means consonant with God’s law. It was ambiguous as to what God’s law would permit under these circumstances.²⁸ However, while there would be a constant threat that the Volunteers would take resistance into their own hands, the Church’s involvement acted as a calming force on the campaign. Most clergy advocated passive resistance, and notwithstanding de Valera’s warnings, this was also the Conference’s preferred method. It was certainly the only measure that could possibly attain undivided support, a condition of any action by the anti-conscription committee.

During initial meetings, it was agreed that the Conference would only discuss the conscription issue and that all decisions should be unanimous.²⁹ Anthony Gaughan contends that this rendered the Conference ‘...almost totally ineffective...’,³⁰ and unanimity proved impossible on vital issues including: determining instructions on resisting conscription, shaping international appeals for support against compulsion and in favour of Irish self-determination, as well as deciding how to best administer the defence fund. The primary source of disputes lay between the Irish Party and Sinn Féin delegates, which undoubtedly inhibited progress. There was even conflict over the appointment of a typist,³¹ and how the names of committee members should be listed on official Conference notepaper.³² Feeling threatened by de Valera, Dillon reportedly demanded to know, ‘ “Do you mean to drive me out of public life?”...’³³ O’Brien described Dillon’s reaction to Conference proceedings: ‘He regarded every practical line of action suggested with suspicion and alarm. Mr. de Valera’s own opinion that the young men would infinitely prefer open fight with arms in their hands to the small torments of passive resistance, he received with a long face...’³⁴ Certainly, Dillon was

²⁰ UCDA, *Éamon de Valera papers*, P150/604, Copy of the Pledge and Declaration.

²¹ De Wiel, *The Catholic Church in Ireland 1914-1918*, p. 221.

²² NLI, *Sean T. O’Ceallaigh papers*, MS 27728/2, Curran’s statement, p. 257.

²³ Pauric Travers ‘The Priest in Politics: the Case of Conscription’, in Oliver MacDonagh, W.F. Mandle and Pauric Travers, (eds), *Irish Culture and Nationalism, 1750-1950*, (Hampshire, 1983), p. 164.

²⁴ NLI, *O’Ceallaigh papers*, MS 27728/2, Curran’s statement, p. 257.

²⁵ De Wiel, *The Catholic Church in Ireland 1914-1918*, p. 220.

²⁶ Father Tomás Ó Fiaich, ‘The Irish Bishops and the Conscription issue 1918’, *The Capuchin Annual*, Vol. 35, (1968), p. 357.

²⁷ O’Brien, *Forth the Banners go*, p. 166.

²⁸ Ó Fiaich, ‘The Irish Bishops and the Conscription issue 1918’, pp. 356-7.

²⁹ NAI, Johnson, W.S. no. 1,755, p. 23.

³⁰ J. Anthony Gaughan, *Thomas Johnson, 1872-1963*, (Dublin, 1980), p. 110.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

³² Travers, ‘The Irish Conscription Crisis 1918’, p. 83.

³³ T.M. Healy, *Letters and Leaders of my Day*, <http://www.chapters.eiretek.org/books/THealy/index.htm>, letter from T.M. Healy to Maurice Healy, 21 May 1918.

³⁴ O’Brien, *The Irish Revolution*, p. 365.

anxious that the campaign would remain one of passive resistance, and wrote a memo on 18 May, considering the best way to stimulate local organisation, ‘...without hinting at Physical force.’³⁵

The Conference called for the establishment of Local Defence Committees. If or when conscription was enforced, resistance would rely on local activity. Therefore, these committees were responsible for planning and overseeing opposition in their district, while also keeping contact with the central Conference. They were to be representative of all nationalist parties in each parish, and selected from those who had signed the pledge.³⁶ The money locally collected for the defence fund was to be kept by the committee, except for ten percent, which was submitted for use by the Conference Standing Committee.³⁷ This body was established on 8 May, and met twice a week while the full Conferences met twice a month. The committee consisted of Dillon, de Valera, and O’Brien (Labour), and essentially oversaw the everyday running of the campaign along with Thomas Johnson, who was appointed secretary for both the Conference and standing committee.³⁸ While establishing the structure of the campaign, the Conference also declared their intention to prepare a statement of Ireland’s case against conscription for presentation to President Wilson of the United States.³⁹

During May, de Valera began a draft of this statement, but failed to complete it before being arrested under the pretext of the German Plot.⁴⁰ The Government claimed that Sinn Féin had been in communication with the Germans, and on 17 and 18 May arrested approximately 100 members, including de Valera and Griffith. However, Ireland’s case was completed by Healy in early June, and entitled ‘No Conscription! Ireland’s Case Re-stated.’⁴¹ Both statements appealed for help from America, as historical friends of Ireland, and as a country fighting for the freedom of small nations in

the current war. Outlining the anti-conscription Declaration, they called on all nations to acknowledge that Britain had no right to enforce conscription on a distinct nation. However, Healy’s version was criticised as weak by radical nationalists, and in 1962 de Valera described it as a “pussyfoot type of case”.⁴² Sinn Féiner, Rosamund Jacob, criticised it as ‘middling’, suffering from Griffith’s absence.⁴³ Labour delegate, Thomas Johnson also felt that it was not satisfactory as the Conferences’ only statement, even requesting that Sinn Féiner and Volunteer leader, Professor Eoin MacNeill, write another one.⁴⁴ In any case, the statement received no reply from Wilson, who chose to stay out of Britain’s domestic problem for the moment.

Proof of a German Plot was never issued, and many believed that it was fabricated to weaken Sinn Féin; the anti-conscription campaign; and the Conference’s international appeals. The arrests did not repress the anti-conscription committee, which replaced de Valera and Griffith with Alderman Kelly and Professor Eoin MacNeill. However, it added to numerous factors impeding the meetings’ progress, including the difficulty in reaching unanimous decisions. Conflict between Sinn Féin and the Irish Party escalated when both contested the East Cavan by-election in June.⁴⁵ After the arrests conscription was postponed by the announcement that the War Office would give voluntary recruitment one final chance, with the re-evaluation of enlistment figures in October. This reduced the immediacy of the threat, and although the Conference did not adjourn, it met less frequently, undermining resistance preparations. During June, the committee was criticised for not achieving a primary goal of issuing guidance to Local Defence Committees on how to resist conscription. The labour movement and radical nationalists were the primary critics of the Conferences’ progress. Censorship reports record radical nationalist newspaper *New Ireland’s* dissatisfaction with the meetings’ ineffectiveness.⁴⁶ Also reports note labour’s *Irish Opinion* July edition,⁴⁷ which asked

³⁵ TCD, *Dillon papers*, MS 6835/15, Memo by Dillon, 18 May 1918.

³⁶ MA, *Thomas Johnson collection*, CD258/7/8, Printed extracts from official reports of National Conference, 19/04/18; *Cork Weekly Examiner*, 27 April 1918.

³⁷ MA, *Johnson collection*, CD258/7/8, Official reports of National Conference, 24 April and 8 May 1918.

³⁸ NLI, *O’Brien papers*, MS 15,653 (2), Letter from the secretaries of the Mansion House Conference, 9 October 1918. Thomas Farren became treasurer and Cathal O’Shannon, Jas Bergin, Laurence Casey, and P. Sheahan were appointed honorary secretaries.

³⁹ MA, *Johnson collection*, CD258/7/8, Official reports of National Conference, 19 April 1918.

⁴⁰ UCDA, *de Valera papers*, P150/604, Éamon de Valera, (edited by Robert Brennan) *Ireland’s Case Against Conscription*, (Maunsel, Dublin, 1918).

⁴¹ MA, *Johnson collection*, CD258/7/14, *No Conscription! Ireland’s Case Re-stated – Address to the President of the United States of America from the Mansion House Conference*, (Dublin, 1918).

⁴² UCDA, *de Valera papers*, P150/604, Notes regarding Ireland’s Case Against Conscription, dictated by de Valera, 1962.

⁴³ NLI, *Rosamund Jacob papers*, Diary MS 32,582/33, 4 July 1918, pp. 257-8.

⁴⁴ UCDA, *Eoin MacNeill papers*, LA1/H/24 (13-14), Letter from Johnson to MacNeill, 21 June 1918.

⁴⁵ MA, *Johnson Collection*, CD258/7/18, *Freeman’s Journal*, 23 and 24 April 1918,

⁴⁶ NAI, *Office of Press Censor*, Monthly Report, July and August, 1918.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 8/62, Handwritten notes on the Sinn Féin weeklies, n.d.

...has the Mansion House Conference one word of encouragement to give to a suffering people groaning under an intolerable tyranny?...Has it given them any guidance or any advice that might serve them in good stead when the hour of conscription strikes?...⁴⁸

The many letters received from Defence Committees seeking further instructions may have prompted this assessment of the situation.

Local Defence Committees appealed for information on basic issues, including how they should be created; what their responsibilities were; who had authority over the committee; and how their local money should be spent. On 4 June, Parish Priest Patrick Daly of Westmeath, felt it necessary to inquire what was the committee's actual function.⁴⁹ Letters frequently requested more detailed advice on how to maintain food supplies if the military cut them off to starve the country into submission. Delegates representing Dublin city and county committees assessed their position, and warned the Conference that they could not afford to buy food for very long, let alone attain it if transport systems were paralyzed. They concluded that '...further instructions to parish committees are requisite.'⁵⁰ Many letters questioned how they should use their funds, and this issue provoked strong opinions, particularly from Irish Party members who feared that the money was being redirected from the anti-conscription campaign to assisting Sinn Féiners.

The Standing Committee received frequent requests for financial aid to defend men arrested for involvement in anti-conscription activities, and to help their dependants. For example, Rhode Committee in King's County wished to use their fund to defend four men arrested as they took part in an anti-conscription procession in June.⁵¹ However, Irish Party supporters questioned whether such men were actually arrested in connection with resistance activities. Writing to Dillon, Peter Varden of Galway dismissed this possibility contending that Dillon and Devlin were much more important in the crusade, '...and you are still unmolested.'⁵² A full time secretariat was set up to deal with correspondence, and they reported numerous queries from policemen, magistrates, and

civil servants, asking if they should resign in protest and to avoid being part of enforcing the act.⁵³ The Conference attempted to address some queries, dealing with how civil servants' should resist conscription in a 'Statement on the position of Irish Civil Servants with Regard to conscription.'⁵⁴ However, the difficulty of gaining unanimous agreement, censorship, the lack of printing facilities, and the need for secrecy made distributing information an arduous process. Also, future statements from the Conference indicate their wish to encourage local initiative, perhaps realising that they would be suppressed and unable to give further guidance when conscription was enforced. Yet these letters reveal Defence Committees' reluctance to undertake action without the Conferences' express direction.

An effort to provide more detailed guidance was predominantly made by the Conference's labour and Sinn Féin delegates. Indeed, all practical proposals appeared to almost solely emanate from Johnson and McNeill. Having received numerous personal inquiries from committees looking for guidance, McNeill wrote to the Mayor on 6 June, advocating an official response. Although the Conference wished to encourage independent action, McNeill concluded that committees would take no initiative without express instruction. He contended that leaving them without direction would mean '...that many committees will lapse into complete inactivity – or perhaps worse – into local wrangles for want of proper occupation...' Therefore, McNeill suggested that they prepare general recommendations, and included a possible draft. His statement stressed that committees were primarily responsible for adopting measures of resistance, suitable to their locality, and for allocating their locally collected fund. It strongly recommended that they communicate with their neighbours and that each send delegates to a larger district committee to facilitate intercommunication. McNeill particularly urged that their activity should not be relaxed at this time, simply because they had the impression from Lord French that the threat had been removed.⁵⁵ Other elements of the Conference also handed in draft statements including Healy, Dillon, Kelly, and Labour delegates.⁵⁶

⁴⁸ *Irish Opinion*, 27 July 1918.

⁴⁹ TCD, *Dillon papers*, MS 6835/40 Patrick Daly P.P. to John Dillon, 4 June 1918.

⁵⁰ MA, *Johnson collection*, CD258/7/26, Statement by sub-committee of delegates from Dublin city and county parish committees, n.d.

⁵¹ TCD, *Dillon papers*, MS 6835/51, Minutes of Mansion House Conference Standing Committee, 26 June 1918.

⁵² *Ibid.*, MS 6835/27, Letter from Peter Varden to Dillon, n.d.

⁵³ NLI, *O'Brien papers*, MS 15,653 (2) Report on correspondence with Local Defence Committees.

⁵⁴ MA, *Johnson collection*, CD258/7/33, 'Statement on the position of Irish Civil Servants with regard to Conscription', source unknown, n.d.

⁵⁵ MA, *Johnson collection*, CD258/7/24, Letter from Eoin McNeill to O'Neill, 6/06/18.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, CD258/7/35, Proposal that Conference issue statement, drafts by Healy, Dillon, Kelly, and Labour, June 1918.

Johnson later wrote 'It is hardly necessary to say that these various statements could not be reconciled...' and could not recall any statement being agreed on.⁵⁷

Dillon effectively ended McNeill's initiative by objecting to all other statements because they addressed issues other than conscription. Indeed, various delegates were increasingly combining Ireland's case against conscription with their right to self-determination, extending the meeting's initial mandate.⁵⁸ For example, Healy's draft suggested that the Conference become a provisional government, while executive power was given to American forces. Such re-direction of discussion was against the rules, and Dillon's draft insisted that they be upheld.⁵⁹ O'Brien M.P. expressed his disappointment to the Lord Mayor on 22 June, declaring that without compromise '...it is not easy to see any substantial reason for continuing the sittings of the Conference until...some fresh danger of conscription arises.'⁶⁰ Subsequently, the main body of the Conference was adjourned until August, and O'Brien M.P. contended that the disposal of the defence fund was '...the only remaining object for which the Conference can be useful.'⁶¹ Indeed, the fund, which ultimately totalled about £250,000,⁶² appeared to be Dillon's primary concern. O'Brien M.P. later asserted that Dillon was '...obsessed with the suspicion that they would be spent on armaments.'⁶³

Although they are mainly undated, there are various memoranda deposited in Johnson and O'Brien's (Labour) personal papers, indicating the Labour representatives' attempts to instigate examination of local resistance methods. Key topics included how to react to threats on food supplies; pressure to enlist due to unemployment; the derangements of communications; and the isolation of communities. They also consistently examine the legal position of men refusing to obey conscription.⁶⁴ While it is difficult to tell to what extent these memos were circulated, Labour delegates successfully prepared and issued 'Suggestions to Local Defence Committees' on behalf

of the conference including a separate statement concerning food supplies. As the principle of resistance was the refusal to recognise the act, the memo advised men to ignore calling up notices, refuse medical examinations, decline applying for exemption, and calls on arrested men to refuse to obey any military orders such as donning the uniform. The memo also discussed the rights of arrested men, advising committees to become familiar with them.⁶⁵ The attached statement entitled 'Notes on Food Supplies' addressed how to avoid being starved into compliance, recommending that machinery for distribution, economical use of present supplies, and widespread knowledge of substitutes for the ordinary foods in common use were required. Shopkeepers and wholesalers were to keep larger stocks of non-perishable foods, while householders maintained a full larder. Similarly to McNeill's statement, the memo urged Defence Committees to consider how best to provide for their own specific local requirements, encouraging initiative.⁶⁶ From a date pencilled on a copy sent to Dillon, it can be concluded that Johnson drafted these in June,⁶⁷ and they were subsequently circulated. However, by the time distribution occurred, Johnson claimed that they would not serve much use: 'If Conscription is coming it will come before anything can be done in the way suggested by this memorandum...'⁶⁸ Certainly resistance required preparation, and instructions needed time to be put into force before conscription was imposed.

Johnson attempted to issue further instructions in July, and the standing committee agreed to consider drafts,⁶⁹ which McNeill and labour leaders submitted on 19 August.⁷⁰ The labour representative's memorandum reflected previous suggestions and chiefly emphasised the importance of maintaining unity. The authors warned that the army would attempt to divide the people into classes when applying conscription, such as married versus unmarried men. Therefore, they urged the whole country to take action, even if conscription was only announced in one area. The authors also cautioned that districts would be isolated and advised areas to appoint a district executive committee to

⁵⁷ NAI, Johnson, W.S. no. 1,755, pp. 28-9.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-9.

⁶⁰ NLI, *O'Brien M.P. papers*, MS 8506 (3) Pos 8425, Letter from O'Brien to O'Neill, 22 June 1918.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Lil Conlon, *Cumann na mBan and the Women of Ireland 1913-25*, (Kilkenny, 1969), p. 59.

⁶³ O'Brien, *The Irish Revolution*, p. 365.

⁶⁴ MA, *Johnson collection*, CD258/7/31, Johnson's draft memo on 'Evading arrest as a conscript and procedure after arrest', n.d.; NLI, *O'Brien papers*, MS15,653, 'Memorandum by Labour representatives'; NLI, *O'Brien papers*, p4160, number 10, Draft of Memorandum by the Labour Representatives.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, CD258/7/1, Johnson's draft of 'Suggestions to Local Defence Committees,' n.d.

⁶⁶ NLI, *O'Brien papers*, MS 15,653 (2), 'Notes on food supplies,' n.d.

⁶⁷ TCD, *Dillon papers*, MS 6835/35, 'Notes on Food Supplies', date in pencil suggesting that it was at sent or received on the 1 June 1918.

⁶⁸ NLI, *O'Brien papers*, MS 15,653 (2) Letter from Thomas Johnson to William O'Brien, n.d.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* Letter from Johnson to O'Brien (labour), 23 July 1918.

⁷⁰ TCD, *Dillon papers*, MS 6835/80, Memo by Dillon regarding the suggested instructions by Labour representatives, 20 August 1918.

organise communication in their locality. The memo asserted that their primary goal was to make the government of Ireland impossible. Therefore, when the act was extended it suggested that bank deposits were withdrawn to bring financial pressure to bear upon the government; railway workers would cease work indefinitely; and there was to be a general stoppage of work including post offices, civil service clerks, police, and all City and Town workers. The memo also considered the issue of food supplies, and examined Dublin's position if the military chose to cut off food supplies. This was to provide sample instructions to other large towns. As in previous suggestions, the labour leaders outlined proceedings for men after arrest.⁷¹

McNeill declared his memo, 'a supplement the Memorandum by Labour Representatives.' Indeed there are distinct elements of similarity between all suggestions made by McNeill and labour leaders, indicating their common outlook. McNeill likewise asserted that indirect resistance required making the machinery to enforce the act unworkable. In this regard, he declared that nothing should be done to facilitate conscription, and that all persons engaged in related work should be boycotted. Liable men were to avoid arrest, helped by those bound by the pledge to assist them in finding food and shelter. McNeill suggested that men stay in small groups, 'since some men left alone loose heart, and larger groups attract attention...' He also considered food supplies, advising each household to gather non-perishable food and safeguard their stores against seizure. Addressing resistance after arrest, McNeill summed up the appropriate resistance method with the word "non-compliance," and pointed to the actions of English Conscientious Objectors' as examples to follow. Similarly to his previous memo, McNeill advised Local Committees to maintain their activity and meet frequently, and reiterated that they were not limited to these recommendations, but should adopt the most appropriate measures for their district.⁷²

Due to the suspension of full meetings, consideration of these memos was delayed until October when the statements were sent to Conference members for deliberation. Dillon criticized the proposals to such an extent that O'Brien M.P. despaired of any hope '...for the unanimous adoption of any instructions worth issuing.' O'Brien M.P. believed

that both memoranda contained valuable instructions and recommended that they be combined.⁷³ In an effort to win agreement, Johnson did merge them in a measure that was amended and approved by the Conference on 8 and 11 October.⁷⁴ According to Gaughan, thousands of copies were printed, and the 'Memorandum to Local Defence Committees' was distributed throughout the country.⁷⁵ Yet as the month progressed, it became clear the war would soon end and that these instructions were almost obsolete. The primary focus of the Conference turned towards the approaching Peace Conference of nations after the war, which would allow Ireland a forum to claim the right to self-determination.

The prospect of peace gave rise to hope that the Conference would become a national organ of the Irish people, and undertake to present their case internationally. Therefore, it was again suggested that the Conference extend their initial mandate as an anti-conscription committee. On 18 October, McNeill submitted a draft statement calling on the United States and other belligerent and neutral countries to assist Ireland in securing a hearing at the up-coming Peace Conference. The statement assured readers that Irish people only wished to live in peace with all nations, developing their own national life, and benefitting from their own resources.⁷⁶ Johnson endorsed the statement, and Michael Egan subsequently communicated his support.⁷⁷ O'Brien declared the draft to be '...a prudent and dignified one' but recalled that the Conference was forbidden to discuss subjects apart from conscription. He proposed that this rule was withdrawn and supported the declaration.⁷⁸ Healy submitted his substantial agreement that the Conference should be enabled to address wider topics.⁷⁹ Yet despite this majority approval, Dillon predictably dissented. He may well have perceived an agenda in McNeill's memo to promote an essentially Sinn Féin programme for independence, which would further undermine his party's declining position in Irish politics. Dillon was unable or unwilling to attend meetings to discuss the statement, and made it clear to

⁷¹ NLI, *Johnson papers*, Ms 17115 (ii), 'Memorandum by labour representatives,' n.d.

⁷² TCD, *Dillon papers*, MS 6835/143, Eoin McNeill, 'Suggested instructions to Local Defence Committees,' annotated by John Dillon, n.d.

⁷³ NLI, *O'Brien M.P. papers*, MS 8506 (3) Pos 8425, letter from O'Brien M.P. to O'Neill, 5 October 1918.

⁷⁴ MA, *Johnson collection*, CD258/7/10, Mansion House Conference pamphlet, 'Memorandum to Local Defence Committees', n.d.

⁷⁵ Gaughan, *Thomas Johnson*, p. 109.

⁷⁶ MA, *Johnson collection*, CD258/7/40, Draft statement by McNeill and covering letter, 18 October, 1918.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, CD258/7/41 and 46, Letter from Johnson to O'Neill, 23 October 1918, and letter from Michael Egan to Johnson, 26 October 1918.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, CD258/7/46, Letter from O'Brien M.P. to Johnson, 24 October 1918.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Letter from Healy to Johnson, 26 October 1918.

Johnson that 'It would be quite impossible for me to accept the draft, or anything like it...' He again insisted that the Conference had been called for one purpose, and reminded Johnson that all decisions required unanimous agreement.⁸⁰

However, in the face of Dillon's objections,⁸¹ labour delegates at the Irish Trade Union Congress and Labour Party annual meeting on 1 November called on O'Neill to gather a special national Conference, or to augment the present anti-conscription Conference, 'for the purpose of giving national expression to the Irish demands for self-determination in the same manner as the Mansion House Conference defined Ireland's national will on that issue.'⁸² While agreeing to submit the suggestion to the anti-conscription committee, O'Neill was concerned that Dillon would again refuse to attend. With Johnson's assistance, the Lord Mayor urged Dillon to comply with these requests, which not only came from within the Conference, but also from the Trade Union Congress, the press, and numerous private representations. O'Neill asserted that the Conference could agree on a simple demand for self-determination, while leaving each party to advocate their preferred form of government. However, repeated requests for Dillon and Devlin to be present at the meeting on 9 November fell on deaf ears.⁸³ The Conference gathered to again consider McNeill's memorandum, and a draft statement prepared by the labour representatives on the issue.⁸⁴ However, in view of the Irish Party leaders' absence the Conference felt bound due to the rule prescribing unanimity, '...to adjourn this business.'⁸⁵ Dillon remained adamant that Ireland's national status should not be dealt with by the anti-conscription committee.⁸⁶ Any hope that the Conference could be converted into a national body to lead Ireland's pursuit of self-determination disappeared as the General Election increased divisions. The Conference did not reconvene until April 1919, when they considered how to dispose of the excess fund.⁸⁷

Other Conference members were bitter at Dillon's consistent obstruction of proceedings, and O'Brien was particularly scathing declaring that 'only one member of the Conference blocked the way with the technical objection that the cabinet was called to discuss Conscription alone...'⁸⁸ The Conference was impeded by various difficulties, and although it succeeded in seeing Ireland through the threat of conscription, it did not become a 'National Cabinet' as many increasingly hoped. Furthermore the effectiveness of the Conference's leadership was never actually tested, as conscription was not enforced.

However, the crisis certainly led to an exceptional and representative gathering, which significantly impacted Irish politics by consolidating Sinn Féin's growing popularity. The threat of conscription undoubtedly solidified the connection between the Labour movement and Sinn Féin, similarly mobilising support for radical nationalism amongst the All-For-Ireland League. O'Brien M.P. credited them as the only party who could have effectively resisted conscription,⁸⁹ and by the General Election, Sinn Féin were predominantly regarded as the best party to assert a united nationalist claim for independence. Although the labour movement also deserved recognition for their key role in the anti-conscription campaign,⁹⁰ and there had been an unprecedented growth in the trade union movement during the war years,⁹¹ the Irish Labour Party abstained from the election. Johnson explained this decision, asserting the need to maintain the cohesive nationalist front created by the conscription issue to effectively claim Ireland's right to self-determination.⁹² Fitzpatrick points out that Labour would not have been able to evoke this political unity.⁹³ The All-For-Ireland League also abstained as O'Brien believed that those who had saved '...the country from Partition, from Conscription and from political corruption ought now to have a full and sympathetic trial for their own plans for enforcing the Irish nation's right of Self-determination.'⁹⁴ This left the contest between Sinn Féin and the Irish Party. The radicals won an overwhelming victory and set about establishing Ireland's second National Cabinet.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Letter from Dillon to Johnson, 31 October 1918.

⁸¹ NAI, Johnson, W.S. no. 1,755, p. 29.

⁸² NLI, *Thomas Johnson papers*, Ms 17115 (ii), Resolution moved by Thomas Foran at Trade Union Conference, 1/11/1918.

⁸³ TCD, *John Dillon papers*, MS 6835/90, 92-93, Letter from O'Neill to Dillon, 4, 6-7 November 1918.

⁸⁴ NAI, Johnson, W.S. no. 1,755, pp. 30-32.

⁸⁵ NLI, *O'Ceallaigh papers*, MS 27712/1, Curran memoirs, p. 424.

⁸⁶ TCD, *Dillon papers*, MS 6835/97, Letter from Dillon to O'Neill, 12 November 1918.

⁸⁷ Gaughan, *Thomas Johnson*, p. 115.

⁸⁸ UCCA, *O'Brien M.P. papers*, UC/WOB/PP/BU/141, O'Brien, 'The Downfall of Parliamentarianism', (Dublin, 1918), p. 53.

⁸⁹ O'Brien, 'The Downfall of Parliamentarianism', p. 52.

⁹⁰ Most notably in the General Strike, which was held for 24 hours on the 23 April 1918, and was adhered to by the majority of Irish workers, with the exception of Belfast.

⁹¹ Kostick, *Revolution in Ireland*, p. 32.

⁹² Arthur Mitchell, *Labour in Irish politics, 1890-1930*, (Dublin, 1974), p. 99.

⁹³ Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish life 1913-1921*, p. 211.

⁹⁴ O'Brien, *The Irish Revolution*, p. 385.



This abandoned turf cutter is a typical model from the first half of the twentieth century. In Ireland over the years many of these machines have frequently uncovered ancient bodies lying beneath the surface of bogs. These bog bodies have been preserved by sphagnum moss, which releases compounds that petrify human tissue. In 2003 one such body was found at Clonycavan, Co. Meath. 'Clonycavan man' has been calculated to have been approximately 1.57 metres (5 ft 2 in) in height, and is remarkable for the "gel" in his hair. He is on display in the National Museum of Ireland, Dublin, where he was featured in the exhibition "Kingship and Sacrifice", 2006-2007.

For further reading:

Feehan, John; O'Donovan, Grace. *The Bogs of Ireland: An Introduction to the natural, cultural and industrial heritage of Irish Peatlands*. (Dublin, 1996).

King, William. 'On the bogs and loughs of Ireland'. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*, 15 (1685), pp. 948-60.

McDermott, Conor, 'Of Bogs, Boats and Bows : Irish Archaeological Wetland Unit Survey 2001', *Archaeology Ireland*, 16:1 (2002), pp. 28-31.

Alice Johnson

In September 1852 Belfast hosted the twenty-second annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. The local newspaper, *Northern Whig* noted that it was 'fitting' that the Association would visit 'a community so distinguished as [Belfast] for proficiency in industrial pursuits.'¹ This article examines how Belfast used the occasion to show its civic pride and address sanitary problems within the city.

The British Association for the Advancement of Science was established in 1831 to 'give a stronger impulse and more systematic direction to the objects of science', and 'to promote the intercourse of the cultivators of science with one another, and with foreign philosophers'.² As an institution, it typified the nineteenth-century tendency to association in which like-minded people came together for the task of learning and improvement. During the 1820s and 1830s, members of the middle class had established philosophical societies in the manufacturing towns and regional centres of the United Kingdom. It was mainly delegates from these societies who attended the Association's inaugural meeting at York in 1831.³ Over the next few years the Association became a forum in which 'cultivators' or 'men of science' promoted the recognition of science in natural life. By the late 1830s, its meetings were drawing audiences exceeding 1,000 and in 1843 the word 'scientist' was coined to describe those 'cultivators' who attended.⁴

The Association met annually over five consecutive days on a peripatetic basis in provincial towns across the United Kingdom. Meetings were held in seven sections⁵ over

¹ *Northern Whig*, 31 August, 1852

² Rev William Vernon Harcourt, cited in A.D. Orange, 'The Beginnings of the British Association 1831-51' in Roy Macleod and Peter Collins (eds.) *The Parliament of Science: The British Association for the Advancement of Science 1831-1981* (London, 1981), pp.43-4

³ Philip Lowe, 'The British Association and the Provincial Public' in Macleod and Collins (eds.) *The Parliament of Science*, p.118

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.17. It is received wisdom that the word 'scientist' was coined by the scientist William Whewell at an Association meeting.

⁵ By 1847, there were seven sections: mathematics and physics, chemistry, geology and physical geography, natural history, ethnology, statistics and mechanical science.

four days, with the fifth set aside for excursions.⁶ Local scientists were given a chance to present papers to more established peers, gaining wide press coverage for their research.⁷ Initially the Association only visited a small circuit of host-towns, but this was later expanded to include any potential British city.⁸ Such a visit was considered a matter of civic pride and municipal authorities competed fiercely to attract it. Once a town succeeded in its application much effort went into civic display. Measures taken for the Nottingham meeting of 1866 included the cleaning and repair of the main streets, municipal buildings and general cemetery and extensive improvements to the Arboretum and the Mechanics' Hall. Municipal authorities were also aware of the fillip to local businesses that Association visits brought.⁹ On one such visit to Hull the president of its Literary and Philosophical Society noted that

...twelve or fifteen hundred strangers, composed principally of the upper ranks of society, cannot spend a week or ten days in a strange town, without a considerable expenditure, of which the inhabitants must derive the benefit.¹⁰

In January 1849, a meeting was held in the Belfast Museum to propose inviting the Association to the city. Dr John Steely, Professor of Natural History at Queen's College, suggested that Belfast should be considered because it was 'the chief seat of Irish manufacture' and had 'several valuable institutions for education and for the advancement...of science'.¹¹ The motion was carried but the application ultimately proved unsuccessful.¹² However, two years later a delegation from Belfast travelled to Ipswich, where the Association visit was being held that year and 'express[ed]... an anxious desire that the next meeting should be held in Belfast'.¹³ This time the invitation

was accepted and the city was selected over both Leeds and Brighton. Belfast's burgeoning prosperity had already led to considerable municipal improvements within the city and its citizens were keen to show civic pride in their new buildings. The *Northern Whig* published an extended article declaring that Belfast should congratulate itself on the 'honour bestowed on it, which probably will not occur again for a generation, or perhaps for a century'. It continued

Nothing short of the co-operation of all the wealth, enterprise, and intelligence that our community can boast will make the welcome which Belfast is about to give the *elite* of the scientific men of Europe and America what it ought to be. In fact, there is no individual so humble that he may not, in one way or another, contribute to the comfort of our guests, and so leave in their minds a lasting and pleasurable remembrance of their sojourns among us.¹⁴

The article ended with the capitalised directive: BELFAST EXPECTS EVERY MAN TO DO HIS DUTY.

A determined effort was made to complete the Palm House in the Botanic Gardens in time for the event. The ladies of the town held a bazaar in February 1852, raising over £250 for the completion of the dome-shaped conservatory roof. In August 1852 the *Times*, described Belfast as a 'regenerating centre...[with] more [going on] here than in any other part of Ireland.' The report detailed the demographic and physical growth of the town, based, it believed, on the cotton trade: 'Within the last six years the Town Council have spent from 50,000*l* to 60,000*l* in opening new streets and widening old ones; quays have been formed, and all the necessary buildings for municipal purposes built.'¹⁵ Colonel Edward Sabine, president of the British Association agreed. At his opening address he commented on 'the evidence, which forcibly impresses itself on every side of rapidly increasing prosperity.'¹⁶ He also described Belfast as 'a part of the kingdom which has furnished to the British Association so large a proportion of distinguished members actively engaged in almost every department of science'. He added: 'On our arrival, we find ourselves surrounded by faces familiar to us in the

⁶ In 1852 these included the Armagh Observatory, the Giant's Causeway, the Round Tower in Antrim and Carrickfergus Castle.

⁷ Cardwell has termed these enthusiasts 'devotees', people who did not make a living directly from science but whose standards of expertise could be seen as equivalent to those of professionals.

⁸ Twenty-two years elapsed between the first application from Leeds and the Association's first visit to the city, while neighbouring Sheffield had to wait forty years for its turn.

⁹ Occasionally new societies were established while existing ones gained new members.

¹⁰ The address had been delivered to the Hull Literary and Philosophical Society on 16 November 1852. It was published (in Hull) early the following year. Philip Lowe, 'The British Association and the Provincial Public' in Macleod and Collins (eds.), *The Parliament of Science*, p.124

¹¹ *Belfast News Letter*, 19 January, 1849; By this time the Association had already visited Ireland twice. It came first to Dublin in 1835 and then to Cork in 1843.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *The Times*, 13 August, 1852

¹⁴ *Northern Whig*, 19 August, 1852

¹⁵ *The Times*, 13 August, 1852

¹⁶ *Report of the Twenty Second Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science; Held at Belfast in September 1852.* (London, 1853), p.xli

recollections of many previous meetings, and long recognised as amongst the warmest and steadiest friends of our Association.¹⁷

Subsequently Queen's College professors featured prominently as contributors to the conference. Natural History professor George Dickie gave a paper on 'Plants in the North of Ireland', while six other professors read papers to their respective sections.¹⁸ Local naturalists Robert Patterson and James R. Garrett contributed a paper on 'The Fresh-water Fishes of Ulster', while local physician A.G. Malcolm delivered a paper entitled 'On some Results drawn from the Sanitary Condition of Belfast'. In it Malcolm argued that poor sanitary conditions - including a severe lack of sewerage facilities - were directly linked to the city's cholera epidemic of 1847. Malcolm also predicted a further epidemic potentially costing hundreds of more lives. His paper immediately provoked a heated debate in which a town councillor and the local M.P. were forced to explain why the Health of Towns Bill did not extend to Ireland.¹⁹ Although there were other papers that highlighted Belfast's successes, it was Malcolm's lecture that proved the most sensational with the press.

The general public also took a lively interest in the proceedings. Provisional schedules and venue listings were printed a month before the event. Conversaciones, ceremonial dinners, soirees and excursions were all part of the official programme.²⁰ Two soirées took place in the Workmans' warehouse in Bedford Street,²¹ the premises decorated 'to a high standard with red and white cloth on the walls'.²² A flower show was held in the Botanic Gardens for the opening of its new 'Lily House',²³ while an antiquities exhibition at the Belfast Museum displayed all aspects of Ulster history. Among its exhibits were 'the undoubted memorial of an old Irish Chieftain or

Ecclesiastic, a Norman Knight or a Cromwellian Soldier... realis[ing] in some degree, the very different states of society which have prevailed in Ireland, and of which our historians convey a very feeble idea.'²⁴ A public banquet honouring the visit of the Lord Lieutenant was held in the music hall on 8 September,²⁵ and was 'attended by all the nobility in the country besides a great many others also a great many of the principal families about town'.²⁶

At the end of the Association visit the Belfast press proudly reported the concluding general meeting, held in May Street Church, at which the Assistant-General Secretary revealed the attendance figures for the current and previous years. The Belfast figures of 1852 were higher than Ipswich in 1851, with a significant increase of ladies (292 in Belfast compared to 141 the year before). Belfast ticket sales were 1,108 to Ipswich's 771 and the news that Belfast had raised £400 more than the previous year was greeted with loud cheers.²⁷ It was also proudly reported that during the President's Dinner, Prince De Canino, a high-profile member of the Association, said that in no town in England had he 'seen them taking so much interest in the British Association as the people of Belfast had done'.²⁸ He proceeded to describe a train journey to Belfast in which

there were several persons in the railway carriage who had the newspapers in their hands, taking a lively interest in the scientific discussions of the Association; and he could assure them he heard a great many remarks that could be offered at any of their Sections. Among them was a lady, who was telling him of a kind of Section which she had in her own house - (laughter) - and he had no doubt there were others who had the same.²⁹

The *Northern Whig* also commented on the social benefits of the Association visit, revealing how Belfast viewed itself as a self-made, youthful town, firmly on a par with other British industrial centres. Although Belfast lacked the 'polish' of 'older and less enterprising communities' it was widely believed that the Association visit had provided an unrivalled opportunity for refinement

¹⁷ *Report of the Twenty Second Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science; Held at Belfast in September 1852.* (London, 1853), p.xli

¹⁸ *Report of the twenty-second meeting of the British Association...held at Belfast in September 1852,* p.xxiii; reports, pp.273-89; communications to the sections, pp.33-5, 36, 41, 55, 65-8, 72-3, 90-95, 116-7, 127-8; *Belfast News-Letter*, 3, 6 September 1852

¹⁹ *Northern Whig*, 9 September, 1852

²⁰ Significantly, Belfast was true to its industrial character with around forty factories and mills opened to public view.

²¹ On Thursday September 2nd, from 8 to 10pm and Saturday September 4th at 8pm, soirees took place in the Workman rooms. *Report of the Twenty Second Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science; Held at Belfast in September 1852.* (London, 1853), p.xl

²² *Banner of Ulster*, 3 September, 1852

²³ *Belfast News Letter*, 6 December, 1852; The Lily House was designed by the garden's curator, Daniel Ferguson

²⁴ 'Belfast Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science: Proposed Exhibition of objects of Antiquity'. Newspaper cutting, Hyndman papers, Ulster Museum.

²⁵ *The Times*, 16 August, 1852.

²⁶ From the diary of John McCance, of Suffolk near Belfast. P.R.O.N.I., McCance papers, T1677/1/1; Lord Eglinton was then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

²⁷ *Northern Whig*, 9 September, 1852

²⁸ The British Association - the President's Dinner. Newspaper cutting, Hyndman papers, Ulster Museum

²⁹ *Ibid.*

... where no old aristocratic class holds its place as a sort of model to aspiring wealth, there is less polish and more rude strength – more of the vigour of prosperity but little of its refinement. To such towns as this – the Glasgows, the Belfasts, the Manchesters of Great Britain, these gatherings of the distinguished in learning and in rank are valuable in a social point of view. They stimulate friendly intercourse. By the frequent contact of strangers, put to their mettle to expend all their resources of mutual courtesy and good breeding, they help to smooth down all the roughness and angularity that is bred by exclusivism.³⁰

Later the *Belfast News Letter* reported that A.G. Malcolm's controversial paper had 'excited a good deal of discussion in private circles'. The *News Letter* was 'not sorry that it ha[d] had this effect' because something needed to be done 'especially at a season when we are once more threatened with the chastisement of a fearful epidemic'. However, the paper also pointed out that, while there was much to be done, in other areas Belfast's sanitary record was not so bad.³¹ The *Northern Whig* disagreed and branded Belfast's sanitary conditions a 'disgrace' and the worst of their kind in all of Ireland. It mentioned that during the visit of the British Association they 'excited the wonder and disgust of every stranger'. The report concluded

Once for all, then, some speedy effort must be made to improve the very backward sanitary state of the town. Everywhere else people are active. There is scarcely a town in England where the population have not taken counsel with one another at this crisis. It would be a sad thing if we were behind the rest of the nation.³²

It would not do for Belfast to lag 'behind the rest of the nation' and the active civic pride so manifest during the Association visit, would later solve the sanitary problems highlighted by Malcolm's paper.

³⁰ *Northern Whig*, 14 September, 1852.

³¹ *Belfast News Letter*, 13 September, 1852.

³² *Northern Whig*, 14 September, 1852.

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History Studies

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